Borgers Tilman (25 results)

Soft cover. Condition: Very Good. Science Direct/Elsevier. Expanded mid-size. Book is clean, with a strong spine, strong binding, no tears, and no writing, with only a small amount of handling wear. Book has approximately 500 pages, containing 16 exceptionally detailed and comprehensive abstracts from distinguished academicians and scholars. Profusely illustrated with mathematical delineations. The average length of each monograph is approximately 30 pages. Three of the titles are as follows: 'Social Norms in Networks,' 'Stability for Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics,' 'Evolution of Preferences in Structured Populations: Genes, Guns, and Culture.' Includes references after each abstract. Securely packed in a lidded box.…

Hardcover. Condition: Good. 1st Edition. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In this book, Tilman Brgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument.An 8vo hardback in glossy black boards with gilt lettering to spine. The light green dust jacket has subtle finger prints and three short strokes from black ball-pens on surface. Tiny marks of light blue ink (probably from printing) to fore-edge, otherwise very good. Copyright 漏 OUP.…

Hardcover. Condition: Good. 1st Edition. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In this book, Tilman Brgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An 8vo hardback in glossy black boards with gilt lettering to spine. The greenish dust jacket is sealed in a transparent wrapper with three short strokes of black ink to surface and a few blue stain to its verso. Small corner of the plastic wrapper inside the top rear fold is crease and semi-detached. Also, tiny marks of blue ink (probably from printing) to fore-edge. Otherwise in very good condition. Copyright 漏 OUP.…

Condition: New.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condition: New. pp. 140.

Hardback. Condition: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.…

Condition: New.

Hardback. Condition: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardback. Condition: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.…

Buch. Condition: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Arising out of the author's lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Ariel Rubinstein touches the structure imposed on binary relations in daily language, the evolutionary development of the meaning of words, game-theoretical considerations of pragmatics, the language of economic agents and the rhetoric of game theory. These short essays are full of challenging ideas for social scientists that should help to encourage a fundamental rethinking of many of the underlying assumptions in economic theory and game theory. As a postscript two economists, Tilman Borgers (University College London) and Bart Lipman (University of Wisconsin, Madison), and a logician, Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation and Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information) offer comments.…

Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 1st edition. 264 pages. 9.50x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Hardback. Condition: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.…

Buch. Condition: Neu. Neuware - What is the best way of auctioning an asset How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods How should exchanges be organized In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.…

Hardback. Condition: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.…

Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 1st edition. 264 pages. 9.50x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Boergers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makespredictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game.A relatively new economic theory, mechanismdesign studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence ofdominant strategy voting mechanisms. Boergers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design is a rigorous but accessible exploration mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Condition: New. Print on Demand pp. 140 44:B&W 5.5 x 8.5 in or 216 x 140 mm (Demy 8vo) Case Laminate on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Condition: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 140.

Gebunden. Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Written by one of the world s leading thinkers on game theory, this short book offers a challenging and accessible analysis of the relationship between economics and language. Essential reading for all social scientists.&Uumlber den Autor. …

Condition: New. Print on Demand pp. 272.

Condition: New. Print on Demand pp. 272.

Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Boergers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makespredictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game.A relatively new economic theory, mechanismdesign studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence ofdominant strategy voting mechanisms. Boergers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design is a rigorous but accessible exploration mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Condition: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 272.