Soviet Biological Weapons Program by Leitenberg Milton (20 results)

Condition: acceptable. This book is in acceptable condition and may have highlighting and or writing throughout. The actual cover image may not match the stock photo, dust jacket may be damaged or missing. Book may show internal and or external wear on spine or cover and may be slightly skewed or have creased pages. This is a used book so codes may be invalid or accompanying media may be missing. May be an Ex library book with stickers and stamps.

hardcover. Condition: Very Good. Hardback--small smudge on outer page edge--otherwise excellent condition.

Condition: good. Befriedigend/Good: Durchschnittlich erhaltenes Buch bzw. Schutzumschlag mit Gebrauchsspuren, aber vollständigen Seiten. / Describes the average WORN book or dust jacket that has all the pages present.

Hardcover. Condition: Very Good. Illustrated. Grade 3 out 5 points. Book has wear on cover and pages. May have personalized notes/names, stickers/labels. Has no markings on pages. May not include extra materials like access codes, CDs, accessories, etc. All orders ship by next business day! We are a small company and very thankful for your business!

Hardback. Condition: New. Russian officials claim today that the USSR never possessed an offensive biological weapons program. In fact, the Soviet government spent billions of rubles and hard currency to fund a hugely expensive weapons program that added nothing to the country's security. This history is the first attempt to understand the broad scope of the USSR's offensive biological weapons research-its inception in the 1920s, its growth between 1970 and 1990, and its possible remnants in present-day Russia. We learn that the U.S. and U.K. governments never obtained clear evidence of the program's closure from 1990 to the present day, raising the critical question whether the means for waging biological warfare could be resurrected in Russia in the future.Based on interviews with important Soviet scientists and managers, papers from the Soviet Central Committee, and U.S. and U.K. declassified documents, this book peels back layers of lies, to reveal how and why Soviet leaders decided to develop biological weapons, the scientific resources they dedicated to this task, and the multitude of research institutes that applied themselves to its fulfillment. We learn that Biopreparat, an ostensibly civilian organization, was established to manage a top secret program, code-named Ferment, whose objective was to apply genetic engineering to develop strains of pathogenic agents that had never existed in nature. Leitenberg and Zilinskas consider the performance of the U.S. intelligence community in discovering and assessing these activities, and they examine in detail the crucial years 1985 to 1992, when Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts to put an end to the program were thwarted as they were under Yeltsin.

Condition: New.

HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condition: new.

Condition: New. This is the first attempt to understand the broad scope of the USSR's offensive biological weapons research from its inception in the 1920s. Gorbachev tried to end the program, but the US and UK never obtained clear evidence he succeeded, raising the question whether the means for waging biological warfare could be revived in Russia in the future. Num Pages: 960 pages, 28 halftones, 6 line illustrations, 20 tables. BIC Classification: 1DVUA; 3JJ; HBW; JPS; JWMC. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 237 x 163 x 53. Weight in Grams: 1422. . 2012. Hardcover. . . . .

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condition: New. This is the first attempt to understand the broad scope of the USSR's offensive biological weapons research from its inception in the 1920s. Gorbachev tried to end the program, but the US and UK never obtained clear evidence he succeeded, raising the question whether the means for waging biological warfare could be revived in Russia in the future. Num Pages: 960 pages, 28 halftones, 6 line illustrations, 20 tables. BIC Classification: 1DVUA; 3JJ; HBW; JPS; JWMC. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 237 x 163 x 53. Weight in Grams: 1422. . 2012. Hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condition: New.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condition: New. This is the first attempt to understand the broad scope of the USSR s offensive biological weapons research from its inception in the 1920s. Gorbachev tried to end the program, but the US and UK never obtained clear evidence he succeeded, raising the questi.

Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 800 pages. 9.50x6.75x2.25 inches. In Stock.

Hardback. Condition: New. Russian officials claim today that the USSR never possessed an offensive biological weapons program. In fact, the Soviet government spent billions of rubles and hard currency to fund a hugely expensive weapons program that added nothing to the country's security. This history is the first attempt to understand the broad scope of the USSR's offensive biological weapons research-its inception in the 1920s, its growth between 1970 and 1990, and its possible remnants in present-day Russia. We learn that the U.S. and U.K. governments never obtained clear evidence of the program's closure from 1990 to the present day, raising the critical question whether the means for waging biological warfare could be resurrected in Russia in the future.Based on interviews with important Soviet scientists and managers, papers from the Soviet Central Committee, and U.S. and U.K. declassified documents, this book peels back layers of lies, to reveal how and why Soviet leaders decided to develop biological weapons, the scientific resources they dedicated to this task, and the multitude of research institutes that applied themselves to its fulfillment. We learn that Biopreparat, an ostensibly civilian organization, was established to manage a top secret program, code-named Ferment, whose objective was to apply genetic engineering to develop strains of pathogenic agents that had never existed in nature. Leitenberg and Zilinskas consider the performance of the U.S. intelligence community in discovering and assessing these activities, and they examine in detail the crucial years 1985 to 1992, when Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts to put an end to the program were thwarted as they were under Yeltsin.

Buch. Condition: Neu. Neuware - This is the first attempt to understand the broad scope of the USSRżs offensive biological weapons research from its inception in the 1920s. Gorbachev tried to end the program, but the US and UK never obtained clear evidence he succeeded, raising the question whether the means for waging biological warfare could be revived in Russia in the future.

Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 800 pages. 9.50x6.75x2.25 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Russian officials claim today that the USSR never possessed an offensive biological weapons program. In fact, the Soviet government spent billions of rubles and hard currency to fund a hugely expensive weapons program that added nothing to the country's security. This history is the first attempt to understand the broad scope of the USSR's offensive biological weapons research-its inception in the 1920s, its growth between 1970 and 1990, and its possible remnants in present-day Russia. We learn that the U.S. and U.K. governments never obtained clear evidence of the program's closure from 1990 to the present day, raising the critical question whether the means for waging biological warfare could be resurrected in Russia in the future.Based on interviews with important Soviet scientists and managers, papers from the Soviet Central Committee, and U.S. and U.K. declassified documents, this book peels back layers of lies, to reveal how and why Soviet leaders decided to develop biological weapons, the scientific resources they dedicated to this task, and the multitude of research institutes that applied themselves to its fulfillment. We learn that Biopreparat, an ostensibly civilian organization, was established to manage a top secret program, code-named Ferment, whose objective was to apply genetic engineering to develop strains of pathogenic agents that had never existed in nature. Leitenberg and Zilinskas consider the performance of the U.S. intelligence community in discovering and assessing these activities, and they examine in detail the crucial years 1985 to 1992, when Mikhail Gorbachev's attempts to put an end to the program were thwarted as they were under Yeltsin. This is the first attempt to understand the broad scope of the USSRs offensive biological weapons research from its inception in the 1920s. Gorbachev tried to end the program, but the US and UK never obtained clear evidence he succeeded, raising the question whether the means for waging biological warfare could be revived in Russia in the future. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.