Vierkant Tillmann (46 results)

Original publisher's black paperback, title spine and frontcover, 12mo: 214pp., [8]pp. Very fine copy.

gebundene Ausgabe. Condition: Gut. 356 Seiten; Der Erhaltungszustand des hier angebotenen Werks ist trotz seiner Bibliotheksnutzung sehr sauber. Es befindet sich neben dem Rückenschild lediglich ein Bibliotheksstempel im Buch; ordnungsgemäß entwidmet. Das Buch ist in eine Plastikfolie eingeklebt. In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 630.…

Softcover. Condition: gut. 1. Auflage. Einzelne Markierungen mit Kugelschreiber. In deutscher Sprache. 214 S. pages. 17,5 x 10,5 cm.

Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. Neuware - Gibt es Willenshandlungen, ja, gibt es überhaupt den Willen Das ist gegenwärtig eine der meistdiskutierten Fragen. Dieses Buch bietet einen idealen Einstieg in die Beschäftigung mit einem der großen Rätsel der Menschheit. Es gibt nicht nur eine kompetente Einführung in die philosophischen Auseinandersetzungen mit der Frage der Willensfreiheit, sondern gewährt auch einen Einblick in die kognitionswissenschaftliche Forschung zu Willenshandlungen sowie eine soziologische Analyse des Willensbegriffs in seiner geschichtlichen und zeitgeschichtlichen Dimension. Erstmalig wird hier der Versuch unternommen, die Frage der Willenshandlung interdisziplinär anzugehen und Antworten höchst unterschiedlicher Fachbereiche zu sammeln. Experten aus Philosophie, Kognitionswissenschaft und Soziologie haben gemeinsam versucht, auf die Frage der Willenshandlung eine Antwort zu geben, die dem state of the art der Forschung entspricht.…

Condition: Very Good.

Hardcover. Condition: Near Fine. 1st Edition.

Condition: New.

HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardcover. Condition: New.

Condition: new.

Condition: New.

Condition: New. In English.

Hardback. Condition: New. Epistemic agency is a crucial concept in many different areas of philosophy and the cognitive sciences. It is crucial in dual process theories of cognition as well as theories of metacognition and mindreading, self-control, and moral agency. But what is epistemic agency? The Tinkering Mind argues that epistemic agency has two distinct and incompatible definitions. It can be simply understood as intentional mental action, or as a distinct non-voluntary form of evaluative agency. The core argument of the book demonstrates that both definitions lead to surprising and counterintuitive consequences. If epistemic agency is a form of intentional action, then this implies that the radical theory of extended cognition has to be true. If, on the other hand, epistemic agency is not intentional action but evaluative agency, then intentional epistemic actions like deliberation are not truly cognitive but merely catalytic. Once established, the distinction between these two options sheds new light on various and diverse philosophical and psychological debates from dual process theories to debates on choice and self-control. …

Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 208 pages. 9.00x5.75x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Hardback. Condition: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 3 working days.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Epistemic agency is a crucial concept in many different areas of philosophy and the cognitive sciences. It is crucial in dual process theories of cognition as well as theories of metacognition and mindreading, self-control, and moral agency. But what is epistemic agency? The Tinkering Mind argues that epistemic agency has two distinct and incompatible definitions. It can be simply understood as intentional mental action, or as a distinct non-voluntary form of evaluative agency. The core argument of the book demonstrates that both definitions lead to surprising and counterintuitive consequences. If epistemic agency is a form of intentional action, then this implies that the radical theory of extended cognition has to be true. If, on the other hand, epistemic agency is not intentional action but evaluative agency, then intentional epistemic actions like deliberation are not truly cognitive but merely catalytic. Once established, the distinction between these two options sheds new light on various and diverse philosophical and psychological debates from dual process theories to debates on choice and self-control. Epistemic agency is a crucial concept in many areas of philosophy and cognitive sciences. But what is it? The Tinkering Mind argues that epistemic agency has two distinct, incompatible definitions - intentional mental action, or a distinct non-voluntary form of evaluative agency, both of which lead to surprising, counterintuitive consequences. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Condition: New. 2022. 1st Edition. Hardcover. . . . . .

Condition: NEW.

Condition: New.

Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 208 pages. 9.00x5.75x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Condition: New. 2022. 1st Edition. Hardcover. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Condition: New.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Buch. Condition: Neu. The Tinkering Mind | Agency, Cognition, and the Extended Mind | Tillmann Vierkant | Buch | Gebunden | Englisch | 2023 | Oxford University Press | EAN 9780192894267 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.…

Buch. Condition: Neu. Neuware - Epistemic agency is a crucial concept in many different areas of philosophy and the cognitive sciences. It is crucial in dual process theories of cognition as well as theories of metacognition and mindreading, self-control, and moral agency. But what is epistemic agency The Tinkering Mind argues that epistemic agency has two distinct and incompatible definitions. It can be simply understood as intentional mental action, or as a distinct non-voluntary form of evaluative agency. The core argument of the book demonstrates that both definitions lead to surprising and counterintuitive consequences. If epistemic agency is a form of intentional action, then this implies that the radical theory of extended cognition has to be true. If, on the other hand, epistemic agency is not intentional action but evaluative agency, then intentional epistemic actions like deliberation are not truly cognitive but merely catalytic. Once established, the distinction between these two options sheds new light on various and diverse philosophical and psychological debates from dual process theories to debates on choice and self-control.…

Hardback. Condition: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.

Condition: New. In English.