Shafer Glenn (128 results)

Hardcover. Condition: Good. Dust Jacket Condition: no dust jacket present. The book is in good condition with a sturdy binding and clean pages. The cover shows some wear, particularly at the edges, but remains intact. There is no dust jacket present, which is common for this type of academic publication. No inscriptions or library markings are found within the book.…

Condition: Good. y First edition. Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.…

Paperback. Condition: Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used textbooks may not include companion materials such as access codes, etc. May have some wear or writing/highlighting. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority.

Paperback. Condition: Fair. No Jacket. Readable copy. Pages may have considerable notes/highlighting. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

hardcover. Condition: Good. Book is bent.

hardcover. Condition: Very Good.

hardcover. Condition: Fine.

Condition: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. In good all round condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,550grams, ISBN:9780691100425.

Condition: New.

Paperback. Condition: New. Both in science and in practical affairs we reason by combining facts only inconclusively supported by evidence. Building on an abstract understanding of this process of combination, this book constructs a new theory of epistemic probability. The theory draws on the work of A. P. Dempster but diverges from Depster's viewpoint by identifying his "lower probabilities" as epistemic probabilities and taking his rule for combining "upper and lower probabilities" as fundamental. The book opens with a critique of the well-known Bayesian theory of epistemic probability. It then proceeds to develop an alternative to the additive set functions and the rule of conditioning of the Bayesian theory: set functions that need only be what Choquet called "monotone of order of infinity." and Dempster's rule for combining such set functions. This rule, together with the idea of "weights of evidence," leads to both an extensive new theory and a better understanding of the Bayesian theory. The book concludes with a brief treatment of statistical inference and a discussion of the limitations of epistemic probability.Appendices contain mathematical proofs, which are relatively elementary and seldom depend on mathematics more advanced that the binomial theorem.…

Paperback. Condition: New. Both in science and in practical affairs we reason by combining facts only inconclusively supported by evidence. Building on an abstract understanding of this process of combination, this book constructs a new theory of epistemic probability. The theory draws on the work of A. P. Dempster but diverges from Depster's viewpoint by identifying his "lower probabilities" as epistemic probabilities and taking his rule for combining "upper and lower probabilities" as fundamental. The book opens with a critique of the well-known Bayesian theory of epistemic probability. It then proceeds to develop an alternative to the additive set functions and the rule of conditioning of the Bayesian theory: set functions that need only be what Choquet called "monotone of order of infinity." and Dempster's rule for combining such set functions. This rule, together with the idea of "weights of evidence," leads to both an extensive new theory and a better understanding of the Bayesian theory. The book concludes with a brief treatment of statistical inference and a discussion of the limitations of epistemic probability.Appendices contain mathematical proofs, which are relatively elementary and seldom depend on mathematics more advanced that the binomial theorem.…

Condition: New. 1976. Paperback. . . . . .

Condition: Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condition: New. Well packaged and promptly shipped from California. Partnered with Friends of the Library since 2010.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condition: New. 1976. Paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Paperback. Condition: Brand New. illustrated edition edition. 88 pages. 10.00x7.00x0.50 inches. In Stock.

Condition: New.

Condition: New. In English.

Condition: New. In English.

Condition: New. 1987. Annotated. paperback. . . . . .

Hardcover. Condition: Fine. Unmarked copy, with shelf wear only.

PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condition: New. 1987. Annotated. paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Paperback. Condition: Brand New. 297 pages. 9.00x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.

HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback. Condition: New. Both in science and in practical affairs we reason by combining facts only inconclusively supported by evidence. Building on an abstract understanding of this process of combination, this book constructs a new theory of epistemic probability. The theory draws on the work of A. P. Dempster but diverges from Depster's viewpoint by identifying his "lower probabilities" as epistemic probabilities and taking his rule for combining "upper and lower probabilities" as fundamental. The book opens with a critique of the well-known Bayesian theory of epistemic probability. It then proceeds to develop an alternative to the additive set functions and the rule of conditioning of the Bayesian theory: set functions that need only be what Choquet called "monotone of order of infinity." and Dempster's rule for combining such set functions. This rule, together with the idea of "weights of evidence," leads to both an extensive new theory and a better understanding of the Bayesian theory. The book concludes with a brief treatment of statistical inference and a discussion of the limitations of epistemic probability.Appendices contain mathematical proofs, which are relatively elementary and seldom depend on mathematics more advanced that the binomial theorem.…

Condition: New.