Dr Antonio Giustozzi (43 results)

Paperback. Condition: Very Good. Announcements of an impending victory over the Taliban have been repeated ad nauseam since the Allied invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, particularly after the Presidential elections of 2004, which were said to have marked the 'moral and psychological defeat of the Taliban'. In moments of triumphalism, some commentators claimed that 'reconstruction and development' had won over the population, despite much criticism of the meagre distribution of aid, the lack of 'nation-building' and corruption among Kabul's elite. In March 2006, both Afghan and American officials were still claiming, just before a series of particularly ferocious clashes, that 'the Taliban are no longer able to fight large battles'. Later that year, the mood in the mass media had turned to one of defeatism, even of impending catastrophe. In reality, as early as 2003-5 there was a growing body of evidence that cast doubt on the official interpretation of the conflict. Rather than there having been a '2006 surprise', Giustozzi argues that the Neo-Taliban insurgency had put down strong roots in Afghanistan as early as 2003, a phenomenon he investigates in this timely and thought-provoking book. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.

paperback. Condition: Very Good. ALL ITEMS ARE DISPATCHED FROM THE UK WITHIN 48 HOURS ( BOOKS ORDERED OVER THE WEEKEND DISPATCHED ON MONDAY) ALL OVERSEAS ORDERS SENT BY TRACKABLE AIR MAIL. IF YOU ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UK PLEASE ASK US FOR A POSTAGE QUOTE FOR MULTI VOLUME SETS BEFORE ORDERING.

PAP. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. Announcements of an impending victory over the Taliban have been repeated ad nauseam since the Allied invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, particularly after the Presidential elections of 2004, which were said to have marked the 'moral and psychological defeat of the Taliban'. In moments of triumphalism, some commentators claimed that 'reconstruction and development' had won over the population, despite much criticism of the meagre distribution of aid, the lack of 'nation-building' and corruption among Kabul's elite. In March 2006, both Afghan and American officials were still claiming, just before a series of particularly ferocious clashes, that 'the Taliban are no longer able to fight large battles'. Later that year, the mood in the mass media had turned to one of defeatism, even of impending catastrophe. In reality, as early as 2003-5 there was a growing body of evidence that cast doubt on the official interpretation of the conflict. Rather than there having been a '2006 surprise', Giustozzi argues that the Neo-Taliban insurgency had put down strong roots in Afghanistan as early as 2003, a phenomenon he investigates in this timely and thought-provoking book. In March 2006, both Afghan and American officials were still claiming, just before a series of particularly ferocious clashes, that 'the Taliban are no longer able to fight large battles'. This book states that in reality, as early as 2003-5 there was a growing body of evidence that cast doubt on the official interpretation of the conflict. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condition: Very Good. Dust Jacket Condition: Very Good. Internally unmarked and solidly bound. The corners and edges of the book have been bumped and the edges of the dust jacket creased and worn. On the top right hand corner of the front of the dust jacket there is a pen impression.

Paperback. Condition: New.

Condition: New.

Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. While the 'New Taliban' looms large in the global media, little is known about how it functions as an organisation. How united is it? Are its structures relatively strong, or surprisingly brittle? Are personal relations and networking based on traditional ties of kin and ethnicity the sum total of its organisational capabilities, or are efforts underway to build more institutionalised chains of command? How united is the New Taliban, and how does it maintain whatever degree of unity it has, given the attrition it has suffered in the field? And to what extent is its leadership able to impose switches in strategy among the rank-andfile, given Afghanistan's difficult geography and poor communications? These are among the questions answered in this book by a renowned cast of practitioners, journalists and academics, all of whom have long field experience of the latest phase of the New Taliban's insurgency in Afghanistan. Decoding the New Taliban includes a number of detailed studies of specific regions or provinces, which for different reasons are especially significant for the Taliban and for understanding their expansion. Alongside these regional studies, the volume includes thematic analyses of negotiating with the Taliban, the Taliban's propaganda effort and its strategic vision Comprehensive expose on the New Taliban by practitioners with personal experience. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback / softback. Condition: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.

Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. Warlords are charismatic military leaders who exploit weak central authorities in order to gain control of sub-national areas. Notwithstanding their bad reputation, warlords have often participated in state formation. In Empires of Mud Giustozzi analyses the dynamics of warlordism in Afghanistan within the context of such debates. He approaches this complex task by first analysing aspects of the Afghan environment that might have been conductive to the fragmentation of central authority and the emergence of warlords and then accounts for the emergence of warlordism in the 1980s and subsequently. He accounts for the phenomenon from the 1980s to today, considering Afghanistan's two foremost warlords, Ismail Khan and Abdul Rashid Dostum, and their political, economic, and military systems of rule. Despite the intervention of Allied forces in 2001, both of these leaders continue to wield considerable power. The author also discusses Ahmad Shah Massoud, whose 'system' incorporated elements of rule not dissimilar from that of the warlords. Giustozzi reveals common themes in the emergence of warlordism, particularly the role of local military leaders and their gradual acquisition of 'class consciousness,' which over time evolves into a more sophisticated, state-like, or political party-like, structure. Explains the history of the warlord system in Afghani politics Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 288 pages. 8.74x5.75x0.94 inches. In Stock.

Condition: New.

Paperback. Condition: New.

Paperback. Condition: New.

Condition: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. In good all round condition. Dust jacket in good condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,500grams, ISBN:9781849042055.

Paperback / softback. Condition: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 3 working days.

Condition: new.

Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Policing is not a popular topic of serious scholarly research. Although a vast literature on policing exists, it is mostly technical in nature and only rarely analytical. Even the police forces of Western Europe and North America have rarely been investigated in depth as far as their history and functioning goes. In particular, the politics of policing, its political economy, have been largely neglected. This book is a rare in-depth study of a police force in a developing country which is also undergoing a bitter internal conflict, further to the post-2001 external intervention in Afghanistan. Policing Afghanistan discusses the evolution of the country's police through its various stages but focuses in particular on the last decade. The authors review the ongoing debates over the future shape of Afghanistan's police, but seek primarily to analyse the way Afghanistan is policed relative to its existing social, political and international constraints. Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh have observed the development of the police force from its early stages, starting from what was a rudimentary, militia-based, police force prior to 2001. This is a book about how the police really work in such a difficult environment, the nuts and bolts approach, based on first hand research, as opposed to a description of how the Afghan police are institutionally organised and regulated. A rare in-depth study of a police force in a developing country which is also undergoing a bitter internal conflict, further to the post-2001 external intervention in Afghanistan. Policing Afghanistan discusses the evolution of the country's police through its various stages but focuses in particular on the last decade. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

paperback. Condition: New.

HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

brossura paperback. Condition: Buono (Good). paperback 176 9781850658733 Buono (Good) Libro usato proveniente da collezione privata.La copertina riporta piccole tracce d'uso. Le pagine risultano lievemente imbrunite dal tempo. All'interno in ottime condizioni. Lingua inglese. Book.

Paperback / softback. Condition: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.

HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Hardback. Condition: Very Good. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.

Hardcover. Condition: New.

Hardback. Condition: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.

Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. Announcements of an impending victory over the Taliban have been repeated ad nauseam since the Allied invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, particularly after the Presidential elections of 2004, which were said to have marked the 'moral and psychological defeat of the Taliban'. In moments of triumphalism, some commentators claimed that 'reconstruction and development' had won over the population, despite much criticism of the meagre distribution of aid, the lack of 'nation-building' and corruption among Kabul's elite. In March 2006, both Afghan and American officials were still claiming, just before a series of particularly ferocious clashes, that 'the Taliban are no longer able to fight large battles'. Later that year, the mood in the mass media had turned to one of defeatism, even of impending catastrophe. In reality, as early as 2003-5 there was a growing body of evidence that cast doubt on the official interpretation of the conflict. Rather than there having been a '2006 surprise', Giustozzi argues that the Neo-Taliban insurgency had put down strong roots in Afghanistan as early as 2003, a phenomenon he investigates in this timely and thought-provoking book. In March 2006, both Afghan and American officials were still claiming, just before a series of particularly ferocious clashes, that 'the Taliban are no longer able to fight large battles'. This book states that in reality, as early as 2003-5 there was a growing body of evidence that cast doubt on the official interpretation of the conflict. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Condition: New. Building a fully unified Afghan Army dominated neither by Pashtuns nor by Tajiks has eluded the authorities in Kabul for decades. This book explains why. Num Pages: 288 pages. BIC Classification: 1FCA; HBJF; HBW; JWD. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 216 x 138. Weight in Grams: 512. . 2016. 1st Edition. Hardcover. . . . .