Weatherson Brian (93 results)

hardcover. Condition: Very Good.

Paperback or Softback. Condition: New. Knowledge: A Human Interest Story. Book.

Paperback. Condition: New.

Condition: New.

Condition: New.

Condition: New. In English.

Hardback. Condition: New.

Softcover. Condition: Very Good+. First Edition. First trade paperback printing, has a mild skew to the binding, light shelf wear with some peeling starting to the spine ends, cover edges and corners, rubbing to the covers, and shallow waving to the edges of the text block. Overall, this is a solid, tight and clean, Very Good+ copy. …

Condition: New. In English.

Condition: New.

Condition: New. There is a lot that we don't know. That means there are a lot of possibilities that are, epistemically speaking, open. What are these epistemic possibilities? How do we understand the semantics of epistemic modals? Ten new essays explore various answers to these questions, including those offered by contextualism, relativism, and expressivism. Editor(s): Egan, Andy; Weatherson, Brian. Num Pages: 352 pages, 16 illustrations. BIC Classification: CFA; CFK; HPJ; HPK. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 232 x 160 x 19. Weight in Grams: 542. . 2011. 1st Edition. Paperback. . . . .…

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condition: New.

Condition: New. There is a lot that we don't know. That means there are a lot of possibilities that are, epistemically speaking, open. What are these epistemic possibilities? How do we understand the semantics of epistemic modals? Ten new essays explore various answers to these questions, including those offered by contextualism, relativism, and expressivism. Editor(s): Egan, Andy; Weatherson, Brian. Num Pages: 352 pages, 16 illustrations. BIC Classification: CFA; CFK; HPJ; HPK. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 232 x 160 x 19. Weight in Grams: 542. . 2011. 1st Edition. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.…

Condition: New. In English.

Paperback / softback. Condition: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Condition: New.

Condition: New.

Hardback. Condition: New.

Condition: Hervorragend. Zustand: Hervorragend | Seiten: 286 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | In this book the author argues for a groundbreaking perspective that knowledge is inherently interest-relative. This means that what one knows is influenced not just by belief, evidence, and truth, but crucially by the purposes those beliefs serve. Drawing from classical Ny¿ya epistemologies, the book asserts that knowledge rationalizes action: if you know something, it is sensible to act on it-and the best way to square this with an anti-sceptical epistemology is to say that knowledge is interest-relative.While versions of this view have been debated, they haven't gained wide acceptance. The author addresses common objections with a refined formulation and explores how this perspective elucidates the role of knowledge in inquiry, daily life, and the history of thought. Key distinctions include the impact of "long odds" situations on knowledge, the distinctive role knowledge has a starting point for inquiry, and the importance of using non-ideal models in theorising about knowledge.Building on decades of scholarship, the author offers a cohesive theory that integrates and clarifies previous works, demonstrating that not only knowledge but also belief, rational belief, and evidence are interest-relative. This book is essential for those seeking a deeper understanding of the intricate relationship between knowledge and practical interests.…

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condition: New.

Hardback. Condition: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.

Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condition: New. In English.

Condition: Brand New.

Condition: New. 2019. hardcover. . . . . .

Hardback. Condition: New. Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the correct principles, not one's own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty should be treated just like factual uncertainty, that moral ignorance frequently excuses moral wrongdoing, and that hypocrisy is a vice. In epistemology, it suggests we need new treatments of higher-order evidence, and of peer disagreement, and of circular reasoning, and the book suggests new approaches to each of these problems. Although the debates in ethics and in epistemology are often conducted separately, putting them in one place helps bring out their common themes. One common theme is that the view that one should live up to one's own principles looks less attractive when people have terrible principles, or when following their own principles would lead to riskier or more aggressive action than the correct principles. Another common theme is that asking people to live up to their principles leads to regresses. It can be hard to know what action or belief complies with one's principles. And now we can ask, in such a case should a person do what they think their principles require, or what their principles actually require? Both answers lead to problems, and the best way to avoid these problems is to simply say people should follow the correct principles. …

Condition: New.