Kleinerman Benjamin (79 results)

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Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. George W. Bushs use of the war on terror to justify the creation of a unitary executive, acting outside and even against the law, was a source of praise and blame for his administration. Immediately after 9/11, a constitutionalist would have worried about the peril of executive power, but today he might worry that we ignore its promise and distrust discretionary actions that truly ought to be taken by presidents in times of peril. Benjamin Kleinerman addresses the fundamental question of what role discretionary executive power should play in a constitutional order, reexamining what has become an intractable debate to show that what can destroy our Constitution also has the potential to save it. Kleinerman traces this problem from Hobbes through Lincoln to address one of the central dilemmas of our post-9/11 age: how to empower the president to respond to legitimate threats without endangering the constitutional order. He stakes out a middle ground in this highly contentious debate, affirming that a president has the discretionary power to act for the public good without statutory authorizationbut warning that, to remain constitutional, it must be truly discretionary power that could not be legalized. Kleinerman articulates and defends a constitutional politics of necessity, best exemplified by Lincoln, in which opponents should call on presidents to defend the necessity of exceptional actions and explain why they had to be taken outside the existing legal framework, beyond simply being for the public good. He observes that Lincoln acknowledged the illegality of his actions while claiming their necessity but that Bush claimed powers as if they were permanent. He also reexamines separation of powers in light of executive discretion, suggesting that, during times of insecurity, discretionary executive power can be devoted to preservation of the Constitution so long as the other branches remain vigilant. Kleinerman argues for a president sufficiently strong to take actions without which we cannot be secure yet sufficiently circumscribed that such actions do not become the norm. His book delineates the tough distinctions citizens need to make between the necessary exercise of extraordinary powers and the dangerous aggrandizement of unnecessary power. Examines both the peril and the promise of presidential power to clarify that what can destroy our Constitution can--if the threat is dire--also save it. An unusually balanced study that argues for a middle path whereby presidents choose consciously to act temporarily outside or even against the laws in serving the nation's best interest. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Paperback. Condition: New. George W. Bush's use of the war on terror to justify the creation of a unitary executive, acting outside and even against the law, was a source of praise and blame for his administration. Immediately after 9/11, a constitutionalist would have worried about the peril of executive power, but today he might worry that we ignore its promise and distrust discretionary actions that truly ought to be taken by presidents in times of peril. Benjamin Kleinerman addresses the fundamental question of what role discretionary executive power should play in a constitutional order, reexamining what has become an intractable debate to show that what can destroy our Constitution also has the potential to save it. Kleinerman traces this problem from Hobbes through Lincoln to address one of the central dilemmas of our post-9/11 age: how to empower the president to respond to legitimate threats without endangering the constitutional order. He stakes out a middle ground in this highly contentious debate, affirming that a president has the discretionary power to act for the public good without statutory authorization-but warning that, to remain constitutional, it must be truly discretionary power that could not be legalized. Kleinerman articulates and defends a "constitutional politics of necessity," best exemplified by Lincoln, in which opponents should call on presidents to defend the necessity of exceptional actions and explain why they had to be taken outside the existing legal framework, beyond simply being "for the public good." He observes that Lincoln acknowledged the illegality of his actions while claiming their necessity but that Bush claimed powers as if they were permanent. He also reexamines separation of powers in light of executive discretion, suggesting that, during times of insecurity, discretionary executive power can be devoted to preservation of the Constitution so long as the other branches remain vigilant. Kleinerman argues for a president sufficiently strong to take actions without which we cannot be secure yet sufficiently circumscribed that such actions do not become the norm. His book delineates the tough distinctions citizens need to make between the necessary exercise of extraordinary powers and the dangerous aggrandizement of unnecessary power.…

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Paperback or Softback. Condition: New. The Discretionary President: The Promise and Peril of Executive Power. Book.

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Condition: Good. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condition: New. 2026. paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Paperback. Condition: Brand New. 338 pages. 6.00x0.72x9.00 inches. In Stock.

Hardback. Condition: New. An argument for understanding the separation of powers as a political arrangement designed to pursue the common democratic goodBeyond Checks and Balances seeks to rescue the democratic concept of the separation of powers from a popular caricature of it: that checks and balances exist between branches of government to frustrate, slow, and inhibit change. Long regarded as a legal doctrine that must be adjudicated by the federal courts, political scientists Connor M. Ewing, Benjamin A. Kleinerman, and Charles U. Zug have gathered leading scholars' analyses into a volume that argues that the separation of powers is instead best understood politically. When cast as a configuration of powers, incentives, and institutions designed to pursue the foundational ends of politics, it becomes clear that separation of powers does not exist to stymie collective action, though it certainly is capable of doing so.The book is divided into two sections: the first examines the foundations of statement-of-powers doctrine and thought. The second set of chapters analyzes the application of the doctrine and addresses more specific topics, such as the power to declare war, the scope of executive powers, and the impeachment of federal judges. The contributors spotlight the substantive constitutional goodsthat the arrangement commonly referred to as the separation of powers is designed to achieve. The collection shows that-as a concept dedicated to creating collaborative, good democratic government-the separation of powers includes, but cannot be reduced to, constraints on governmental power. By incentivizing conflict and negotiation between different constitutional offices, the separation of powers brings diverse governmental perspectives to bear on the basic problems of politics, promoting political values like deliberation, decisiveness, and inclusion across branches.Contributors: Sotirios A. Barber, Thomas R. Bell, Paul Carrese, Connor M. Ewing, Brigid Flaherty Staab, Benjamin A. Kleinerman, David J. Siemers, George Thomas, Kathleen Tipler, Jeffrey K. Tulis, Keith E. Whittington, Mariah Zeisberg, Charles U. Zug.…

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HRD. Condition: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condition: New. 2026. paperback. . . . . .

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Hardback. Condition: New. George W. Bush's use of the war on terror to justify the creation of a unitary executive, acting outside and even against the law, was a source of praise and blame for his administration. Immediately after 9/11, a constitutionalist would have worried about the peril of executive power, but today he might worry that we ignore its promise and distrust discretionary actions that truly ought to be taken by presidents in times of peril. Benjamin Kleinerman addresses the fundamental question of what role discretionary executive power should play in a constitutional order, reexamining what has become an intractable debate to show that what can destroy our Constitution also has the potential to save it. Kleinerman traces this problem from Hobbes through Lincoln to address one of the central dilemmas of our post-9/11 age: how to empower the president to respond to legitimate threats without endangering the constitutional order. He stakes out a middle ground in this highly contentious debate, affirming that a president has the discretionary power to act for the public good without statutory authorization - but warning that, to remain constitutional, it must be truly discretionary power that could not be legalized. Kleinerman articulates and defends a 'constitutional politics of necessity', best exemplified by Lincoln, in which opponents should call on presidents to defend the necessity of exceptional actions and explain why they had to be taken outside the existing legal framework, beyond simply being 'for the public good'. He observes that Lincoln acknowledged the illegality of his actions while claiming their necessity but that Bush claimed powers as if they were permanent. He also reexamines separation of powers in light of executive discretion, suggesting that, during times of insecurity, discretionary executive power can be devoted to preservation of the Constitution so long as the other branches remain vigilant. Kleinerman argues for a president sufficiently strong to take actions without which we cannot be secure yet sufficiently circumscribed that such actions do not become the norm. His book delineates the tough distinctions citizens need to make between the necessary exercise of extraordinary powers and the dangerous aggrandizement of unnecessary power.…

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Condition: New. Addresses the fundamental question of what role discretionary executive power should play in a constitutional order, reexamining what has become an intractable debate to show that what can destroy our Constitution also has the potential to save it. Num Pages: 336 pages. BIC Classification: 1KBB; JPHL. Category: (G) General (US: Trade); (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 229 x 152 x 30. Weight in Grams: 658. . 2009. Hardback. . . . .…

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Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

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