9783540543725 - Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets: 365 (lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 365) by Heuer, Gerald A.; Leopold-wildburger, Ulrike (11 results)

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Condition: New. pp. v + 140 Softcover Reprint of the Original 1st Edition 1991.

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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - A Silverman game is a two-person zero-sum game defined in terms of two sets S I and S II of positive numbers, and two parameters, the threshold T 1 and the penalty v 0. Players I and II independently choose numbers from S I and S II, respectively.…The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses v. Equal numbers tie. Such a game might be used to model various bidding or spending situations in which within some bounds the higher bidder or bigger spender wins, but loses if it is overdone. Such situations may include spending on armaments, advertising spending or sealed bids in an auction. Previous work has dealt mainly with special cases. In this work recent progress for arbitrary discrete sets S I and S II is presented. Under quite general conditions, these games reduce to finite matrix games. A large class of games are completely determined by the diagonal of the matrix, and it is shown how the great majority of these appear to have unique optimal strategies. The work is accessible to all who are familiar with basic noncooperative game theory.

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Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. A Silverman game is a two-person zero-sum game defined in terms of two sets S I and S II of positive numbers, and two parameters, the threshold T > 1 and the penalty v > 0. Players I and II independently choose number…s from S I and S II, respectively. The h.

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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Games are studied in which within certain bounds the player with the larger number wins, but loses if it is too much larger than the other. The games model various bidding or spending situations governed by rules of this nature. Under q…uite general conditions the games reduce to finite matrix games.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 152 pp. Englisch.

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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -A Silverman game is a two-person zero-sum game defined in terms of two sets S I and S II of positive numbers, and two parameters, the threshold T 1 and the penalty v 0. Players I and II independently choose numbers from S I and S II…, respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses v. Equal numbers tie. Such a game might be used to model various bidding or spending situations in which within some bounds the higher bidder or bigger spender wins, but loses if it is overdone. Such situations may include spending on armaments, advertising spending or sealed bids in an auction. Previous work has dealt mainly with special cases. In this work recent progress for arbitrary discrete sets S I and S II is presented. Under quite general conditions, these games reduce to finite matrix games. A large class of games are completely determined by the diagonal of the matrix, and it is shown how the great majority of these appear to have unique optimal strategies. The work is accessible to all who are familiar with basic noncooperative game theory. 152 pp. Englisch.