ISBN: 9780262582384 - A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games (mit Press) (11 results)

Paperback. Condition: Good. The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well. By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality. The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.…

Condition: good. The cover shows wear with possible indentations, creases, and small tears. The pages show wear that may include evidence of handling, smudges, and edge discoloration markings stains . The book may or may not have mild corner dings. The imagery is a stock photo of the item.

Paperback. Condition: Good. The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well. By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality. The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.…

Paperback. Condition: Brand New. illustrated edition. 396 pages. 8.75x5.75x0.75 inches. In Stock.

paperback. Condition: New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title.

Condition: New. Print on Demand pp. 396.

Condition: New. Print on Demand pp. 396 Illustrated edition.

Condition: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 396.

Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. &Uumlber den AutorrnrnJohn C. Harsanyi is Flood Research Professor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley.The late Reinhard Selten was Professor at the University of Bonn and was a co-w.…

Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well. By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality. The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.…

Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games | John C. Harsanyi (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Englisch | 1988 | MIT Press | EAN 9780262582384 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand. …