Language: English
Published by Cambridge University Press CUP, 1987
ISBN 10: 0521310954 ISBN 13: 9780521310956
Seller: Books Puddle, New York, NY, U.S.A.
Condition: New. pp. 250.
Language: English
Published by Cambridge University Press, 2010
ISBN 10: 0521310954 ISBN 13: 9780521310956
Seller: Buchpark, Trebbin, Germany
Condition: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | The papers in this volume provide a complex view of market processes.
Language: English
Published by Cambridge University Press, 1987
ISBN 10: 0521310954 ISBN 13: 9780521310956
Seller: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Germany
Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Growing out of a conference on Expectations Formation and Economic Disequilibrium held in New York City in 1981, the papers in this volume provide a complex view of market processes in which individual rationality is no guarantee of convergence to the 'correct' model and the equilibrium coordination of agents' plans. They reject the 'optimality' argument for the rational expectations hypothesis, opening the door to other hypotheses of optimal expectations of agents in the decentralized market economy.
Language: English
Published by Cambridge University Press, 1987
ISBN 10: 0521310954 ISBN 13: 9780521310956
Seller: Majestic Books, Hounslow, United Kingdom
Condition: New. Print on Demand pp. 250 2:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam.
Language: English
Published by Cambridge University Press, 1987
ISBN 10: 0521310954 ISBN 13: 9780521310956
Seller: Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Germany
Condition: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 250.
Language: English
Published by Cambridge University Press, 2010
ISBN 10: 0521310954 ISBN 13: 9780521310956
Seller: moluna, Greven, Germany
Kartoniert / Broschiert. Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. The papers in this volume provide a complex view of market processes in which individual rationality is no guarantee of convergence to the correct model and the equilibrium coordination of agents plans. They reject the optimality argument for the ratio.