Binmore Ken Kirman Alan (4 results)

- Hardcover
Seller: Better World Books Ltd, Dunfermline, United KingdomBetter World Books Ltd
Contact seller5-star sellerCondition: Used - Good
£ 5.78
£ 5.00 shippingShips from United Kingdom to U.S.A.Quantity: 1 available
Condition: Good. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

- Hardcover
Seller: HPB Inc., Dallas, TX, U.S.A.HPB Inc.
Contact seller5-star sellerCondition: Used - Very good
£ 26.23
£ 2.81 shippingShips within U.S.A.Quantity: 1 available
hardcover. Condition: Very Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used books may not include companion materials, and may have some shelf wear or limited writing. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority.
More images- Hardcover
- First Edition
Seller: ALEJANDRIA, BARCELONA, B, SpainALEJANDRIA
Contact seller4-star sellerCondition: Used - Very good
£ 20.68
£ 31.04 shippingShips from Spain to U.S.A.Quantity: 1 available
Tapa Dura con Sobrecubierta. Condition: Bien. Dust Jacket Condition: Good. . Colección: Sin especificar 351 p. 23x16x0 - 700 g.
Published by Cambridge & London: MIT Press, 1993., 1993
- Hardcover
- First Edition
Seller: Ted Kottler, Bookseller, Redondo Beach, CA, U.S.A.Ted Kottler, Bookseller
Contact seller3-star sellerFirst Edition. vi, 351 pp. Original cloth. Marker stripe on bottom edge, else Near Fine, in near fine dust jacket. "These seventeen contributions take up the most recent research in game theory, reflecting the many diverse approaches in the field today. They are classified in five general tactical categories - prediction, explanation, investigation, description, and prescription - and wit in these along applied and theoretical divisions. The introduction clearly lays out this framework" (MIT Press Web site). Contents: Famous Gamesters, Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani. Cognition and Framing in Sequential Bargaining for Gains and Losses, Cohn F. Camerer, Eric J. Johnson, Talia Rymon, Sankar Sen. Explaining the Vote: Constituency Constraints on Sophisticated Voting, David Austen Smith. The Dynamics of Learning in N-Person Games with the Wrong N, Vincent Brousseau and Alan Kirman. Stationary Equilibria for Deterministic Graphical Games, Steve Alpern. Stable Coalition Structures in Consecutive Games, Joseph Greenberg and Shlomo Weber. The General Nucleolus and the Reduced Game Property, Michael Maschler, Jos Potters, Stef Tijs. Some Thoughts on Efficiency and Information, Françoise Forges. On the Fair and Coalitionstrategyproof Allocation of Private Goods, Hervé Moulin. From Repeated to Differential Games: How Time and Uncertainty Pervade the Theory of Games, Alain Haurie. Unraveling in Games of Sharing and Exchange, Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, Morton D. Davis. Does Evolution Eliminate Dominated Strategies? Larry Samuelson. Equilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games, Hans Carlsson and Eric van Damme. Variable Universe Games, Michael Bacharach. Aspects of Rationalizable Behavior, Peter J. Hammond. Normative Validity and Meaning of von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities, John C. Harsanyi. DeBayesing Game Theory, Ken Binmore.…