"It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical." This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that "thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing," that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies.
"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
Seller: Ammareal, Morangis, France
Softcover. Condition: Bon. Ancien livre de bibliothèque avec équipements. Edition 1985. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Good. Former library book. Edition 1985. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations. Seller Inventory # G-728-797
Seller: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # ABLIING23Mar3113020234318
Seller: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, United Kingdom
Condition: New. In. Seller Inventory # ria9783642697487_new
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Germany
Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -'It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical.' This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that 'thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing,' that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies. 304 pp. Englisch. Seller Inventory # 9783642697487
Seller: moluna, Greven, Germany
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 5068367
Seller: Books Puddle, New York, NY, U.S.A.
Condition: New. pp. 304. Seller Inventory # 2648032579
Seller: Revaluation Books, Exeter, United Kingdom
Paperback. Condition: Brand New. reprint edition. 286 pages. 8.75x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock. Seller Inventory # x-3642697488
Seller: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Germany
Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -'It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical.' This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that 'thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing,' that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies.Springer-Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 304 pp. Englisch. Seller Inventory # 9783642697487
Seller: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Germany
Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - 'It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical.' This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that 'thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing,' that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies. Seller Inventory # 9783642697487
Seller: Majestic Books, Hounslow, United Kingdom
Condition: New. Print on Demand pp. 304 19 Figures, 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam. Seller Inventory # 44782748