Game-Theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups - Hardcover

Sloof, Randolph

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0792382307 ISBN 13: 9780792382300

Publisher: Springer, 1998

Synopsis

In this chapter the topic of this book is introduced. Section 1. 1 provides a brief and rather general motivation for the scientific project undertaken here. Interest groups are a very popular object of scientific inquiry, and they received already considerable research attention from scholars in political science, as well as from researchers in economics. Necessarily, then, this book adds to a literature which is already quite developed. A detailed positioning in this literature of the theoretical material presented in this monograph will be given in Chapter 2. This second chapter will also, by means of a review of the empirical literature, provide a more general overview of the issues deemed to be important when studying the influence of interest groups on public policy. The outline of the entire book is described in greater detail in Section 1. 2. As most issues involved are more easily presented in later chapters, this introductory chapter is kept brief. 1. 1 MOTIVATION Substantial political power is often attributed to interest groups. Examples abound in both the economics and political science literature, as well as in journalistic accounts and popular publications. On many occasions the authors express concerns about the negative impact of interest groups on the democratic quality of government. "The interests of a small group are served at the expense of the interests of the general public, the taxpayers!", is an often heard popular complaint.

About this title

Synopsis

This volume starts with an overview of the results obtained from empirical models of the political influence of interest groups. It is observed that, by and large, interest groups affect public policy significantly. Moreover, the empirical results indicate that interest groups use several means of influence that may differ in their effectiveness, and between which interaction effects may occur. Theoretical models analyzing the choice of an interest group between different means of influence are relatively scarce, though. The three game-theoretic models presented in the main part of this volume are meant to help fill this gap.First, the choice of an interest group between campaign contributions and direct endorsements to influence voter behavior is investigated. Second, the choice between using 'words' (lobbying) and using 'actions' (pressure) in influencing a policymaker is analyzed. Third, the question is addressed at what level of government an interest group should direct its lobbying activities. Also in this third model, the problem faced by politicians as to when to delegate policy authority to bureaucrats is studied within the context of interest group influence.

The theoretical predictions obtained from the models are evaluated in the light of existing empirical evidence.

Edition details

• Publisher: Springer
• Publication date: 1998
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0792382307
• ISBN 13: 9780792382300
• Binding: Hardcover
• Number of pages: 272