(1) Beliefs are involuntary, and not nonnally subject to direct voluntary control. For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such things. (2) Beliefs are nonnally shaped by evidence for what is believed, unless they are, in some sense, irrational. In general a belief is rational if it is proportioned to the degree of evidence that one has for its truth. In this sense, one often says that "beliefs aim at truth" . This is why it is, on the face of it, irrational to believe against the evidence that one has. A subject whose beliefs are not shaped by a concern for their truth, but by what she wants to be the case, is more or less a wishful thinker or a self-deceiver. (3) Beliefs are context independent, in the sense that at one time a subject believes something or does not believe it; she does not believe it relative to one context and not relative to another. For instance if I believe that Paris is a polluted city, I cannot believe that on Monday and not on Tuesday; that would be a change of belief, or a change of mind, but not a case of believing one thing in one context and another thing in another context. If I believe something, the belief is more or 4 less pennanent across various contexts.
"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
The notion of belief figures prominently in contemporary philosophy of language and mind and in cognitive science. These essays address a range of issues concerning the complexity of our belief attitudes, their contents, and the influence of motivational factors on beliefs. The book is addressed to philosophers, psychologists, cognitive scientists and social theorists interested in the problem of representation, metarepresentation and the contents of propositional attitudes.
"About this title" may belong to another edition of this title.
Seller: Better World Books: West, Reno, NV, U.S.A.
Condition: Very Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with possible writing/highlighting. Binding strong with minor wear. Dust jackets/supplements may not be included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good. Seller Inventory # 67464733-75
Seller: California Books, Miami, FL, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # I-9780792362388
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 5004909-n
Seller: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Seller Inventory # 5004909
Seller: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Germany
Buch. Condition: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -(1) Beliefs are involuntary, and not nonnally subject to direct voluntary control. For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such things. (2) Beliefs are nonnally shaped by evidence for what is believed, unless they are, in some sense, irrational. In general a belief is rational if it is proportioned to the degree of evidence that one has for its truth. In this sense, one often says that 'beliefs aim at truth' . This is why it is, on the face of it, irrational to believe against the evidence that one has. A subject whose beliefs are not shaped by a concern for their truth, but by what she wants to be the case, is more or less a wishful thinker or a self-deceiver. (3) Beliefs are context independent, in the sense that at one time a subject believes something or does not believe it; she does not believe it relative to one context and not relative to another. For instance if I believe that Paris is a polluted city, I cannot believe that on Monday and not on Tuesday; that would be a change of belief, or a change of mind, but not a case of believing one thing in one context and another thing in another context. If I believe something, the belief is more or 4 less pennanent across various contexts. 312 pp. Englisch. Seller Inventory # 9780792362388
Seller: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, United Kingdom
Condition: New. Seller Inventory # 5004909-n
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Seller: moluna, Greven, Germany
Gebunden. Condition: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. (1) Beliefs are involuntary, and not nonnally subject to direct voluntary control. For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such thin. Seller Inventory # 5969265
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, United Kingdom
Condition: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Seller Inventory # 5004909
Quantity: Over 20 available
Seller: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Ireland
Condition: New. The notion of belief figures prominently in contemporary philosophy of language and mind and in cognitive science. This work features essays that address a range of issues concerning the complexity of our belief attitudes, their contents, and the influence of motivational factors on beliefs. Editor(s): Engel, Pascal. Series: Philosophical Studies Series. Num Pages: 307 pages, biography. BIC Classification: HPK. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 235 x 155 x 19. Weight in Grams: 1360. . 2000. Hardback. . . . . Seller Inventory # V9780792362388
Seller: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Germany
Buch. Condition: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - (1) Beliefs are involuntary, and not nonnally subject to direct voluntary control. For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such things. (2) Beliefs are nonnally shaped by evidence for what is believed, unless they are, in some sense, irrational. In general a belief is rational if it is proportioned to the degree of evidence that one has for its truth. In this sense, one often says that 'beliefs aim at truth' . This is why it is, on the face of it, irrational to believe against the evidence that one has. A subject whose beliefs are not shaped by a concern for their truth, but by what she wants to be the case, is more or less a wishful thinker or a self-deceiver. (3) Beliefs are context independent, in the sense that at one time a subject believes something or does not believe it; she does not believe it relative to one context and not relative to another. For instance if I believe that Paris is a polluted city, I cannot believe that on Monday and not on Tuesday; that would be a change of belief, or a change of mind, but not a case of believing one thing in one context and another thing in another context. If I believe something, the belief is more or 4 less pennanent across various contexts. Seller Inventory # 9780792362388