Taken from the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics, The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis: Other-Regarding Preferences is an authoritative and cutting edge guide to this essential topic for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. It considers the evidence from experimental games on human sociality, and gives models and applications of inequity aversion, intention based reciprocity, conditional cooperation, human virtues, and social identity.
This updated extract from Dhami's leading textbook allows the reader to pursue subsections of this vast and rapidly growing field and to tailor their reading to their specific interests in behavioural economics.
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Sanjit Dhami is Professor of Economics at the University of Leicester. He studied at the Delhi School of Economics and the University of Toronto for his Masters, MPhil, and PhD degrees in economics. He has previously taught at the Universities of Toronto, Essex, and Newcastle. His research has mainly focused on behavioral economic theory and its applications. He has published on the axiomatic foundations of the various components of prospect theory, behavioral political economy using other-regarding preferences, behavioral time preferences, foundations of behavioral game theory, and applications in tax evasion, stochastic dominance concepts under other-regarding preferences, and in behavioral law and economics.
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Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. Taken from the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics, The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis: Other-Regarding Preferences is an authoritative and cutting edge guide to this essential topic for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. It considers the evidence from experimental games on human sociality, and gives models and applications of inequity aversion, intention based reciprocity, conditional cooperation, humanvirtues, and social identity.This updated extract from Dhami's leading textbook allows the reader to pursue subsections of this vast and rapidly growing field and to tailor their reading totheir specific interests in behavioural economics. This is the second volume of focused texts developed from leading textbook The Foundations of Behavioral Economics. Authoritative, cutting edge, and accessible, this volume covers other-regarding preferences. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9780198837435
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