Going Critical; The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Wit, Joel S., and Poneman, Daniel B., and Gallucci, Robert L.

ISBN 10: 0815793863 / ISBN 13: 9780815793861

Published by Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2004

About this Item

xviii, [2], 474, [2] pages. DJ has slight wear and soiling. Minor edge soiling. Illustrations. Chronology. Notes. Index. Inscribed by Poneman on the fep To Vic Reis--A great public and original thinker on issues of greatest importance to us all--With respect and warm regards--Dan Poneman. Vic Reis is a technologist and former U.S. government official, best known as the architect and original sponsor of the U.S. nuclear Stockpile Stewardship Program. In Going Critical, three former U.S. officials who played key roles in the nuclear crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freeze and pledge ultimately to dismantle its plutonium production program under international inspection. Drawing on documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the authors chronicle the complex web of diplomacy from Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to Geneva, Moscow, and Vienna and back again that led to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. They explore the challenge of weaving together the military, economic, and diplomatic instruments employed to persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response. Some ten years after these intense negotiations, the Agreed Framework lies abandoned. The story of the 1994 confrontation provides important lessons for the United States as it grapples once again with a nuclear crisis on a peninsula that half a century ago claimed more than 50,000 American lives and today bristles with arms along the De-Militarized Zone separating the two Koreas. Joel S. Wit has served as Senior Advisor to Ambassador Robert L. Galluci from 1993-1995, where he developed strategies to help resolve the crisis over North Korea s weapons program, and as Coordinator for the US-North Korea Agreed Framework from 1995-1999, where he was the official in charge of implementation. He was also a key participant in the establishment of the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Prior to his efforts on the Agreed Framework, Wit was assigned to the State Department s Office of Strategic Nuclear Policy, where he was responsible for U.S. policy on a range of issues related to nuclear arms control and weapons proliferation. In that capacity from 1988 to 1992, Wit helped negotiate strategic arms control agreements with the former Soviet Union and participated in the Nunn-Lugar program to dismantle its nuclear weapons. Daniel Bruce Poneman (born March 12, 1956) is an American politician who was the United States Deputy Secretary of Energy from 2009 to 2014. Poneman was a principal of The Scowcroft Group, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C., in the eight years prior to his appointment to the United States Department of Energy. Robert L. Gallucci (born February 11, 1946) is an Italian American academic and diplomat, who formerly worked as president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. He previously served as dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, from 1996 to June 2009. During the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, Gallucci was the chief U.S. negotiator.

Seller Inventory # 90918

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Going Critical; The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis
• Publisher: Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC
• Publication Date: 2004
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0815793863
• ISBN 13: 9780815793861
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition: First Printing [Stated].
• Condition: Very good
• Dust Jacket Condition: Very good
• Signed: Signed by Author(s)
• Seller catalogs:
  • Nuclear Weapons

About this title

Synopsis

A decade before being proclaimed part of the "axis of evil," North Korea raised alarms in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as the pace of its clandestine nuclear weapons program mounted. When confronted by evidence of its deception in 1993, Pyongyang abruptly announced its intention to become the first nation ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, defying its earlier commitments to submit its nuclear activities to full international inspections.
U.S. intelligence had revealed evidence of a robust plutonium production program. Unconstrained, North Korea's nuclear factory would soon be capable of building about thirty Nagasaki-sized nuclear weapons annually. The resulting arsenal would directly threaten the security of the United States and its allies, while tempting cash-starved North Korea to export its deadly wares to America's most bitter adversaries.
In Going Critical, three former U.S. officials who played key roles in the nuclear crisis trace the intense efforts that led North Korea to freeze ―and pledge ultimately to dismantle ―its dangerous plutonium production program under international inspection, while the storm clouds of a second Korean War gathered. Drawing on international government documents, memoranda, cables, and notes, the authors chronicle the complex web of diplomacy--from Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing to Geneva, Moscow, and Vienna and back again ―that led to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework intended to resolve this nuclear standoff. They also explore the challenge of weaving together the military, economic, and diplomatic instruments employed to persuade North Korea to accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking a violent North Korean response.
Some ten years after these intense negotiations, the Agreed Framework lies abandoned. North Korea claims to possess some nuclear weapons, while threatening to produce even more. The story of the 1994 confrontation provides important lessons for the United States as it grapples once again with a nuclear crisis on a peninsula that half a century ago claimed more than 50,000 American lives and today bristles with arms along the last frontier of the cold war: the De-Militarized Zone separating North and South Korea.

About the Author

Joel S. Wit is a senior fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., USA. He served for 15 years in the Department of State and was coordinator for the 1994 U.S.–North Korea Agreed Framework.
Daniel B. Poneman is a senior fellow with the Forum for International Policy and a principal in The Scowcroft Group, USA. He served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, including nearly four years as special assistant to the President for nonproliferation.
Robert L. Gallucci is dean of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, USA. A career civil servant in the Department of State, he led the team that negotiated the Agreed Framework and served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs and ambassador-at-large.