Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning

Betts, Richard K.

ISBN 10: 0815709293 / ISBN 13: 9780815709299

Published by Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 1982

First trade paper edition. Light wear to corners o/w clean, unmarked with a solid and crease-free spine. TM/MilSc. Seller Inventory # ABE-1646957601905

Synopsis:

Long before Germany's blitzkrieg swept the West, European leaders had received many signals of its imminence. Stalin, too, had abundant warning of German designs on Russia but believed that by avoiding provocative defensive measures he could avert the attack that finally came in June 1941. And the stories of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, and three Arab-Israeli conflicts are replete with missed opportunities to react to unmistakable warnings. Richad K. Betts analyzes surprise attacks during the mid-twentieth century to illustrate his thesis: surprise attacks occur, not because intelligence services fail to warn, but because of the disbelief of political leaders.
Although the probability is low that the United States will fail to deter direct attack by the Soviet Union, Betts says, the intensity of the threat warrants painstaking analysis of how to cope with it. His own investigation of the historical, psychological, political, diplomatic, and military aspects of his subject heightens understanding of why surprise attacks succeed and why victim nations fail to respond to warnings. In discussing current policy he focuses on the defense of Western Europe and applies the lessons of history to U.S. defense planning, offering detailed recommendations for changes in strategy. Obviously some of the potential dangers of military surprise cannot be prevented. The important thing, he emphasizes, is that without forces that exceed requirements (the solution Moscow appears to have chosen), it is vital to ensure that what forces exist can be brought to bear when needed.

About the Author: Richard K. Betts is an adjunct senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, the Arnold A. Saltzman professor of war and peace studies, as well as director of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, and director of the international security policy program in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. On the faculty of Harvard University when he began work on The Irony of Vietnam, he completed it while a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Bibliographic Details

Title: Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press, Washington
Publication Date: 1982
Binding: Soft cover
Condition: Very Good
Edition: 1st Edition