Strategic Command and Control; Redefining the Nuclear Threat

Name: Strategic Command and Control; Redefining the Nuclear Threat
Rating: 4.22 (9 reviews)
Author: Blair, Bruce G.
ISBN: 9780815709817

Blair, Bruce G.

9 ratings by Goodreads

Language: English

Published by The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1985

0815709811 / 9780815709817

First Edition
Softcover
Used

See all details

Heritage seller

Seller: Ground Zero Books, Ltd., Silver Spring, MD, U.S.A.Ground Zero Books, Ltd.

5-star seller

AbeBooks seller since August 14, 1998

View this seller's items

Softcover

Condition: Used - Very good

£ 24.83

£ 3.71 shipping

Ships within U.S.A.

Quantity: 3 available

Add to basket

Save for laterCreate a Want for similar items

Item description from seller

xiv, 341, [13] pages. Illustrations, black & white. Abbreviations and Acronyms. Map. Footnotes. Index. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Bruce G. Blair (born 1947) is a nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He focuses on technical and policy steps on the path toward the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, specifically on deep bilateral nuclear arms reductions, multilateral arms negotiations and de-alerting of nuclear arsenals. In 2011, he was appointed to the U.S. Secretary of States International Security Advisory Board, a group of experts that provides the Department of State with independent insight and advice on all aspects of international security, disarmament and arms control. In 1999, he was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship Prize for his research and leadership on de-alerting nuclear forces. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence. First edition. First paperback edition. First printing [stated].

Seller Inventory # 71926

Contact seller about this item

Report this item

Title: Strategic Command and Control; Redefining the Nuclear Threat
Author: Blair, Bruce G.
Publisher: The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
Publication year: 1985
Condition: Very good
Binding: Trade paperback
Language: English
ISBN 10: 0815709811
ISBN 13: 9780815709817
Edition: 1st Edition
Seller catalogs: Deterrence, Nuclear Weapons

During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decisionmakers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence.

"Synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.

Ground Zero Books, Ltd.

Silver Spring, MD, U.S.A.

5-star seller

AbeBooks seller since August 14, 1998

Shipping rates within U.S.A.

Item	5 to 20 business days	3 to 6 business days
First item	£ 3.71	£ 5.56

Delivery times are set by sellers and vary by carrier and location. Orders passing through Customs may face delays and buyers are responsible for any associated duties or fees. Sellers may contact you regarding additional charges to cover any increased costs to ship your items.

Payment methods

Check
Invoice
Money Order
Paypal

Store description

Founded and operated by trained historians, Ground Zero Books, Ltd., serves the book collector, the scholar, and institutions. We focus on the individual, and pride ourselves on our personal service. Please contact us with your wants, as we have many books not yet listed in our database.

Specialty

Military History, Nuclear, American Revolution, Military Medicine, Vietnam, World War II, British Empire, World War I, Unit Histories, Civil War

Seller's business information

Ground Zero Books, Ltd.

9033 Georgia Avenue
Silver Spring, MD U.S.A. 20910-2254

Contact sellerView this seller's itemsView seller's storefront

Terms of sale

Books are subject to prior sale. Please ask us to hold a book for you before you
mail your check. Books are returnable within 7 days, if not satisfactory. MD
residents add 6% state sales tax.
The mailing address for Ground Zero Books, Ltd. (a subchapter-S corporation) is
P.O. Box 8369, Silver Spring, MD 20907-8369. You can reach us by phone at 301-
585-1471, by fax at 301-920-0253, or by e-mail at gzbooksltd@aol.com. Ground Zero
Books, Ltd., is owned & operated by R. Alan Lewis & Lynne Haims.

Right of withdrawal

If you are a consumer you can withdraw from the contract in accordance with the following. Consumer means any natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession.

Information regarding the right of withdrawal

Statutory right to withdraw

You have the right to withdraw from this contract within 14 days without giving any reason.

The withdrawal period will expire after 14 days from the day on which you acquire, or a third party other than the carrier and indicated by you acquires, physical possession of the last good or the last lot or piece.

To exercise the right of withdrawal, electronically fill in and submit a clear statement on our website, under "My Purchases" in "My Account". We will communicate to you an acknowledgement of receipt of such a withdrawal on a durable medium (e.g. by e-mail) without delay.

To meet the withdrawal deadline, it is sufficient for you to send your communication concerning your exercise of the right of withdrawal before the withdrawal period has expired.

Effects of withdrawal

If you withdraw from this contract, we will reimburse to you all payments received from you, including the costs of delivery (except for the supplementary costs arising if you chose a type of delivery other than the least expensive type of standard delivery offered by us).

We may make a deduction from the reimbursement for loss in value of any goods supplied, if the loss is the result of unnecessary handling by you.

We will make the reimbursement without undue delay, and not later than 14 days after the day on which we are informed about your decision to withdraw from this contract.

We will make the reimbursement using the same means of payment as you used for the initial transaction, unless you have expressly agreed otherwise; in any event, you will not incur any fees as a result of such reimbursement.

We may withhold reimbursement until we have received the goods back, or you have supplied evidence of having sent back the goods, whichever is the earliest.

You shall send back the goods or hand them over to Ground Zero Books, Ltd., Silver Spring, Maryland, U.S.A., +1 240-316-0119, without undue delay and in any event not later than 14 days from the day on which you communicate your withdrawal from this contract to us. The deadline is met if you send back the goods before the period of 14 days has expired. You will have to bear the direct cost of returning the goods. You are only liable for any diminished value of the goods resulting from the handling other than what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the goods.

Exceptions to the right of withdrawal

The right of withdrawal does not apply to:

The delivery of newspapers, journals or magazines with the exception of subscription contracts; and
The supply of digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium (e.g. on a CD or DVD) if you accepted when you placed your order that we could start to deliver it, and that you could not withdraw once delivery had started.

Shipping terms

Orders usually ship within 2 business days. Shipping costs are based on books
weighing 2.2 LB, or 1 KG. If your book order is heavy or oversized, we may contact
you to let you know extra shipping is required.

Strategic Command and Control; Redefining the Nuclear Threat

Item description from seller

Bibliographic details

Synopsis

About the title

From the Back Cover

Ground Zero Books, Ltd.

Shipping rates within U.S.A.

Payment methods

Store description

Specialty

Seller's business information

Terms of sale

Right of withdrawal

Shipping terms