Countering Cyber Sabotage: Introducing Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) introduces a new methodology to help critical infrastructure owners, operators and their security practitioners make demonstrable improvements in securing their most important functions and processes.
Current best practice approaches to cyber defense struggle to stop targeted attackers from creating potentially catastrophic results. From a national security perspective, it is not just the damage to the military, the economy, or essential critical infrastructure companies that is a concern. It is the cumulative, downstream effects from potential regional blackouts, military mission kills, transportation stoppages, water delivery or treatment issues, and so on. CCE is a validation that engineering first principles can be applied to the most important cybersecurity challenges and in so doing, protect organizations in ways current approaches do not. The most pressing threat is cyber-enabled sabotage, and CCE begins with the assumption that well-resourced, adaptive adversaries are already in and have been for some time, undetected and perhaps undetectable.
Chapter 1 recaps the current and near-future states of digital technologies in critical infrastructure and the implications of our near-total dependence on them. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the origins of the methodology and set the stage for the more in-depth examination that follows. Chapter 4 describes how to prepare for an engagement, and chapters 5-8 address each of the four phases. The CCE phase chapters take the reader on a more granular walkthrough of the methodology with examples from the field, phase objectives, and the steps to take in each phase. Concluding chapter 9 covers training options and looks towards a future where these concepts are scaled more broadly.
Andy Bochman is the Senior Grid Strategist for Idaho National Laboratory’s National and Homeland Security directorate. In this role, Mr. Bochman provides strategic guidance on topics at the intersection of grid security and resilience to INL leadership as well as senior US and international government and industry leaders. A frequent speaker, writer, and trainer, Mr. Bochman has provided analysis on electric grid and energy sector infrastructure security actions, standards, and gaps to the Department of Energy, Department of Defense, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC), and most of the US state utility commissions. Teaming with DOE, NARUC, USAID, and international partners, he has cyber-trained grid operators, and is a cybersecurity subject matter expert listed with the US State Department Speakers Bureau. Mr. Bochman has testified before the US Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on energy infrastructure cybersecurity issues and before FERC on the security readiness of smart grid cybersecurity standards. He has also held recurring conversations on grid security matters with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the National Security Council (NSC). Prior to joining INL, he was the Global Energy & Utilities Security Lead at IBM and a Senior Advisor at the Chertoff Group in Washington, DC. Mr. Bochman earned a Bachelor of Science degree from the US Air Force Academy and a Master of Arts degree from the Harvard University Extension School.
Sarah Freeman is an Industrial Control Systems (ICS) cyber security analyst at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), where she provides US government partners and private sector entities with actionable cyber threat intelligence, developing innovative security solutions for the critical infrastructure within the US. At Idaho National Laboratory, Ms. Freeman pursues innovative threat analysis and cyber defense approaches, most recently Consequence driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE). As Principle Investigator on a laboratory discretionary research, her current research is focused on new signatures and structured methods for cyber adversary characterization. Following the December 2015 electric grid attacks, Ms. Freeman participated in the DOE-sponsored training for Ukrainian asset owners in May 2016. She has also researched the Ukrainian 2015 and 2016 cyber-attacks and the Trisis/Hatman incident. Ms. Freeman earned a Bachelor of Arts from Grinnell College and a Master’s in Security and Intelligence Studies from the University of Pittsburgh.
