Coming to our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

Michael Devitt

ISBN 10: 0521495431 / ISBN 13: 9780521495431

Published by Cambridge University Press, 1995

About this Item

This is a fine, as new, hardcover first edition copy, blue cloth with gold stamping on the cover & spine, no DJ.

Seller Inventory # 089906

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Coming to our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Publication Date: 1995
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0521495431
• ISBN 13: 9780521495431
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition: First Edition
• Condition: As New
• Dust Jacket Condition: No DJ

About this title

Synopsis

Michael Devitt is a distinguished philosopher of language. In this book he takes up one of the most important difficulties that must be faced by philosophical semantics: namely, the threat posed by holism. Three important questions lie at the core of this book: what are the main objectives of semantics; why are they worthwhile; how should we accomplish them? Devitt answers these 'methodological' questions naturalistically and explores what semantic programme arises from the answers. The approach is anti-Cartesian, rejecting the idea that linguistic or conceptual competence yields any privileged access to meanings. This new methodology is used first against holism. Devitt argues for a truth-referential localism, and in the process rejects direct-reference, two-factor, and verificationist theories. The book concludes by arguing against revisionism, eliminativism, and the idea that we should ascribe narrow meanings to explain behaviour.

From the Back Cover

Michael Devitt is a distinguished philosopher of language. In this new book he takes up foundational issues in semantics. Three important questions lie at the core of this book: What are the main objectives of semantics? Why are they worthwhile? How should we accomplish them? Devitt answers these "methodological" questions naturalistically and explores what semantic program arises from the answers. The approach is anti-Cartesian, rejecting the idea that linguistic or conceptual competence yields any privileged access to meanings. A substantial contribution to the literature on meaning and intentionality, this important study will be of particular interest to philosophers of language and mind and could be used in graduate-level seminars in these areas. The book will also appeal to readers in linguistics and the other cognitive sciences.