The Challenger Launch Decision; Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA

Vaughan, Diane

ISBN 10: 0226851753 / ISBN 13: 9780226851754

Published by The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1996

About this Item

xv, [1], 575, [1] pages. Figures. Tables. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Ex-library with usual library markings. DJ in plastic sleeve. DJ flaps pasted inside boards. Diane Vaughan is an American sociologist and professor at Columbia University. She is known for her work on organizational and management issues, in particular in the case of the space shuttle Challenger crash. In the understanding of safety and risk, Vaughan is perhaps best known for coining the phrase "normalization of deviance", which she has used to explain the sociological causes of the Challenger and Columbia disasters. Vaughan defines this as a process where a clearly unsafe practice comes to be considered normal if it does not immediately cause a catastrophe. Vaughan received her Ph.D. in sociology from Ohio State University and is a laureate of the Public Understanding of Sociology Award, of the American Sociological Organization. When the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded on January 28, 1986, millions of Americans became bound together in a single, historic moment. Many still vividly remember exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard about the tragedy. Diane Vaughan recreates the steps leading up to that fateful decision, contradicting conventional interpretations to prove that what occurred at NASA was not skullduggery or misconduct but a disastrous mistake. Why did NASA managers, who not only had all the information prior to the launch but also were warned against it, decide to proceed? In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the managers and the engineers, Vaughan uncovers an incremental descent into poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. She reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable to them. Seller Inventory # 25186

Bibliographic Details

Title: The Challenger Launch Decision; Risky ...

Publisher: The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL

Publication Date: 1996

Binding: Hardcover

Condition: Good

Dust Jacket Condition: Fair

Edition: First Printing.

About this title

Synopsis:

The explosion of space shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986, and the death of the seven astronauts aboard had a major impact on American culture, with many people still vividly remembering exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard about the tragedy. Journalists and investigators have historically cited production problems and managerial wrong-doing as the reasons behind the disaster. The Presidential Commission uncovered a flawed decision-making process at the space agency as well, citing a well-documented history of problems with the O-ring and a dramatic last-minute protest by engineers over the Solid Rocket Boosters as evidence of managerial neglect. Why did NASA managers, who not only had all the information prior to the launch but also were warned against it, decide to proceed? In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the managers and the engineers, this book uncovers an incremental descent into poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. The author reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable to them. No safety rules were broken. No single individual was at fault. Instead, the cause of the disaster stemmed from the banality of organizational life. This work explains why the Challenger tragedy must be re-examined and seeks to offer a warning about the hidden hazards of living in this technological age.