The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth by Alperovitz Gar (6 results)

Hardcover. Condition: Fine. Dust Jacket Condition: Fine. 1st Edition. cloth, dust jacket, xiv, 847 pages,One of the most controversial issues absorbing America today: Was it necessary to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Fifty years after the fateful summer of 1945, we are still debating Harry Truman's decision. Now, in an exhaustive, thoroughly documented study of the events of that time, Gar Alperovitz makes plain why the United States did not need to deploy the bomb, how Truman was advised of alternatives to it by nearly every civilian and military adviser, and how his final decision was later justified by what amounted to a deception - the claim that the action saved half a million to a million American soldiers who might otherwise have died in an invasion.

large thick orange & black ½ cloth hardbound 8vo. dustwrapper in protective plastic. v fine cond. binding square & tight. couple of faint smudges on covers . edges clean. contents free of all markings. dustwrapper in fine cond. minor rubbing & wrinkling, not torn or price clipped. nice copy. no library markings, store stamps, stickers, bookplates, no names, inking , underlining, remainder markings etc ~first edition so stated. first printing (nap). xiv+847p+ about the author & colophon. appendix. notes.select bibliography. acknowledgments. index. deckled foredge (looks "hand cut")world history. american history. history of japan. world war ii. james f. byrnes. war in the pacific. harry s truman. FDR. atomic physics. nuclear weapons research. ~ One of the most controversial issues absorbing America today: Was it necessary to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Fifty years after the fateful summer of 1945, we are still debating Harry Truman's decision. Now, in an exhaustive, thoroughly documented study of the events of that time, Gar Alperovitz makes plain why the United States did not need to deploy the bomb, how Truman was advised of alternatives to it by nearly every civilian and military adviser, and how his final decision was later justified by what amounted to a deception~the claim that the action saved half a million to a million American soldiers who might otherwise have died in an invasion. Alperovitz demonstrates that Japan was close to surrender, that it was profoundly threatened by the prospect of Soviet entry into the war, and that American leaders knew the end was near. Military commanders like Eisenhower, Arnold, and Leahy saw no need to use the bomb; most of Truman's key Cabinet members urged a clarification of the position of Japan's Emperor to speed surrender. But the inexperienced president listened most intently to his incoming secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, and Byrnes was convinced the bomb would be an important diplomatic instrument in dealing with the Soviets. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb is based on many years of archival research and includes important new documentary discoveries. It assesses who knew what and when, and who did what and why. It is the fullest account yet written of this momentous and sobering episode in twentieth~century history.

Hardcover. First Edition; First Printing. Very Good+ in a Very Good+ dust jacket. Foxing on to text block edge. Light shelfwear on rear panel side edge. ; 7 X 2.25 X 9.5 inches.

Condition: good. Fast Shipping - Good and clean conditions used book. Pages and cover are intact. Limited notes marks and highlighting may be present. May show signs of normal shelf wear and bends on edges. Item may be missing CDs or access codes. May include library marks.

Gilt decorated hard cover. Stated first edition. Important reference work. Very scarce in this condition. Fine copy in fine dust jacket (in mylar). As new. 847 pps.

Hardcover. Condition: Fine in Fine dust jacket. 847 pp. Footnotes. Appendix. Notes. Selected Bibliography. Index. Stating that the United States did not have to use the atomic bomb in order to win the war, a detailed study profiles a defeated Japan while citing the influences of such figures as Dwight Eisenhower and James F. Byrnes on the decision.