Plan Attacking Spanish Settlements West (1 results)

An intriguing, unsigned early 18th-century manuscript, outlining a plan of attack against all Spanish possessions in the Americas with an army of soldiers and sailors raised in the British colonies in North America and the Caribbean. Half strategic document and half sales pitch, this plan describes the selection of officers, recruitment of soldiers in America, timelines and troop strength for assaults on Portobelo, Cartagena, Havana, Lima, and Vera Cruz, and, perhaps most importantly, the vast material wealth to be found in the Spanish colonies. It is unclear to what degree this document represents an official plan, or whether it was devised by a military authority, a government minister, or perhaps a deeply invested merchant. Spain's possessions in the New World were long the subject of British envy. The current plan likely dates from the years either immediately preceding or following the Anglo-Spanish War of 172729, and certainly prior to the War of Jenkins' Ear, during which a strategy quite similar to this was employed. This unknown strategist's scheme is optimistic, presuming that a relatively small force of twenty ships and about 12,000 men would be sufficient for the endeavor. "In order to this undertaking," the document begins, "it will be necessary for Officers to be Appointed and dispatched to the several Colonies his Majesty is Posses'd of in America to raise men, the Americans being more proper for this enterprise than Europeans because most of those who will List for this Expedition have already been in the West Indies and are Seasoned to those Climes and Consequently will not be so subject to Sickness and Mortality as Raw unexperienced Europeans besides they are more Inur'd to Arms and will take less time to Discipline." Disease was always a concern for European campaigns in the West Indies indeed, this passage may seem to suggest that the plan was formulated shortly after the Ango-Spanish War, which culminated in a disastrous failed siege of Cartagena; estimates of casualties caused by illness range from eighty to ninety percent. In order to avoid a repeat performance, the author suggests that it will be necessary to encourage American recruits by supplying them with arms and ammunition at no cost, guaranteed passage home after hostilities cease, and by promising that all plunder taken on land be split equitably among the army and navy. The selected officers are to follow a swift timeline, arriving in America in May, raising their regiments by July, and rendezvousing in Jamaica in September. The document suggests a quota of soldiers to be raised from each colony, including 800 from Massachusetts, 200 from New Hampshire, 500 from Rhode Island, 1500 from "New York and the Jerseys" (with an additional 300 from Long Island), 800 from Pennsylvania, 1000 from Virginia and Maryland, 1000 from "both the Carolinas," and several hundred from each of the islands in the West Indies then controlled by the British. Notably, Georgia does not factor into any of these plans, suggesting that they were formulated prior to its establishment in 1732. At the same time as the American units were to gather in Jamaica, twelve Men of War and two regiments of veteran regulars would sail directly from Britain, pausing in Madera to pick up wine for the expedition. At that point: "It is highly probable that by the end of September the whole fleet and Army will be Joyned and ready for any undertaking in October, which will be the properest time of year to enter upon Action, the Hurrycane months being then over and the Raines ceased, the weather will be more moderate and consequently the Army will not endure the Fitigue as they Necessarily must in the Hotter and Rainy months. Cartagena and Porto Bello may be both attacked at the same time, a Small Force being able to Reduce the latter; and when Conquer'd the Forces may either joyn the Grand Army at Cartagena or else Attack Chagres which can make but little Risistance." This plan was carried out in 1740, when Admiral Vernon did indeed conquer Portobelo as easily as hoped, sending ships on to capture Chagres in short order. Despite a force of nearly ten times as many ships as this document recommends, however, the siege of Cartagena proved more challenging: Spanish fortifications stopped the assault dead in its tracks, and an outbreak of Yellow Fever rendered the completion of this plan more or less impossible. Ultimately, the British suffered well over 20,000 casualties in the war, more than double the total force suggested herein. Had the British succeeded in capturing Cartagena, this document suggests they should have moved on to Havana, "the Key of the Gulph of Florida," which would also give them the means to neuter all trade between Veracruz and Europe, "and thereby the whole Commerce of Spain to those parts will be Intirely Cut off." Not content with Mexico and the West Indies, this ambitious plan suggests a simultaneous assault on South America, and in particular the capture of Lima. In this section, the author spends significantly more time arguing for the viability of the strategy and potential rewards for its success than in the first. The South American invasion force would be about half the size of the West Indies army and navy, and would need to set sail about a year earlier in order to round the Cape. They would make a base of operations on the small island of Chiloe, "which is stored with plenty of Cattle, Corn and fruits.The inhabitants are mostly Indians, which are subject to the Spaniards where they have a small Forte, but can make but little Risistance so that this Island may be immediately Seised, the Forte repaired, and a Garrison left therein." From Chiloe they would sail in great secrecy to Lima. Despite an estimated population of 30-40,000, the author expects little resistance, as "they live in such Security that few have good fire arms, and fewer have Courage enough to know how to make use of 'em, but are wholly given up to Ef.