Chinese Policies Limiting Nuclear Weapons by Yoder Amos (3 results)

Softcover. Condition: Fair. 32 pages. Ex-university library marks, heavy wear to the edge from being glued inside of a folder previously; label on the back cover; a solid booklet still. Quantity Available: 1. Category: Sociology & Politics; Inventory No: 220050.

Paperback. Condition: Very Good. Occas Paper 22, 32 pp., Blue Paperback, VG.

Wraps. Condition: Good. Presumed First Edition, First printing. 32 pages. Notes. References. Ink notation on title page. Cover has some wear and soiling. Some minor page staining/soiling noted. Scarce. Amos Yoder was the Borah Distinguished Profess of Political Science at the University of Idaho. Prior to that appointment he was a member of the US diplomatic corps. His tours of duty included political-military affairs on the China Desk, UN economic and social affairs in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, and assignments in Thailand, Israel, the Pentagon, and on German affairs. His experience in the diplomatic and academic fields are evident in his assessment of Chinese policies. The Stanley Foundation Occasional Papers are original essays on international organizations and/or US foreign policy. Stanley Foundation activities are designed to encourage study, research, and education in the field of foreign relations. This Occasional Paper is part of a continuing effort on the part of the Stanley Foundation to disseminate pertinent information about nuclear policy. Since the mid-1950s China has channeled a high proportion of its best technical and industrial resource into building nuclear weapons. The Chinese conducted their first nuclear test in 1964, By 1967 they tested a four-megaton weapons. Observers expected the Chinese to increase their nuclear warheads rapidly as they try to strengthen their deterrent. There was significant debate within the U.S. national security community about whether to try to bring the Chinese into the heretofore bilateral nuclear arms control talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. However, perceived Chinese vulnerability to a first strike and significantly smaller size of their arsenal resulted in a lack of significant interest on the part of the Chinese in participation unless the two superpowers were willing to reduce numbers to rough parity with China. This was a non-starter.