Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Paperback. Condition: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 1.15.
Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press CUP, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Add to basketCondition: New. pp. 336 2:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam.
Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline. As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and contemporary case studies, this book lays out the first systematic explanation of why decentralized countries have had dramatically different fiscal experiences. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
Published by Cambridge University Press, 2010
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Add to basketPaperback. Condition: Very Good. Spine not creased. 230 x 155 mm. xvi, 324 pp. Reprint. First published 2006. A clean, bright copy. Book.
Published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
First Edition
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Add to basketSoft Cover. Condition: Good. No Jacket. Reprint. From an academic library with the usual stamps etc. Covers have been laminated. A00024349.
Published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
First Edition
£ 12
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Add to basketSoft Cover. Condition: Good. No Jacket. Reprint. From an academic library with the usual stamps etc. Covers have been laminated. A00024350.
Published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
First Edition
£ 12
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Add to basketSoft Cover. Condition: Good. No Jacket. Reprint. From an academic library with the usual stamps etc. Covers have been laminated. A00024347.
Published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
First Edition
£ 12
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Add to basketSoft Cover. Condition: Good. No Jacket. Reprint. From an academic library with the usual stamps etc. Covers have been laminated. A00024348.
Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Published by Cambridge University Press 2010-03-09, 2010
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Language: English
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Published by CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2006
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Add to basketCondition: Brand New. Brand New! Fast Delivery This is an International Edition and ship within 24-48 hours. Deliver by FedEx and Dhl, & Aramex, UPS, & USPS and we do accept APO and PO BOX Addresses. Order can be delivered worldwide within 7-11 days and we do have flat rate for up to 2LB. Extra shipping charges will be requested if the Book weight is more than 5 LB. This Item May be shipped from India,& United states & United Kingdom. Depending on your location and availability.
Published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge / New York, 2006
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Original-kartoniert. Condition: Sehr gut. gr8 Original-kartoniert en 313 pp.
Published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Add to basketPaperback. Condition: new. Paperback. As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline. As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and contemporary case studies, this book lays out the first systematic explanation of why decentralized countries have had dramatically different fiscal experiences. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.
Published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Add to basketPaperback. Condition: new. Paperback. As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline. As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and contemporary case studies, this book lays out the first systematic explanation of why decentralized countries have had dramatically different fiscal experiences. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.
Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10: 0521603668 ISBN 13: 9780521603669
Language: English
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Add to basketTaschenbuch. Condition: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.