Hall Gardner

What do my books have in common? (See also my website for my CV, commentaries, other publications, activities and information: http://www.hallgardner.com)

My latest book, World War Trump: The Risks of America’s New Nationalism (published by Prometheus Books in March 2018), seeks to critically analyse many of Trump’s foreign and domestic policy flip-flops since he unexpectedly became the American president. The book provides a deeper analysis behind newspaper headlines and scandal sheets in order to explain what is happening in terms of the US-Russian (and Chinese) nuclear and conventional arms race, alliance relationships, the global trade and financial crisis, the US federal debt, Latin American and Moslem immigration issues, gun control issues, Russian interference in the US election process, among other domestic American political affairs since Trump came to power. The book thus seeks to explain both the domestic and international factors that are impacting Trump’s version of "America First" nationalism (including the possibility of his impeachment) and the significant risks and dangers involved in his policies.

World War Trump (WWT) differs from my previous books in that my purpose is to open up a national and international debate on a number of American foreign and domestic policies.

On the international side, the book argues for an alternative foreign policy that is intended to engage Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea in peace-oriented diplomacy, while concurrently ‘fighting’ the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in concert with other major powers and with greater diplomatic finesse. World War Trump argues that Trump’s often contradictory foreign and defense policies have begun to exacerbate the real possibility that the global state system could soon polarize into two contending alliances, with Russia, China, Iran, among other states, aligning against the US, NATO, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.

The danger is that Trump's erratic policies will not only antagonize major rivals, such as Russia and China, but they could also anger major US Allies in NATO, the European Union, and ASEAN, as well, particularly given his ideological support for anti-immigrant far-right anti-NATO anti-European Union nationalist movements in Europe and elsewhere. Washington's fear that US allies, such as Turkey or Philippines, among others, could soon defect from US hegemonic controls, and begin to move into neutrality or even side with Russia or China, will further aggravate global tensions given the fact that Washington's fear is mirrored by Moscow's fear that Ukraine could eventually regain Crimea (after Moscow's annexation in 2014) and that Belarus could defect from Russian alliance controls, plus by Beijing's fear that Taiwan could demand independence, leading other regions in China to demand secession. This dynamic—in which the US fears the disintegration of its global system of alliances and in which Russia and China both fear their potential disaggregation as multinational empires—in effect impels the US, as well as Russia/China, to attempt to reassert tight controls over their respective spheres of influence and security—while engaging in a dangerous new arms race against each other.

The book argues that if the global state system does continue to polarize then it will become even more likely that US disputes with North Korea, or a conflict in the wider Middle East involving the US, Russia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, among other actors, or a US confrontation with China over Taiwan or else a conflict between the US and other powers with China over islands in the South and East China Seas, could then escalate into a major power war. Moreover, a Trump administration decision to engage in a so-called “preventive war” with Iran and/or with North Korea could soon spark a wider regional conflict—if not draw in Russia, China and/or other regional powers.

On the domestic side, the fact that Trump has threatened a major conventional and nuclear weapons buildup will further augment the domestic and global influence of what President Eisenhower had called the “military-industrial” (and congressional) complex. (WWT, 57-70) The more Trump attempts to assert his Presidential power and thoroughly militarize American society, the more his new military buildup will polarize American society into conflicting factions. Trump’s version of “America First” nationalism and militarism is most clearly illustrated by his strong anti-immigrant stance, which can impact Mexican and Latin American political-economic stability and intensify the ongoing drug wars (WWT, p.85-87), plus his stubborn reluctance to engage in strong gun control measures even after a spate of mass shootings during his first year in office. (WWT, 47-56). Trump’s nationalism and militarism is also illustrated by his February 2018 directive to the Pentagon to organize a costly national military parade (as predicted he would do in the book, WWT, p.57)—at a time when he is concurrently making massive budget cuts in health care and other social and environmental protection programs, in addition to cutting back State Department and other government expenditure.

The book further warns against "America First" economic protectionism similar to that illustrated by Trump's March 2018 autocratic directive (opposed by his own economic advisor and many Republicans) to impose tariffs on steel and aluminium imports on countries with large trade surpluses with the US. The issue is important, and needs addressing, but not in the way Trump has gone about it. And it is certainly not the right time to bludgeon South Korea in particular over the head due its trade surplus with the US when Seoul has just begun to engage in delicate negotiations with North Korea over the question of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons and missile programs.

The trade and tariff issue needs to be handled on a country-by-country basis. Across the board protectionism as first threatened by Trump will not serve the interests of the majority of Americans and could cause an inter-Allied trade war that could harm both US and Allied political-economic and consumer interests—but without substantially hurting China, which represents the major US trade rival, and which only exports to the US less than 2% of the US demand for steel. As argued in the book, Beijing has already begun to search for alternatives to the US market by expanding its global outreach through its Belt and Road Initiative; China will additionally benefit greatly from Trump's rash decision to dump the Trans-Pacific Partnership that had been negotiated by President Obama. (WWT, 152-155.)

World War Trump argues that the way Trump came to power and his efforts to strengthen presidential rule raise significant questions about the nature of American democratic governance. These questions involve deep voter alienation and the fact that Trump won by the electoral college, and not by the popular vote; the issue of congressional “vetocracy” and the bicameral system; the tremendous influence of domestic lobby groups, such as the National Rifle Association, among many others, on domestic and international policy; the problematic impact of the two-term American presidency upon both domestic and foreign policy; alleged Russian and "illegal" immigrant impact on the US presidential election; not to overlook the burgeoning federal, state, and local (and personal) debt crises—in which the federal debt crisis is being made much worse by Trump’s conventional and nuclear arms buildup and the nationalist and militarist orientation of many of Trump’s domestic and foreign policies.

As argued in the final chapter and in the postscript, "It Can Happen Here," World War Trump warns against Trump's efforts to expand his presidential powers and to strengthen the power and influence of the military-industrial and congressional complex. Given Trump's authoritarian predilections and his efforts to augment the powers of the US presidency, the book hopes to raise a national debate as to whether the US system of indirect liberal democratic governance may eventually require significant legal and constitutional reforms—in order to reduce the huge costs of American government and make it more effective—while concurrently reducing the power of the presidency and augmenting democratic participation in all dimensions of American society.(WWT, p. 287-290)

In sum, World War Trump argues that Trump's renewed military build-up will not be able to force either Moscow or Beijing to capitulate—in that Russia and China can forge a closer alliance and engage in asymmetrical measures to counter US military pressures and economic sanctions. In the near future, the United States will not only need to re-formulate its foreign and defense policy, but it must also radically reform its system of governance and its domestic political-economy—if it is to achieve peace abroad while working to mitigate tendencies toward even deeper social, economic, and political polarisation within the United States itself during a socio-political-economic crisis that will be exacerbated by Trump's authoritarian, nationalist and militarist policies.

The possibility that Washington could actually engage in a peace-oriented diplomacy assumes that Trump will either be forced to step down from power much like Richard Nixon or, more dubiously, that Trump can radically alter his domestic and international policies in the near future, somewhat like Ronald Reagan did, but only in his second term of office. (WWT, p. 290)

The book foresees the possibility that Trump would meet Kim Jong UN and how Trump handles North Korea may prove to be his test case of peace or war. (WWT, p. 259) The risk is that if Trump fails to forge a peace settlement with North Korea—and he could fail precisely because his visit might not be properly prepared, because the situation between the two Koreas and between the US and North Korea is not really ripe for resolution, and because both Trump and Kim have big egos and great expectations that might not be met—then an even more dangerous nuclear and conventional weapons confrontation could begin. And North Korea is not the only challenge.

Trump's choice of neo-conservative and bureaucratic infighter John Bolton in March 2018 as national security adviser represents a complete about-face from Trump's anti-official Washington presidential campaign stance and threatens to further isolate the last remaining "realist"—who has been willing to engage in real diplomacy to resolve a number of US disputes with Iran, North Korea, Turkey, Russia and China, on Trump's staff, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis—just after the ousting of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and his replacement by hardliner Mike Pompeo. The war drums are beating.

If Washington—whether or not Trump remains in power—does not soon begin to engage in bilateral and concerted forms of peace-oriented diplomacy and conflict resolution/ transformation in the quest to mend US diplomatic relations with both friends and rivals alike—the alternative could well be the aggravation of domestic and global tensions, if not World War Trump.

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My previous book, Crimea, Global Rivalry, and the Vengeance of History, published by Palgrave Macmillan in August 2015, analyses the long term causes and consequences of Moscow's annexation of Crimea and its political-military interference in eastern Ukraine. The books picks up on points of my first book, Surviving the Millennium, which first warned in 1994 of a possible pessimistic scenario in which Moscow might eventually opt for the annexation of Crimea. Crimea, Global Rivalry, and the Vengeance of History also responds to Francis Fukuyama's 1995 Foreign Affairs review of my first book---while additionally critiquing Fukuyama's more recent arguments in reference to Ukraine and other issues---by arguing that the post-Cold War world was never at the "end of history." Rather, homo geopoliticus is presently experiencing the "vengeance of history"---a dangerous period that must be surmounted by reaching a difficult accommodation with Russia and China, among other states. The book then reviews a number of geostrategic options, based on a mix of historical analogies to World War I, World War II, plus contemporary analysis. The intent of such a global strategy is to minimize the possibility of wider regional wars---as well as the real possibility of major power war. It is argued that the present crisis represents a mix of the pre-World War I analogy (based on my interpretation of the origins of WWI, as argued in The Failure to Prevent World War I: The Unexpected Armageddon) and pre-World War II analogy---but that Russian actions against Ukraine are more like those of Lenin during the interwar period, than the much later actions of Hitler in annexing the Sudetenland.

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Published in February 2015, The Failure to Prevent World War I: The Unexpected Armageddon originated in my PhD dissertation (1987) at the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, which had compared and contrasted the geopolitical, political-economic, military technological and diplomatic dynamics between Great Britain and Germany that led to World War I in the period from 1870 to 1914 to the US-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. Following Soviet collapse, my first book, Surviving the Millennium (1994) then updated the multiple dimensions of US-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. Despite Soviet collapse, my study of the World War I period was not, however, entirely left in limbo. I began to engage in deeper research on the subject, particularly as I realized that most studies on the origins of WWI written in English tended to focus primarily on Anglo-German relations, but of course with a number of important studies on Austrian and Russian perspectives. And yet there seemed to be relatively fewer studies written on the French perspective.

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My first step was consequently to update my previous research for one of the chapters of the Ashgate Research Companion to War: Origins and Prevention, which I edited with Oleg Kobtzeff in 2012. But in working on that chapter, I realized that a truly systemic and long-term historical approach to the origins of World War I, which brought in the French perspective on Alsace Lorraine since the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian war, was crucial to an understanding of the causes of the Armageddon of 1914-18. It is consequently in researching through official French documents that I discovered that French sources had reported in March 1911 that Berlin and Vienna had hoped to place the eldest son of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of the House of Habsburg-Lorraine and heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Maximilian, as the royal governor of Alsace-Lorraine. If Maximilian was made royal governor of Alsace-Lorraine, it would, in effect, provide a royal legitimacy to Austro-German control over the annexed territory, and help solidify the Austria-German alliance against their rivals. I then discovered, too late to include in the book that had already gone to press, that the secret meeting of Kaiser Wilhelm II with the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Konopischt on 13-14 June 1914 (which was relayed by the Tsarist secret police) reconfirmed those secret French reports dating from March 1911. In effect, this represents a smoking gun (but not conclusive proof) to argue that the Russians, Serbs, as well as the French, all had reasons to eliminate the Archduke Ferdinand. The problem, and what requires deeper research, is that all French documents dealing with the relationship between the Archduke and Alsace Lorraine—in addition to reports on those who were involved in that assassination—were removed from the public domain. The smoking gun is there. But will the truth ever be revealed?

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My book, NATO Expansion and US Strategy in Asia (Palgrave-MacMillan, 2013) picks up from my previous book, Averting Global War and critiques US and NATO policy from a global and systemic perspective. It argues that NATO enlargement, combined with the US pivot to Asia, could press Russia and a rising China into a tighter alliance—but with Russia playing the role of a junior partner. This book argues for bringing Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey into a new Euro-Atlantic confederation, not only in order to draw Moscow away from forging a closer military relationship with Beijing and prevent Russo-Ukrainian conflict, but also to help revitalize a Europe in crisis. Concurrently, Washington and Moscow need to work together to prevent disputes between North and South Korea, Japan, and China, as well as between Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iran from exploding into a major power war. The book provides background for the Japanese and Chinese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands,for example, among other conflicts in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere, that could potentially draw the United States into the fray.

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My edited book, The Ashgate Companion to War: Origins and Prevention (Ashgate 2012), with Oleg Kobtzeff, features 29 essays of differing authors who seek to explicate theories as to the origins of war under the general concept of "polemology." The book analyzes the roots of significant conflicts from the Peloponnesian wars to World War II and examines the ramifications of Cold War and post-Cold War conflict. It also looks at long cycles of systemic conflict, and speculates, in part, whether another global war is theoretically possible, and if so, whether such a war (which may be very different than more recent "world wars") can be averted. My own contribution in the General Introduction critiques democratic peace theory, claims to "nuclear peace" and hegemonic stability theory (linked to neo-conservatism) as ostensible means to preserve global peace. I argue that the possibility of major power warfare is not necessarily "waning" nor "passing from the scene" as Francis Fukuyama, among others, argued in the aftermath of the Cold War. My chapter "Alienation and the Origins and Prevention of War" seeks to re-define and expand the concept of alienation as examined by Karl Marx, among others, by systematically developing the multidimensional concepts of alienation involving inter-state, inter-societal (as well as intra-societal) alienation—in addition to the general alienation of mankind from nature under contemporary state-capitalist forms of development. My chapter "The Failure to Prevent World War I" seeks to provide an alternative perspective to that of historian Paul Kennedy. My final chapter, "Reflections on Polemology" seeks to explicate apparent long cycles of systemic conflict in terms of wars of initial challenge and wars of revenge, and argues for an alternative global strategy designed to bring Russia into a larger Euro-Atlantic confederation, but without alienating China or other significant powers, while simultaneously seeking to implement a world-wide confederation of interlinked and internationalized "regional security and development communities."

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My book, Averting Global War: Regional Challenges, Overextension, and Options for American Strategy (2007; 2010)- published in paperback- argues that warfare among major powers and/or else wider regional wars represent real possibilities if a concerted US-NATO-European-Russian and Japanese relationship (in working with China where possible) cannot soon be established. Such a war would not at all be like that of either World War I or World War II, but could be sparked by regional instabilities and significant acts of terrorism. The book moves around the globe in analyzing key hot spots: NATO-Russia-Ukraine-Eastern Europe/ the Caucasus, Iraq, Iran, Israel and the Palestinians, the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, North-South Korea, China-Taiwan, Colombia-Venezuela and the Tex-Mex border, among other areas. While recognizing regional specificity, the book frames ways to resolve disputes/conflicts through the establishment of internationalized and interlocking "regional security communities." Averting Global War (2007) clearly predicted the possibility of war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, among other scenarios that could generate even wider and more dangerous conflicts—forewarning likewise of Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

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My book, American Global Strategy and the 'War on Terrorism' (2005; 2007 paperback), examines the ramifications of the 'global war on terrorism' after the September 11 attacks and American military expansionism. It traces the rise of American neo-conservatism (from Alexander Hamilton) and critiques the reasons for the essentially unilateral American intervention in Iraq. The book likewise examines questions concerning the dialectics of state-supported and anti-state terrorism, the risks of nuclear proliferation (and nuclear terrorism), the dangers of political-economic instability in a nuclear Pakistan, and the apparently rising clash of values, goals and interests between the US and Europe that must soon be overcome if the Americans and Europeans are to show themselves capable of ultimately transcending the global disequilibrium. The book proposes a more concerted US, European and Russian strategy.

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My book, Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the Future of NATO (1997), focused on the post-Cold War period and the domestic and international reasons Washington opted to enlarge NATO. I argued that NATO enlargement would not only risk a Russian backlash, but could eventually overextend American/NATO capabilities as well. Dangerous Crossroads consequently outlined differing approaches to NATO enlargement, but argued for establishing a more concerted relationship with Russia that would in turn guarantee the security concerns of eastern European states (including a "neutral" Ukraine which was key to long-term European stability) by means of strengthening the NATO Partnership for Peace initiative and by implementing and extending overlapping US/NATO, European and Russian security guarantees to central and eastern European states.

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My book, Surviving the Millennium: American Global Strategy, and the Question of Peace (1994), was written in response to the collapse of the Soviet Union and argued against the triumphalist wave of "end of history" theosophy. After analyzing the dual nature of US-Soviet rivalry and collaboration, in emphasizing the joint US-Soviet role in "double containing" the potential power capabilities of a number of states throughout the Cold War, I argued that the collapse of Soviet global influence would open the door to the rise of new states and socio-political movements that would soon challenge American predominance. In response, and rather than seeking to implement a policy of neo-containment of Russia that could cause a Russian backlash (if not a dangerous break-up of the Russian Federation), the US needed to find ways to establish a US-European-Russian-Japanese concert that would seek to channel China's rise as a major military and political economic actor, while at the same time seeking to stem the rise of a number of states and socio-political movements that could seek to further destabilize the global system through significant acts of terrorism, support for revolutions, or through the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction, for example. It warned of the possibility of Russian annexation of Ukraine and of Russo-Ukraine conflict in one of the pessimistic scenarios.

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My first book of poems, The Wake-Up Blast (2008), captures over three decades of poetic protest and dissent, recounted through the lens of personal encounters throughout the world. I have a number of poetry books, short stories and two novels in the stage of near completion. I have completed a novel, Da Zi Bao: Red Empire Changing Colors, which is based on my actual experience in China in the period 1988-89 prior to the government crackdown on student demonstrators on Tiananmen Square.

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My edited books (prior to The Ashgate Companion to War: Origins and Prevention) are based upon conferences that I either participated in or organized.

My edited book, NATO and the European Union: New World, New Europe, New threats, was based on a conference of the same title that I set up, quite by accident, on December 7-8, 2001, Pearl Harbor Day, at the French Senate, just after the September 11 attacks. My contributions in the book deal with the shift from nuclear 'balance to imbalance of terror' (dealing with the global spread of nuclear capabilities and the development of Ballistic Missile Defense systems); the need to establish new Euro-Atlantic, Euro-Mediterranean Security Communities; plus the global ramifications of the Iraq war. There are some excellent chapters written by top scholars dealing with the future of NATO, with US-EU relations, and with the 'war on terrorism'.

The New Transatlantic Agenda: Facing the Challenges of Global Governance (Ashgate, 2001) was based on a conference organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali. It was reissued by Routledge in 2017. The book has excellent contributions from top scholars and foreign policy analysts. My chapter on "Russia and China: The Risks of Uncoordinated Transatlantic Strategies" discussed the fallout from the war "over" Kosovo, and issues such as Schengen, Kaliningrad, Turkey, pan-Islam and China. It warned that NATO "may be drawn unwillingly into burgeoning conflict" in Afghanistan (page 140-141). The book was published just before the September 11, 2001 attacks, yet much of the analysis is still relevant.

My first edited book, Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition: Perspectives on Success and Failure Since 1989 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999), was based on a lecture series of top experts on eastern Europe hosted by the International Affairs Department of American University of Paris in 1998. It has a number of excellent chapters that reflect upon the post-1989 transition period from Communism. My contribution "The Genesis of NATO Enlargement and of War 'over' Kosovo" critiqued NATO's expansion and military intervention in Kosovo.

See also my website for my CV, commentaries, other publications, activities and information: http://www.hallgardner.com