Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts

Suren Basov

ISBN 10: 981109313X / ISBN 13: 9789811093135

Published by Springer Nature Singapore, Springer Nature Singapore Jun 2018, 2018

About this Item

Neuware -This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation.Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design.This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 188 pp. Englisch.

Seller Inventory # 9789811093135

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts
• Publisher: Springer Nature Singapore, Springer Nature Singapore Jun 2018
• Publication Date: 2018
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 981109313X
• ISBN 13: 9789811093135
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 235W x 155H x 11D millimeters 235 millimeters width by 155 millimeters height by 11 millimeters depth
• Weight: 295 grams

About this title

Synopsis

This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation.
Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design.
This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.

About the Author

Suren Basov is a visitor to the Centre for Economics and Financial Econometrics at Deakin University, Australia. His research interests lie in the areas of mechanism design, with a particular emphasis on multidimensional screening models, the theory of bounded rationality, and evolutionary game theory. He also does research in the areas of directed search and unemployment, and incentive provision within clubs, with a particular application to Islamic finance.