Self-Consciousness and Objectivity

Sebastian Rödl

ISBN 10: 0674976517 / ISBN 13: 9780674976511

Published by Harvard University Press, 2018

About this Item

Sebastian Roedl undermines a foundational dogma of contemporary philosophy: that knowledge, in order to be objective, must be knowledge of something that is as it is, independent of being known to be so. This profound work revives the thought that knowledge.

Seller Inventory # 225913285

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Self-Consciousness and Objectivity
• Publisher: Harvard University Press
• Publication Date: 2018
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0674976517
• ISBN 13: 9780674976511
• Binding: Hardcover
• Condition: New

About this title

Synopsis

Self-Consciousness and Objectivity undermines a foundational dogma of contemporary philosophy: that knowledge, in order to be objective, must be knowledge of something that is as it is, independent of being known to be so. Sebastian Rödl revives the thought―as ancient as philosophy but largely forgotten today―that knowledge, precisely on account of being objective, is self-knowledge: knowledge knowing itself. Thus he intervenes in a discussion that runs through the work of Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel, Adrian Moore, and others, who seek to comprehend the claim to objectivity we raise in making judgments. While these authors think that the quest for objectivity demands that we transcend the first person, Rödl argues that it is through the first-person thought contained in every judgment that our judgments possess the objectivity that defines knowledge.

Self-Consciousness and Objectivity can be read as an introduction to absolute idealism, for it dismantles a stubborn obstacle to absolute idealism’s reception: the notion that it is a species of idealism, which is understood to be the assertion that the world depends upon the mind. As Rödl brings out, absolute idealism is the resolute rejection of that idea.

The implications of this work are profound. It undercuts a number of contemporary presumptions, such as that judgment is a propositional attitude, that inference is a mental process, and that there is an empirical science of the capacity for objective knowledge. All of these presumptions flow from the erroneous notion that the objectivity of knowledge stands opposed to its first-person character.

About the Author

Sebastian Rödl is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Leipzig.