Science policy, ethics, and economic methodology : some problems of technology assessment and environmental-impact analysis

xviii, 321 pages ; 24 cm I. Introduction.- One: An Overview of Technology Assessment and Environmental-Impact Analysis.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Concepts of Technology Assessment and Environmental-Impact Analysis.- 2.1. TA and EIA: Similarities and Differences.- 2.2. The Components of TA and EIA.- 2.3. The Uses and Users of TA's and EIA's.- 3. The Institutionalization of TA and EIA.- 3.1. The National Environmental Policy ACT (NEPA).- 3.2. The US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).- 3.3. TA/EIA Outside the OTA.- 4. TA/EIA Methodology.- 5. The Preeminence of Risk-Cost-Benefit Analysis in TA/EIA.- 5.1. The Origins of RCBA.- 5.2. The Techniques of RCBA.- 6. The Role of the Philosopher in TA and EIA.- 6.1. The Role of the Ethicist in TA and EIA.- 6.2. The Role of the Applied Philosopher of Science.- 7. Criticism of TA/EIA and an Outline for Reform.- Notes.- Two: Assessing Risk-Cost-Benefit Analysis, the Preeminent Method of Technology Assessment and Environmental-Impact Analysis.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Deficiency Argument.- 2.1. Phenomenological Variants of the Deficiency Argument.- 2.2. Kantian Variants of the Deficiency Argument.- 3. Assumptions Underlying the Main Inference of the Deficiency Argument.- 3.1. The Assumption that RCBA Deficiencies Are a Sufficient Condition for Rejecting It.- 3.2. The Assumption That Any Systematic, Rational Form of Policymaking Ought to Be Rejected.- 3.3. The Assumption That Not all Policy Alternatives Have Theoretical Residuals.- 3.4. The Assumption That Wholly Rational Decisionmaking Is Possible.- 3.5. The Assumption That Many of the Constraints on Real-World Decisionmaking May Be Ignored.- 4. The First Premise of the Kantian Argument: RCBA Is Utilitarian.- 5. Conclusion.- Notes.- II. General Methodological Problems.- Three: The Retreat from Ethical Analysis.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Principle of Complete Neutrality.- 2.1. One Case Against Complete Neutrality: Constitutive Values.- 2.2. Another Case Against Neutrality: Contextual Values.- 2.3. The Fact-Value Dichotomy.- 3. The Impossibility of Wholly Objective Technology Assessment and Environmental-Impact Analyses.- 3.1. Methodological Assumptions in Technology Assessment.- 3.2. Evaluative Assumptions in the Light of Inadequate Data.- 3.3. Political Assumptions in TA and EIA.- 4. The Ideal of Complete Neutrality.- 4.1. The Presupposition That Objectivity = Neutrality.- 4.2. The Presupposition That There Is No Place for Philosophical Evaluation in Technology Assessment and Environmental-Impact Analysis.- 4.3. Consequences of Condemning Applied Ethics and Philosophy of Science.- 4.3.1. Sanctioning Ethical Relativism.- 4.3.2. Accepting the Status Quo.- 4.3.3. Masking Central Evaluational Assumptions.- 5. Deemphasizing Nontechnical Policy Solutions.- 6. Alternatives to the Principle and the Ideal of Complete Neutrality.- 6.1. The Importance of Including Philosophical Analysis.- 6.2. The Positivistic Attack on Philosophy.- 7. Conclusion.- Notes.- Four: The Fallacy of Unfinished Business.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Suboptimization and the Status Quo.- 3. The Fallacy of Unifinished Business and the Naturalistic Fallacy.- 4. One Solution: Broadening the Scope of TA and EIA.- 5. Objections to Broadening the Scope of TA and EIA So As to Avoid the Fallacy of Unfinished Business.- 6. Conclusion.- Notes.- III. Particular Methodological Problems.- Five: RCBA and the Aggregation Assumption.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Aggregation Assumption.- 3. Methodological Presuppositions Implicit in the Aggregation Assumption.- 3.1. The Aggregation Assumption and the First Presupposition.- 3.2. The Aggregation Assumption and the Second Presupposition.- 3.3. The Aggregation Assumption and the Third Presupposition.- 4. Theoretical Status of the Aggregation Assumption.- 5. Applications of the Aggregation Assumption to Technology Assessment and Environmental Analysis.- 5.1. Consequences of Ignoring Distributive Impacts.- 5.2. Consequences of Using Subjective Feelings as Cr. …