Relational Supply Contracts | Optimal Concessions in Return Policies for Continuous Quality Improvements

Michaela Isabel Höhn

ISBN 10: 3642027903 / ISBN 13: 9783642027901

Published by Springer, 2009

Relational Supply Contracts | Optimal Concessions in Return Policies for Continuous Quality Improvements | Michaela Isabel Höhn | Taschenbuch | xvi | Englisch | 2009 | Springer | EAN 9783642027901 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu. Seller Inventory # 101537978

Synopsis:

Supply relations are often governed by so-called relational contracts. These are informal agreements sustained by the value of future cooperation. Although relational contracts persist in practice, research on these types of contract is only emerging in Operations and Supply Chain Management. This book studies a two-firm supply chain, where repeated transactions via well-established supply contracts and continued quality-improvement efforts are governed by a relational contract. We are able to characterize an optimal relational contract, i.e., to develop policies for supplier and buyer that structure investments in quality and flexibility in a way that no other self-enforcing contract generates higher expected joint surplus. A second goal is to compare the performance of different returns mechanisms in the context of relational contracting (quantity flexibility and buy-back contracts). Industry studies motivate the presented model.

From the Back Cover:

Supply relations are often governed by so-called relational contracts. These are informal agreements sustained by the value of future cooperation. Although relational contracts persist in practice, research on these types of contracts is only emerging in Operations and Supply Chain Management. This book studies a two-firm supply chain, where repeated transactions via well-established supply contracts and continued quality-improvement efforts are governed by a relational contract. We are able to characterize an optimal relational contract, i.e., to develop policies for supplier and buyer that structure investments in quality and flexibility in a way that no other self-enforcing contract generates higher expected joint surplus. A second goal is to compare the performance of different returns mechanisms in the context of relational contracting (quantity flexibility and buy-back contracts). Industry studies motivate the presented model.

Bibliographic Details

Title: Relational Supply Contracts | Optimal ...
Publisher: Springer
Publication Date: 2009
Binding: Taschenbuch
Condition: Neu