The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information (Paperback)

Helmut Meister

ISBN 10: 3540184295 / ISBN 13: 9783540184294

Published by Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin, 1987

About this Item

Paperback. The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach. The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Seller Inventory # 9783540184294

Bibliographic Details

• Title: The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information (Paperback)
• Publisher: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin
• Publication Date: 1987
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 3540184295
• ISBN 13: 9783540184294
• Binding: Paperback
• Condition: new

About this title

Synopsis

The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.