CHAPTER 1
THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS
By far the most influential American revisionist interpreter of the origins of the Cold War has been William Appleman Williams. As early as 1952, a time when the political and intellectual climate was most uncongenial to such interpretations, Williams's American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947 anticipated many of the themes later revisionists would amplify. Then, in 1959, his more sophisticated The Tragedy of American Diplomacy appeared, a book which a sympathetic scholar has called "perhaps the finest interpretive essay on American foreign policy ever written," and which even an unfriendly reviewer conceded was "brilliant." In addition to his own writing, Williams inspired a number of younger scholars — some his own students — who themselves went on to publish variations on his themes. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that much of the existing revisionist, or "New Left," literature on the subject amounts to little more than extended footnotes on interpretations Williams first put forward.
In his earlier work, American-Russian Relations, Williams candidly admitted that the dearth of available documents limited him to presenting "no more than a review of the central features of recent relations between the United States and the Soviet Union." Yet the basic framework upon which he would later elaborate was made clear. Contradicting the prevailing notion that the Cold War had come about through the actions of an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union, Williams argued that the United States itself bore the primary responsibility. Even before Pearl Harbor, he wrote, American policymakers had committed themselves to achieving a postwar world dominated by an alliance between Great Britain and the United States. By attempting to force upon Russia this Anglo-American world order without regard to her minimum security needs, American leaders forced an essentially conservative Soviet Union into acting unilaterally in her own defense. Williams's analyses of the means through which the United States supposedly tried to coerce Russia — manipulation of Lend Lease and loans, brandishing atomic weapons, etc. — would later become staple items in revisionist fare.
It was in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, particularly the revised edition of 1962 (by which time important sources such as the Potsdam Papers had become available), that Williams spelled out his more mature views. The "tragedy" of American foreign policy, he contended, was the evolution of the Open Door Policy "from a Utopian idea into an ideology, from an intellectual outlook for changing the world into one concerned with preserving it in the traditional mold." Devised in the context of depression and the closing of the frontier in the 1890's, the Open Door Policy represented an effort to resolve the internal contradictions of capitalism — chronic overproduction, recurrent depression — without inducing fundamental change in the system itself. Applied originally as a means of securing equal access in China for American goods and investments but quickly extended to encompass the entire world, this policy came to be based upon "the firm conviction, even dogmatic belief, that America's domestic well-being depends upon such sustained, ever-increasing overseas economic expansion." The result, as Williams succinctly put it, was that "the history of the Open Door Notes became the history of American foreign relations from 1900 to 1958."
Having enlarged the Open Door concept into a global policy, he continued, American policymakers defined any effort by other powers to obstruct this goal as threatening to the existence of the American system, predicated as it was on the need for unhindered expansion. Of all the twentieth-century American presidents, only Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized the dangers inherent in such an approach. At times F.D.R. appeared to be moving tentatively toward restructuring the American society as a way out of the dilemma, but during his last months "he was turning back toward the inadequate domestic programs of the New Deal era, and was in foreign affairs reasserting the traditional strategy of the Open Door Policy." His successor, Harry S Truman, who failed even to apprehend the problem, seemed "to react, think, and act as an almost classic personification of the entire Open Door Policy." He and his advisors pursued ends that made the Cold War inevitable.
In contrast with the United States' global pretensions, according to Williams, Russian objectives were far more limited. Stalin resolved the contradiction between "the expansive prophecy of Marx about world revolution" and "a realistic, Marxian analysis of world conditions" in a most conservative manner. He was adamant on only three points: Russia must obtain friendly governments on her western periphery, the wherewithal to rebuild her war-torn economy, and guarantees that Germany would not again become a threat to her safety. Everything else was negotiable. Had the United States helped — or merely permitted — Russia to gain these modest ends, there would have been no Cold War. But in their quest for an Open Door in Eastern Europe (which to Williams meant the existence of pro-Western governments there), American leaders contested the first of Russia's minimum conditions and subsequently pursued strategies which jeopardized the other two.
The mortal weakness of Williams's interpretation lay in his inability to produce even the scantiest evidence that American policymakers actually regarded an Open Door in Eastern Europe as the critical factor, rather than as one of many subsidiary goals, in relations with Russia. In lieu of such evidence he quoted a number of government officials and businessmen on the overall importance of trade and investment in the postwar world. None of the statements cited were made with any particular reference to Eastern Europe, however, nor did Williams even try (except through his own repeated assertions) to demonstrate that the authors of those comments considered Eastern Europe as a very important factor in their assessments. Using the same procedures he could have as convincingly shown that American leaders were desperately concerned with achieving an Open Door in even the most insignificant areas.
In the single passage where he did put forward material having to do specifically with Eastern Europe, Williams wrote as follows:
By the end of the month, in preparation for the Potsdam Conference, the American position concerning the countries of eastern Europe had become clear and firm. The United States planned "to insist on the reorganization of the present governments or the holding of free general elections." The broad objective was phrased in the classic terms of the Open Door Policy: "To permit American nationals to enter, move about freely and carry on commercial and government operations unmolested in the countries in question."
The goal was "access, on equal terms, to such trade, raw materials and industry" as existed and developed. In the meantime, such access was sought "to modify existing arrangements." As part of that general effort, American officials planned to demand unrestricted movement for American newspapermen so that "the spotlight [can be] trained on these areas."
In reality, this "clear and firm" policy Williams constructed himself by mixing together portions of three separate position papers, only one of which had anything at all to do with economic matters. That document, the primary topic of which was the removal by Russian forces of some American-owned oil equipment, did recommend that the President request from Stalin agreements which would amount to an Open Door in Eastern Europe. But it contained nothing to suggest that the United States "planned 'to insist on the reorganization of the present governments or the holding of free general elections'" in pursuit of such arrangements. The phrase, taken from another paper, applied only to Bulgaria and Rumania. Its author advocated such a course towards those two nations "to attain at least the same position for which we have consistently striven" in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland (whose governments the United States already had recognized), "where there are some elements not completely subservient to Moscow...." The failure to take this stand, he warned, might encourage the Soviet Union to repeat its actions "in countries farther to the west." The quotation having to do with newspapermen likewise appeared in a document which made no mention of economic issues. In short, the "American position" advanced by Williams consisted of far more than the sum of its actual parts.
How could a policy of such transcendent importance have left so few traces in the records as to have compelled Williams to resort to such procedures? One might reasonably expect the sources to be brimming with references to the drive to obtain an Open Door in Eastern Europe. Not so, Williams argued in an earlier passage. "American leaders had internalized, and had come to believe, the theory, the necessity, and the morality of open-door expansion," he wrote. "Hence they seldom thought it necessary to explain or defend the approach."
Whatever the validity of this "proof by lack of evidence" thesis, Williams himself contradicted it in his own pages. Referring to American goals in Manchuria, he showed through copious quotations that American officials, most notably Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to Russia, were very much concerned to maintain the Open Door in that area. "Stimson," Williams wrote, "seems to have set himself the role of special tutor to Truman and [Secretary of State] Byrnes on the importance of the Open Door Policy in the Far East." Why American policymakers had no need to mention the Open Door in Eastern Europe because the policy had become "internalized," yet referred to it frequently and by name in discussions over Manchuria (the site of its original application), Williams failed to make clear. Equally mysterious is why Stimson should feel the need to appoint himself "special tutor" to a man whom Williams described as the "classic personification" of the Open Door Policy. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that where Williams had the facts he used them, and where he could find none he claimed their very absence corroborated his interpretation.
Williams devoted a good deal of attention to the Potsdam Conference (July 16–August 2, 1945), using it to show how American officials pursued their strategies. Stalin, according to Williams, came to Potsdam in quest of humble goals: "He was still concerned about Russia's frontiers in Europe, about preventing Germany from trying it all over in another 25 years, and about a major economic transfusion for the Soviet Union's battered economy." Convinced that the United States possessed effective economic leverage, emboldened by reports of the successful atomic tests (which arrived as the conference got under way), American negotiators sought to force Russian acquiescence in Eastern Europe by denying her even these minimum demands. Williams's version of the discussions at Potsdam supported his theme, but scarcely resembles what actually took place.
One of the techniques Williams used most often in Tragedy was to construct imaginary speeches and dialogues by splicing together phrases uttered at different times and on diverse subjects. His presentation of Stalin's opening statements at the first plenary meeting is typical:
"This council," Stalin remarked in explaining the Soviet view of the conference at its first general session, "will deal with reparations and will give an indication of the day when the Peace Conference should meet." The primary political issue, he continued, was that of dealing with Germany and its former allies. That was "high policy. The purpose of such a policy was to separate these countries from Germany as a great force." Recurring often to the "many difficulties and sacrifices" brought upon Russia by those Axis partners, Stalin argued that the proper strategy was "to detach them once and for all from Germany." As for reparations, Russia would if necessary "compel" such deliveries.
Stalin made no such speech. His reference on the opening day to "This council" did not even refer to the Potsdam Conference itself; in context the Russian was making a clarifying statement about Truman's proposal that a Council of Foreign Ministers be formed. The other phrases Williams quoted were taken from various parts of a discussion held three days later on another American proposal, this one concerning the treatment of Germany's former allies. Stalin approved the proposal in substance, suggesting only minor changes. And his comment about compelling reparations deliveries did not apply to reparations for Russia, as Williams has it, but to Bulgarian reparations for Greece and Yugoslavia, which is quite a different matter.
Williams's account of the way American negotiators reacted to Stalin's alleged emphasis upon reparations is equally misleading. "'Reparations,'" Williams quoted Byrnes as telling Molotov on July 20, "'do not seem to the United States to be an immediate problem.'" This response, in Tragedy, is presented as "crucial to the outcome of the Potsdam Conference, and also, very probably, to the whole course of subsequent events." Byrnes, according to Williams, was trying to capitalize on Russia's reconstruction needs by refusing to offer post-war loans on the one hand, and by obstructing equitable reparations settlements on the other. The Americans believed they could "bargain from a position of formidable power," in Williams's view, because "Byrnes knew, when he told Molotov on July 20 that reparations were not 'an immediate problem,' that the atom bomb was a success." But what Williams neglected to mention was that Byrnes's statement did not pertain to reparations from Germany, which was the crux of the matter; he was telling Molotov that since the United States at the time was pouring money into Italy to keep her from going under, reparations from Italy were not "an immediate problem. Byrnes's remark, when read in its proper context, is irrelevant to Williams's thesis.
The United States altered its position on reparations (though not its ultimate goals) a few days later, one learns in Tragedy, when it became clear that Russia would not back off from her demands regardless of American economic power or possession of the bomb. On July 23, therefore, Byrnes proposed that each nation take reparations from its own zone of occupation. This suggestion, to Williams, meant "that the Russians would have a free hand in their zone of Germany and throughout eastern Europe" because "the freedom to control economics implied — demanded — political control." Yet, "the fascinating thing is that the Russians fought that proposal for one whole week — from July 23 to July 31 — before Stalin finally agreed to it. Even then, he remarked very sharply that it was 'the opposite of liberal.'"
Why did the Russians oppose such an offer, and why did the United States make it? The answer to both questions, according to Williams, is that the American proposal would have denied Russia badly needed industrial equipment from the Ruhr Valley (which lay within the Western zone) and excluded her from participating in the control of German industry. By refusing to tie the question of German war potential to that of reparations, Williams wrote, the United States could afford to make concessions on the latter issue because it still possessed as tools the bomb and Russian fear of a resurgent Germany. "American leaders were certain that the bomb, and Russia's great recovery needs," as he put it, "provided them with the leverage to re-establish the Open Door, and pro-Western governments, in eastern Europe."
The evidence Williams cited to prove this "new" strategy is as spurious as that he used to substantiate the old one. In order to show that American officials understood that the "meaning" of the arrangement that each power would take reparations from its own zone was that it would in effect "give Russia a free hand," Williams cited a "memorandum" written by Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton after the Conference adjourned:
Although he was formally denying the point he was raising, the tone of his remarks needs no comment. "There appears to be," he noted ruefully, "an unfortunate tendency to interpret the reparations operating agreement as an indication of complete abandonment of four power treatment of Germany. This is not stated in the texts and should not be accepted as a necessary conclusion ..."
Thus, Clayton is made to seem as though he were complaining about how the participants at the Conference interpreted the agreement. That is incorrect. The Assistant Secretary's words were taken from a cable (not a "memorandum") he directed to subordinate officials back in Washington who he believed had gotten the wrong impression about what had been done. The rest of his message, omitted in Tragedy, consisted of a detailed effort to show how the arrangements would be worked out within the framework of "common policies."
