Networks, Dictators and Underdevelopment

Wilson Perez-Oviedo

ISBN 10: 3847306081 / ISBN 13: 9783847306085

Published by LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing Apr 2012, 2012

About this Item

Neuware -How should a country change its institutions to achieve social and economic development This question cannot be answered from a purely economic view; instead, it must be understood within a wider perspective where institutional change requires affecting the whole political-economic system. To address these issues, in this book, we develop a simple model to explain how multiple institutional equilibria could arise in a small open economy, studying how the distribution of political power among four different kinds of agents (capitalists, skilled workers, unskilled workers and ¿grabbers,¿ which are rent-seeking elites, endemic in many underdeveloped countries) could generate either a productive or a rent-seeking equilibrium. As the distribution of political power in a society is so crucial to understanding institutional equilibria, the second part of the book is dedicated to apply the concept of networks to explain this distribution. For that, a game theoretic model is formulated in which both the occurrence and success of an uprising by the citizens against a dictator depend on the characteristics of the communication network that connects the citizens.Books on Demand GmbH, Überseering 33, 22297 Hamburg 92 pp. Englisch.

Seller Inventory # 9783847306085

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Networks, Dictators and Underdevelopment
• Publisher: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing Apr 2012
• Publication Date: 2012
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 3847306081
• ISBN 13: 9783847306085
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 220W x 150H x 6D millimeters 220 millimeters width by 150 millimeters height by 6 millimeters depth
• Weight: 155 grams

About this title

Synopsis

How should a country change its institutions to achieve social and economic development? This question cannot be answered from a purely economic view; instead, it must be understood within a wider perspective where institutional change requires affecting the whole political-economic system. To address these issues, in this book, we develop a simple model to explain how multiple institutional equilibria could arise in a small open economy, studying how the distribution of political power among four different kinds of agents (capitalists, skilled workers, unskilled workers and “grabbers,” which are rent-seeking elites, endemic in many underdeveloped countries) could generate either a productive or a rent-seeking equilibrium. As the distribution of political power in a society is so crucial to understanding institutional equilibria, the second part of the book is dedicated to apply the concept of networks to explain this distribution. For that, a game theoretic model is formulated in which both the occurrence and success of an uprising by the citizens against a dictator depend on the characteristics of the communication network that connects the citizens.

About the Author

Wilson Perez-Oviedo received a B.Sc. in Mathematics from the National Polytechnic University and a Master’s Degree in Economics from FLACSO, both in Quito. In 2006 he received his Ph.D. in Economics from Cornell University, being his advisor Dr. Kaushik Basu. Currently, Wilson teaches economics and mathematics at USFQ and FLACSO, Quito, Ecuador.