Multicriteria Decision Making and Differential Games

George Leitmann

ISBN 10: 0306309203 / ISBN 13: 9780306309205

Published by Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 1976

About this Item

Ancien livre de bibliothèque. Edition 1976. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Very good. Former library book. Edition 1976. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations.

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Bibliographic Details

• Title: Multicriteria Decision Making and Differential Games
• Publisher: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers
• Publication Date: 1976
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0306309203
• ISBN 13: 9780306309205
• Binding: Hardcover
• Condition: Très bon

About this title

Synopsis

This volume is a collection of contributions to the subject of multicriteria decision making and differential games, all of which are based wholly or in part on papers that have appeared in the Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications. The authors take this opportunity to revise, update, or enlarge upon their earlier publications. The theory of multicriteria decision making and differential games is concerned with situations in which a single decision maker is faced with a multiplicity of usually incompatible criteria, performance indices or payoffs, or in which a number of decision makers, or players, must take into account criteria each of which depends on the decisions of all the decision makers. The first six chapters are devoted to situations involving a single decision maker, or a number of decision makers in complete collaboration and thus being in effect a single decision maker. Chapters I -IV treat various topics in the theory of domination structures and nondominated decisions. Chapter V presents a discussion of efficient, or Pareto-optimal, decisions. The approach to multicriteria decision making via preference relations is explored in Chapter VI. When there is more than one decision maker, cooperation, as well as noncooperation, is possible. Chapters VII and VIII deal with the topic of coalitions in a dynamic setting, while Chapters IX and X address the situation of two unequal decision makers, a leader and a follower.