Modeling Bounded Rationality

Rubinstein, Ariel

ISBN 10: 0262681005 / ISBN 13: 9780262681001

Published by The MIT Press, 1997

About this Item

Paperback, marks on a few pages otherwise fine, some normal wear, no remainder marks, tight binding, exact artwork as listed, Seller Inventory # 036180723080

Bibliographic Details

Title: Modeling Bounded Rationality

Publisher: The MIT Press

Publication Date: 1997

Binding: Paperback

Condition: Good

About this title

Synopsis:

The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel Rubinstein defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modeling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book, the author considers the modeling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modeling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know, and group decisions.In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modeling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response. The Zeuthen Lecture Book series is sponsored by the Institute of Economics at the University of Copenhagen.

Synopsis:

The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950's by Herbert Simon. In this book the author defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modelling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book the author considers the modelling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modelling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know and group decisions. In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modelling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modelling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response.