The Limits of Moralizing: Pathos and Subjectivity in Spenser and Milton

Mikics, David

ISBN 10: 0838752853 / ISBN 13: 9780838752852

Published by UNKNO (edition ), 1994

About this Item

Ship within 24hrs. Satisfaction 100% guaranteed. APO/FPO addresses supported.

Seller Inventory # 0838752853-11-1

Bibliographic Details

• Title: The Limits of Moralizing: Pathos and Subjectivity in Spenser and Milton
• Publisher: UNKNO (edition )
• Publication Date: 1994
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0838752853
• ISBN 13: 9780838752852
• Binding: Hardcover
• Condition: Good

About this title

Synopsis

This book argues that critical tradition has obscured the mutually constitutive relation between the didactic mission of Renaissance epic and the pathos of the epic self.
Critics usually see Spenser and Milton either as poets dedicated to an autonomous aesthetic that dictates indulgence in pathos for its own sake, or as Christian moralists who subordinate pathos to the didactic demands of society. The Romantic tradition that stretches from Keats to Harold Bloom exemplifies the former option. Neo-Christian, reader response, and new historicist critics assert a contrary, but similarly unbalanced, view by choosing the didactic authority of social custom, tradition, or ideology over the pathos of subjectivity.
Resisting attempts to establish an absolute priority for either pathos or moralizing, David Mikics looks to the debate between subjective passions and didactic imperatives as a sign of the complex relation between literary creation and social norms. In a study that shies away from new historicist endorsements of the force of normative ideology, as well as late Romantic celebrations of the poetic self, the author finds that Spenser and Milton develop an innovative literary subjectivity under the pressure of the Reformation's moralizing aims.
Incorporating moral force within pathos would allow poetic passion to become a worthy and clearly justifiable public stance. But Spenser and Milton, in their pursuit of this rhetorical ideal, find themselves acknowledging, instead, an enduring disjunction between affect and the discursive forms of public morality which aim to discipline or exploit it.