It came to pass that in 1789, with a brand new president, a decisively split political consensus on the part of the new Congress, attempts were made to resolve the issues existing with the Barbary States. However, with so much political controversy on how best to negotiate with the Musselmen countries, it wasn't until a year later, nearing the time England and France entered into the Napoleonic Wars, that an American Congressional resolution was finally reached—pay the tribute. In the meantime, the Barbary States, with a concentration on Algiers, continued to harass the American merchant vessels with a seeming and never-ending gusto.

The political structure of the United States of America had been established. George Washington was the newly elected President of the United States of America. John Adams was his Vice-President and Thomas Jefferson was his Secretary of State.

Of these three, it was the Secretary of State who shouldered the responsibility to report to the Congress on the state of American commerce. Kind of a mini State of the Union on foreign commerce.

Jefferson understood that negotiations with the Barbary States and the status of United States commerce in the Mediterranean were intimately connected. Currently there was no carrying trade in the Mediterranean due to the Barbary States piratical activity. After all, the bulk of Mediterranean commerce passed within sight of a North African state.

Possessing no proof, he drew up short of outright accusing England of influencing and indeed supporting the Barbary States' hostilities against America. But he continued to adamantly condemn Barbary State hostility as the reason for the lack of Mediterranean commerce.

A hostility he classified to be extortion through piracy whether directed against the United States of America or any other country. Jefferson even more adamantly opposed succumbing to extortion and paying a so-called tribute for peace.

In the past, the Washington administration had initially, albeit reluctantly and without Jefferson's concurrence, made several attempts to pay the tributes demanded by the Barbary States. But the Musselmen would go back on their word so often, it quickly became obvious to the administration that the paying of tribute was not a long term solution. In some cases, it was not even a short term solution. So Washington was very surprised when Congress felt that resolution to the situation was to pay the tribute.

Even in the light of the various heads of the Barbary States, for whatever reason they could conjure up, disavowing any tribute paid by the USA and continuing hostilities with never a lull in activity, let alone a truce, Congress maintained that paying tribute was the answer. Washington was befuddled.

Washington's own Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson very vocally made it known to Congress that he disagreed with this so-called solution. He felt peace was the natural order of things and fair for all. "Peace is to be expected," claimed Jefferson, "it is not something to be purchased for a price."

He was also concerned that his claim of any unsubstantiated accusation toward England would result in a Congressional perception that he was trying to find excuses for the Mediterranean commerce being out of reach. Rather that any unsubstantiated accusation was really the lack of the Washington administration's ability, his ability, to negotiate. Both he and Adams feared some would begin to openly suggest that America should consider a re-alliance with England in order to regain the English "naval protection" it once enjoyed.

Jefferson knew that were he to admit that the Barbary States could not be controlled by America, he would be admitting a Washington administration failure. More importantly, he would be admitting his own personal failure to negotiate with a foreign power. And as politically ambitious as he was, any negative admission to Congress was something he simply could not allow himself to do.

At the insistence of President Washington and the concurrence of Vice-President Adams, Jefferson reluctantly reported to Congress that the Washington administration would pay tribute to the Barbary States, just as Congress had decreed. But in doing so, he also threw out a caveat; he told congressional leaders that the likelihood of the Barbary States, especially Algiers, to adhere to any tribute for any significant length of time, regardless of the amount paid, was very dismal.

Despite Jefferson's Olympic attempts to deter blame for the lack of Mediterranean commerce from the Washington administration and himself, in the eyes of congress the Washington administration was appearing incompetent. Reluctantly, both Adams and Jefferson relayed to President Washington that the current congressional feeling toward the lack of Mediterranean commerce was apt to lead the United States of America down a road of pure turmoil—tribute or no tribute. There may even be calls for reunification with England.

To justify their position they further maintained that there existed a political undercurrent in Congress that reasoned; unless some sort of re-unification with England was considered in order to regain naval protection in the Mediterranean, American commercial potential could never be achieved.

They also relayed that Congress was strangely insistent that commerce, particularly Mediterranean commerce, be successful. Commerce with other areas of the world, like the West Indies and China notwithstanding, the Mediterranean seemed first and foremost on the political mind of Congress, leading one to wonder what other influences from what other countries may be at work in American politics. All this they made known to President Washington's ears only.

The intelligence Washington received from Adams and Jefferson grabbed his attention like never before. It led him to ask himself if his own administration was just being paranoid with a "covert conspiracy" theory or did such an undercurrent truly exist with Congress. Surely no one in their right mind would actually desire the Untied States of America to once again fall under English rule.

But the more President Washington thought about the extraordinary focus of Congress on Mediterranean commerce, especially when commerce in other parts of the world was quite good, the more he came to believe that there very well may be a politically covert conspiratorial effort. The practically continuous claims of conspiracy from his own folks, both Adams and Jefferson, didn't do anything to dissuade his conspiracy thoughts either.

Whether the President's belief was the result of a fear of failure or pressure from being President of the United States of America or even Adams' and Jefferson's constant drum beating, he concluded that a plan of action must be decided upon quickly. A plan that would result in a firm resolution that would allow for viable, long term Mediterranean commerce and put to rest the congressional murmurs of re-unification with England, if in fact there were any.

If there truly was a conspiracy in Congress, any plan to re-establish Mediterranean commerce would necessarily have to be kept very secret and held closely within his administration or it would be thwarted at the very start by factions that desired re-unification. If the plan were to be a military type action, secrecy was absolutely imperative, not only secrecy from Congress but also from the general public. Especially since Congress was certain that payment of tribute was the answer, in spite of clear evidence to the contrary, and would make sure the public felt the same.

Washington felt that both Adams and Jefferson would support any plan of action that he came up with that did not include a payment of any kind, regardless what one may call it. In fact, he sensed a certain anxiety from both Adams and Jefferson in the way he had handled the Mediterranean situation up to this point and that they were ready for some type of decisive action on his part.

Washington perceived these to be drastic times and, drawing on his military training and Continental Army experience, concluded that drastic measures were required.

His Continental Army experience had made him very familiar with Congressional inability to reach a consensus on just about anything. When they did reach a consensus, it was not unusual for that consensus to be wrong. Additionally, they argued over every little thing. If it wasn't the Federalists it was the anti-Federalists. So due to lots of different reasons, he decided to form a very secret and very decisive plan of action.

He agreed with Jefferson's assertion that any kind of trade in the Mediterranean was out of the question as long as the issue with the Barbary States piratical activity went unresolved. He also concurred that the paying of tribute was certainly no resolution to the situation and could not be considered long term.

He also agreed with Jefferson that, for whatever reasons, Congress was in no mood to brook anything less than total commercial success in the Mediterranean. He knew that without success in this area, his administration was doomed for failure. He eventually became convinced, just like his vice-president and Secretary of State, that the failure of his administration would eventually mean a call from some congressional leaders for consideration to a re-unification with England.

He also believed, as Adams and Jefferson did, that there could possibly be a bright spot on the horizon. As abhorrent as it was, another war between England and France was looming. There was just too much tension in that part of the world.

Should this war materialize, and its' likelihood was getting stronger each week, it may serve to focus England's attention on the actions of France, both politically and militarily. With England's attention focused elsewhere, she would not pay much attention to American activities; such as activity off the northern coast of Africa.

Jefferson's analysis was correct; appeasing Congress by paying the tributes would buy the administration some time and appear that President Washington and his administration was succumbing to Congressional will. President Washington was definitely going to take action. But succumbing to Congressional will by paying a tribute was not the action, only the facade.

He decided that a success in the Mediterranean was two-fold. One open and one very, very secret. One; with much fanfare, he would very openly take the political route and pay the tribute. This would appease congress and set the Barbary States at ease. But the other would require extreme secrecy and he had to think as a General not as a President.

In a General's assessment, in order to put a halt to the elicit piracy of the Barbary States, especially Algiers, one would need to ensure that the Barbary States did not have the capability to commit piracy in the first place. His military background had proved that beyond any shadow of doubt. However, with the exception of the siege of Boston and the few small gunboats he deployed in that effort, he had no naval background. And make no mistake about it—permanently establishing commerce in the Mediterranean was going to take a naval action.

The lack of success in naval actions surrounding the siege of Boston coupled with his overwhelming success over General Cornwallis and Yorktown told him a couple of things. He was a commander of troops on dry land—not a maritime type thinker. He would need someone who was good at naval thought.

With his military thinking he surmised that if one would destroy the Barbary State pirates, all of the pirates and all of their ships, then their ability to conduct piratical activity would cease. His political mind reasoned that an action of this type would open the door to commerce in the Mediterranean. It would be the long term result everyone was looking for. It may also be a result that England may not realize as long as the bulk of her resources were increasingly being focused upon France.

So he decided, the two-fold approach was the answer; political tribute on one hand, a secret military approach on the other. The former was what was expected and fairly easy to accomplish. The latter called for much, much more with secrecy being just one aspect of many. Another of the many aspects would require a detailed assessment of the Barbary States naval capabilities.

Fortunately, there was quite a lot of intelligence already gathered about the Barbary States and their navies. For instance, he knew they would raid a weaker country, kidnap Christian folks right out of their beds and if possible, ransom them back to their own country. He also knew the Barbary State pirates were known to capture weaker country's ships and cargoes and enslave the crew and passengers.

He knew it to be true that much of the Barbary States' ability to build and maintain ships, navigate blue water, basically know how to sail blue water, came from the knowledge, skills and abilities of the captured "infidel" crewmembers, primarily English who converted to the Musselman religion.

In the end there was no doubt; as a direct result of the Barbary States activities, the American carrying trade had all but completely ceased in the Mediterranean area. Not only could the Washington administration not survive this, but a growing pressure from the merchant vessel owners as well as pressure from members of his own administration combined to create an atmosphere of which he simply could no longer tolerate.

Washington thought, "The United States' congress can pass all the resolutions they want. They may pay all the tributes they desire. For whatever reason, Congress may choose to continue to tolerate their activity indefinitely—but his administration could not. It was time to act!"

Unknown to President Washington and for that matter most of Congress, there really were unseen activities, conducted by a few very powerful and influential folks, going on behind closed doors. The ultimate goal was re-unification with England and not the lack of an American carrying trade in the Mediterranean. This was in large part the reason for the Congressional focus on the Mediterranean commerce. In this, Thomas Jefferson's worst fears were true.

Unlike the ulterior motives of some congressmen, the reason for a desire for Mediterranean commerce in the Washington administration was simple; America wanted only a level playing field. In other words, fairness. President Washington was as serious to reach that end as any congressman with an ulterior motive.

President Washington may have a reputation as a simple man but to underestimate him was a mistake. His seemingly easy going demeanor hid a savvy politician as well as a determination that was formidable. Not only did Washington want a level playing field but he would not allow his administration to fail. He would succeed at any cost!

Part of the reason for Washington's action plan at this time was due to the slow fostering of the feelings that both his Vice-President and his Secretary of State knew he possessed. In fact, they were acutely aware of his feelings in this regard and were blatant in their actions.

Both men were convinced that decisive action, taken right now, would establish a carrying trade in that part of the world. They also reasoned that if the administration took action against the Barbary States, even if unsuccessful, it would serve to establish bright political futures for both of them.

So there were a lot of different factors at play when President Washington finally decided to take action. Action that would become the very first secret mission sanctioned by a presidential administration of the United States of America.

President Washington felt this mission would call for someone extremely well acquainted with the sea and unquestionably trustworthy. Someone that was personally known to himself so he could vouch for their character and trustworthiness. Someone beyond reproach.

As far as Congress was concerned, his administration was paying tribute to the Barbary states and that was the reason for a cessation of Barbary State piratical activity. So any type of force levied against the Barbary Sates had to be kept very quiet.