Indexical 'I' : The First Person in Thought and Language. This item is unavailable.
Language: English
Published by Springer, 1997
- Hardcover
- Used

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- Title
- Indexical 'I' : The First Person in Thought and Language
- Author
- Brinck, Ingar
- Publisher
- Springer
- Publication year
- 1997
- Condition
- As New
- Binding
- Hardcover
- Language
- English
- ISBN 10
- 0792347412
- ISBN 13
- 9780792347415
The subject of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question concerns what we mean when we say 'J'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'J', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I' -thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in cognition. The purpose is to give a picture of how we think and talk about ourselves in a wide range of circumstances. The topic has been discussed in numerous articles during the last decades, but rarely in the form of a monograph. I felt the need for a book of this kind while working on my dissertation. The manuscript is the result of many years of reflection on the self and indexicals. Some of the theories that I advance have developed as a result of my teaching an undergraduate course in the philosophy of language the last couple of years.
"Synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
Synopsis
The purpose of this book is twofold: to give a theory of reference for the indexical 'I' and to explain what is involved in thinking about oneself. The first part constitutes a critique of different solutions to the problem of how 'I' refers, while the second part advances a positive account of 'I' and I-thoughts. It is argued that 'I' refers indirectly through a de re sense that is based on non-conceptual content. 'I' expresses an individual concept with two components: a de re sense and a context-independent self-concept. Other issues that are discussed concern self-knowledge, e.g. whether there is something in specific that we have to know about ourselves to be able to self-refer, and the kind of self-consciousness that is required for self-reference. Furthermore, the notions of unity of consciousness and personal identity, as they both are presupposed by a competent use of 'I', are examined.Intended audience: This book is intended for philosophers of mind and language with a general interest in theories of reference and meaning, and more specifically in the first person, the self, and self-knowledge.
"About the title" may belong to another edition of this title.