Although the early history of Polaris in the U. S. N. is widely known, the extent of British involvement is little advertised. It is the aim of this book to describe, in the words of those most closely involved, the steady unfolding of the Polaris story in the Royal Navy from 4th November 1955, when Admiral Arleigh Burke (then CNO) told Admiral Mountbatten (then First Sea Lord) of his future plans, until 14 June 1968 when Resolution sailed on her first patrol. The Twenty-eight contributors range from Sir Hugh Mackenzie, Chief Polaris Executive, to Resolution's first Coxswain and include those involved in the Washington end, CPE's staff, those involved with the construction at Faslane and Coulport and with the wives views provided by Lady Fieldhouse. The two most impressive circumstances in the book are the unfailing support rendered by the U. S. N. and, largely thanks to that support, the completion of the largest peacetime naval project of the century on time and within budget. The Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee of that era recommended that a report on the work of the Polaris Executive would "serve as a model of a really effective, well-managed major project." This book offers an explanation for the Chairman's remark.
Navy opposed Beeching overseeing Polaris project. Admiral closed ranks against outside interference, writes Michael Evans.
THE Royal Navy's most senior admirals joined forces in the Sixties to prevent Lord Beeching, the man blamed for ravaging the rail network, from gaining control of the Polaris missile project.
Initially carried out in total secrecy, the project to design and construct the Polaris ballistic missile submarine fleet was run by a small group of Royal Navy commanders. However, according to those involved, Peter Thorneycroft, the Defence Secretary at the time, wanted to put Dr Richard Beeching in charge. He was ennobled later.
The disclosure appears in a unique collection of articles written by those most intimately engaged in the Polaris programme. The Impact of Polaris, edited by Captain John Moore, who drew up the first Polaris feasibility study for the government of Harold Macmillan in 1962, is to be published soon.
Vice-Admiral Sir Hugh Mackenzie, the Chief Polaris Executive from 1963 to 1968, who has died since making his contribution to the book, recalled: "In April [1963] a proposal from the Secretary of Defence threw my very existence into the melting pot. It suggested that I personally be replaced by Dr Beeching who had recently acquired fame, or infamy, for his reorganisation of British Rail." Dr Beeching's rail report in 1963 recommended the closure of 2,128 stations, a reduction by a quarter of the rail network and the axing of 67,700 jobs.
Fortunately for Admiral Mackenzie, Lord Carrington, the First Lord of the Admiralty; Admiral Sir Casper John, the First Sea Lord; and Admiral Sir Michael Le Fanu, Controller of the Navy, all believed the Navy could "run the show".
Admiral Mackenzie wrote: "The proposal, which could only have been totally disruptive of all the effort so far expended by the Navy on building up the Polaris Executive, was hurriedly dropped." The Polaris team did use the management expertise of the late Sir Frederic Hooper, who had just retired as chairman of Schweppes.
In the earliest days of the Polaris story, there were also a number of other proposals which caused alarm in the Royal Navy.
Captain Moore, who was given 18 hours to prepare a report for the Cabinet in December 1962 on the impact of the introduction of Polaris on the Royal Navy, revealed that one of the first suggestions from Washington was for modules containing Polaris missiles to be placed in the "holds of merchant ships which could then cruise the Atlantic". He says: "This naive and pointless proposition died a well-deserved death."
However, it was succeeded by another "equally ill-founded suggestion". It was a plan to arm two dozen Nato warships with Polaris missiles and to man them with ships' companies from all the alliance navies. Captain Moore says: "The linguistic problems beggared description. We believe this strange notion had reached the wastepaper basket by late 1962." -- The Times, Sept. 23 1999
