Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment : A Study in the Unity of A Treatise of Human Nature

W. Brand

ISBN 10: 1402002610 / ISBN 13: 9781402002618

Published by Springer, Springer, 2001

About this Item

Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This study offers an overall interpretation of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. I have emphasized throughout the dialectic between associationism and a theory of critical judgment - the 'combat' of Book I -which con tinues in Books II and III and with no apparent winner. A theory of critical judgment is fIrst worked out in Book I under what Hume calls 'general rules.' The theory explains how unreasonable judgments may be made reasonable and is made use of again in Book III to correct partial evalua tions. Two sorts of general rules compete for prescriptive claims and two sides of human nature, the untutored and the more cultivated and reflective, contribute to science and morality. of David Hume by Annette Baier I was fIrst introduced to the philosophy when she conducted a seminar on the Treatise at the Graduate Center of The City University of New York. Much of the enthusiasm I have sustained for Hume has been due to the teachings of Professor Baier and to the conversations I have had with her. I have profIted from the encouragement and suggestions of Nicholas Capaldi just prior to beginning the work. Charles Landesman, Martin Tamny, and Stephan Baumrin read earlier versions of the manuscript and offered many constructive criticisms. Joram Haber was readily available to hear out my ideas. I am grateful to my wife, Marianne, and children, Anna and Aaron, for their patience and support throughout the project.

Seller Inventory # 9781402002618

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment : A Study in the Unity of A Treatise of Human Nature
• Publisher: Springer, Springer
• Publication Date: 2001
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1402002610
• ISBN 13: 9781402002618
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 235W x 155H x 11D millimeters 235 millimeters width by 155 millimeters height by 11 millimeters depth
• Weight: 295 grams

About this title

Synopsis

Although Hume insists that sympathy, or fellow feeling, is fundamental to moral judgment, he recognizes that sympathetically acquired feelings vary in strength according to a number of circumstances that are irrelevant to an impartial spectator. How can the changeableness of sympathy be reconciled with a stable moral judgment? It emerges that sympathetic judgment becomes corrected by adopting more 'general points of view' Specifically, the theory of belief and general rules in Bk. I of the Treatise accounts for the prejudice which besets the moralist and the method which corrects such prejudice. It is urged that without a full appreciation of Hume's doctrine of belief and general rules in Bk. I of the Treatise, his ideas about moral judgment in Bk. III are far too brief to be understood and are therefore subject to a number of misconceptions. Part One of the present work examines Hume's ideas about human reason and Part Two aims to clarify Hume's notion of sympathy. Both parts seek to explain how certain 'trivial' tendencies of imagination are responsible for the unreasonable judgment of fact and the partial judgment of merit. These over-generalizing tendencies generate the general rules of the imagination. It is by means of the general rules of the understanding, the rules which regulate initial judgments by an act of reflection, that factual judgments become reasonable and moral judgments impartial. What is of interest is the ongoing dialectic of the two sorts of general rules, a conflict of reason and imagination, which Hume never resolves. Although it is concluded that Hume's theory of moral judgment ends with the same skepticism as does his theory of belief and general rules at the close of Bk. I, it also emerges that reason and imagination play a positive role in the development of science and morality.