Games and Information. An Introduction to Game Theory.

Rasmusen, Eric:

ISBN 10: 0631157093 / ISBN 13: 9780631157090

Published by Blackwell Publishers 14.02.1989., 1989

About this Item

400 Seiten Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 969 24,9 x 17,3 x 2,5 cm, Gebundene Ausgabe.

Seller Inventory # 346566

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Games and Information. An Introduction to Game Theory.
• Publisher: Blackwell Publishers 14.02.1989.
• Publication Date: 1989
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0631157093
• ISBN 13: 9780631157090
• Binding: Hardcover
• Condition: Gut

About this title

Synopsis

This textbook reflects the increasing importance in economic research and teaching of the non-cooperative game theory and information economics. Eric Rasmusen begins by laying out the theory of non-cooperative games from a user's viewpoint, introducing definitions and technical results only in so far as they are useful to the student or applied modeller. The book goes on to outline the basic models of incomplete information used in current economic research. The second and larger part of the book is devoted to applications of game theory, presenting many models which have so far been available only in widely dispersed sources. Individual chapters concentrate on auctions, moral hazard, adverse selection, signalling, reputation, bargaining and oligopoly. This text is designed for US microeconomics graduates, UK third year and graduates in microeconomics, specialists in the game theory and information economics, sociologists, and scientists of politics and law.

Review

Praise for the 3rd edition

"Rasmusen’s Games and Information provides wonderful coverage of the basics of game theory and information economics. His consistent style of presenting the theoretical structures lucidly unifies his test’s wide and well–chosen range of applications. I wish that all my students could take a course based on this book, and envy them the opportunity."

Maxwell B. Stinchcombe, University of Texas at Austin

"This is a terrific book bringing together two strands in the recent literature on economic theory, namely game theory and the economics of asymmetric information. The style is brisk, the arguments are rigorous and it seems to be pitched at exactly the right level."

Partha Dasgupta, University of Cambridge