The Faces of Injustice
Language: English
Published by Yale University Press, 1992
- Softcover
- New

Seller: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, U.S.A.PBShop.store US
AbeBooks seller since April 7, 2005
Condition: New
£ 24.50
Quantity: 2 available
Add to basketItem description from seller
New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.
Seller Inventory # GB-9780300056709
- Title
- The Faces of Injustice
- Author
- Judith N. Shklar
- Publisher
- Yale University Press
- Publication year
- 1992
- Condition
- New
- Binding
- PAP
- Language
- English
- ISBN 10
- 0300056702
- ISBN 13
- 9780300056709
- Item weight
- 240 grams
"Synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
THE FACES OF INJUSTICE
By JUDITH N. SHKLARYALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 1990 Yale UniversityAll right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-300-05670-9
Contents
PREFACE........................................viiINTRODUCTION...................................11 GIVING INJUSTICE ITS DUE.....................152 MISFORTUNE AND INJUSTICE.....................53 THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE.......................83NOTES..........................................127INDEX..........................................139
Chapter One
GIVING INJUSTICE ITS DUEJUSTICE AND INJUSTICE
It will always be easier to see misfortune rather than injustice in the afflictions of other people. Only the victims occasionally do not share the inclination to do so. If, however, we remember that we are all potential victims, we might also decide to reconsider the matter and take a closer and more searching look at injustice-not only at justice-even though this is an unusual enterprise. After all, every courthouse boasts a statue of justice in all her dignity. Justice has been represented in an endless number of pictures. Every volume of moral philosophy contains at least one chapter about justice, and many books are devoted entirely to it. But where is injustice? To be sure, sermons, the drama, and fiction deal with little else, but art and philosophy seem to shun injustice. They take it for granted that injustice is simply the absence of justice, and that once we know what is just, we will know all we need to know That belief may not, however, be true. One misses a great deal by looking only at justice. The sense of injustice, the difficulties of identifying the victims of injustice, and the many ways in which we all learn to live with each other's injustices tend to be ignored, as is the relation of private injustice to the public order.
Why should we not think of those experiences that we call unjust directly, as independent phenomena in their own right? Common sense and history surely tell us that these are common experiences and have an immediate claim on our attention. Indeed, in all likelihood most of us have said, "this is unfair" or "this is unjust" more often than "this is just." Is there nothing much more to be said about the sense of injustice that we know so well when we feel it? Why then do most philosophers refuse to think about injustice as deeply or as subtly as they do about justice? I do not know why a curious division of labor prevails, why philosophy ignores iniquity, while history and fiction deal with little else, but it does leave a gap in our thinking.
Fortunately, political theory, which lives in the territory between history and ethics, seems to me to be ideally suited to do something about it. Injustice is not a politically insignificant notion, after all, and the apparently infinite variety and frequency of acts of injustice invite a style of thought that is less abstract than formal ethics but more analytical than history. At the very least, one might begin to shorten the distance between theory and practice when one looks at our many injustices, rather than only at accounts of what we ought to be and do.
My investigations are not meant to challenge in any way the worth of the various theories of justice, nor their search for its ultimate philosophical foundations. I simply want to consider injustice differently, more directly and in greater depth and detail, and also to illuminate a common condition, victimhood, and especially the sense of injustice that it inspires. Such a project may look less eccentric if we recall that European philosophy features many unconventional intuitions about justice and injustice and that these have often moved the political imagination to its greatest achievements. There are skeptical giants upon whose shoulders I can, with some presumption, try to stand.
What is really involved in the experience of injustice? Of course, the exact meaning of the word injustice is "not just" and of injury, "not lawful." But is that all that can be said about them? Why should we not think about injustice more amply than simply to note the absence of righteousness? The answer to this question is far from obvious, because the great tradition of ethics would seem to reject this proposal. For there is a normal way of thinking about justice, which Aristotle did not invent but certainly codified and forever imprinted upon all our minds. This normal model of justice does not ignore injustice but it does tend to reduce it to a prelude to or a rejection and breakdown of justice, as if injustice were a surprising abnormality.
The conventional pictorial representation of injustice thus faithfully shows a devil breaking the scales of justice, tearing the blindfold from her eyes, and beating her up. Injustice simply destroys justice. Moreover, although almost all versions of the normal model begin with a brief sketch of injustice, it is clear that it is significant only as the sort of conduct that the rules of justice are designed to control or eliminate. Injustice is mentioned to tell us what must and can be avoided, and once this preliminary task has been quickly accomplished, one can turn with relief to the real business of ethics: justice. I propose to question this program because it does not treat injustice with the intellectual respect it deserves.
At its barest, the normal model argues that any political society is governed by rules. The most primary of these set out the status and entitlements of the members of the polity. This is distributive justice, and the rules that it proposes are just if they correspond to the most basic ethical beliefs of the society. In a warrior society, for example, the brave must be rewarded, while in an oligarchy the rich ought to get richer, especially in honors and offices. More abstractly, the fundamental ethos of a polity can be and has been presented as a covenant or as the ensemble of its traditions, ideology, and civil religion. It may be treated as the prompting of nature, reason, and common sense. But in all cases distributive justice depends on something apparently elemental and solid for its authority. Even in a complex modern society in which there may be a multiplicity of belief systems side by side, the normal model reaches down to find some solid ground on which distributive justice can ultimately rest.
Distributive justice is, however, an unfortunate term, partly because it had a very different meaning in the Middle Ages and because it is never clear just what is to be distributed. I shall therefore call it primary justice, which is more neutral and merely indicates its place in the normal scheme. In addition to the primary rules settling what is due to whom, there must be effective, specific laws and institutions designed to maintain these rules in the course of private exchanges and to punish those who violate them. And no legal system can be just unless it is managed by officials who are fair, impartial, and committed to the task of maintaining the legal order that gives the society its whole character. When these norms are not followed, there is injustice. Governments that violate them or fail to enforce them are tyrannies, and their subjects may be encouraged to disobey such rulers. That is all that needs to be said: where there is no justice to quell it, injustice prevails.
I do not wish to suggest that there is something absurd about the normal model's construction of justice. It has, after all, been accepted by Aristotelians and Hobbesians, Kantians and utilitarians, liberals and conservatives, and most theologians as well. It corresponds to the common understanding of the matter, in short, and I do not propose to challenge it or to reject the legal values that it promotes. Without juridical institutions and the beliefs that support them, there can be no decent, just, or stable social relations, but only anxiety, mutual mistrust, and insecurity. The state of nature is a perfectly convincing just-so story reminding us of how dismal a nonlegal existence would be. What I do propose to question is not the principle of legality but the normal model's complacent view of injustice and its confidence in the ability of the institutions that it underwrites really to cope with iniquity. Some skeptics have always felt uneasy about these assumptions, and I share their doubts.
No serious theory of justice is simply indifferent to injustice, of course. Normal accounts do begin, as John Stuart Mill's typically does, with the thought that justice, like many other moral notions, is best defined by its opposite. He then goes on to tell us in a very few sentences what injustice involves. It means the violation of good laws, the breaking of promises, the refusal to recognize valid claims, to reward positive merit and to punish crimes, and finally, to be partial in deciding controversies. With that he leaves the subject, having, in fact, shown only that it is unjust to break the rules of normal justice. In this procedure he was by no means unique, but that does not mean that it is a wholly satisfactory one.
Injustice is the absence of justice only in an obvious and circular sense in Mill's account because injustice is presented from the outset as the sort of conduct that normal legal justice is designed to eliminate. To be sure, his real concern was to show why justice is binding upon us and why it is the first of the social virtues. It was not his purpose to draw a full map of all of the kinds of known injustice and their intractability. He was intellectually averse to contemplating the worst historical situations. It was not surprising that, like so many of his successors, he treated injustice merely as the take-off point for a wholesome and upbeat theory of justice. Injustice is not expected to go away, of course, but normal justice is taken implicitly to be adequate to the task of controlling it in practice and understanding it in theory. It is this belief that has often raised skeptical misgivings.
The skeptics do not accuse the normal model of forgetting injustice. They know that laws and conventions are meant to eliminate it. They are not, however, convinced that the normal model offers an elaborate or serious understanding of injustice as a personal and political experience or as a part of all societies known to history. Surely, injustice should not be treated intellectually as a hasty preliminary to the analysis of justice. And the real realm of injustice is not in an amoral and prelegal state of nature. It does not appear only on those rare occasions when a political order wholly collapses. It does not stand outside the gate of even the best of known states. Most injustices occur continuously within the framework of an established polity with an operative system of law, in normal times. Often it is the very people who are supposed to prevent injustice who, in their official capacity, commit the gravest acts of injustice, without much protest from the citizenry.
DOUBTS ABOUT JUSTICE IN THE EMPIRE OF INJUSTICE
These banal historical realities are the chief reason why there have always been political skeptics who have found the self-confident intellectual and moral claims of the normal model unwarranted. Only Plato rejected it entirely, to be sure. Most of the skeptics accepted the practices of judicial legality as unavoidable, but they had serious doubts about their real worth, and especially about their efficacy. They had taken the full measure of injustice and had found it to be vast.
Political skepticism is often rooted in a general cognitive skepticism, but it does not depend on any specific philosophical assumptions about knowledge in general. It is simply a doubting, unconventional view of accepted social beliefs. This kind of skeptic may well begin the journey away from the common understanding because he or she is overwhelmed by the evil of the times. Certainly Plato, Augustine, and Montaigne had every reason to look about them with despair and disgust. And in the midst of civil war and its debris, it is reasonable to ask: "Why do we do these appalling things?" and then, "What do we know about ourselves and each other?" and finally, "What can we know at all?" That is how the great skeptics came to doubt the moral relevance of the normal model of justice among other things and to reject or question it in ways that made injustice stand out more starkly than conventional political ethics permitted.
It is always the aim of skepticism to expose hidden ignorance. It is not, in fact, difficult to show that laws inspire false intellectual self-assurance that positively encourages us to be unjust. The great skeptics doubted that law-governed conduct could be effective or even possible because we simply cannot know enough about men or events to fulfill its demands. That is why Plato turned his back on the normal model, while Augustine and Montaigne reduced its relevance. All of them had an unusually enlarged sense of the various forms of injustice, and even though they did not focus on the personal sense of injustice, as more democratic theorists eventually would, they gave the theory of injustice its main structure and its intellectual force.
These skeptics did not, of course, deny that lawlessness, crime, and unfairness in exchanges and in judging were acts of wrongdoing, but they looked beyond these obvious misdeeds to rediscover injustice itself in its scope and endless detail. They saw it directly, not just as encompassing those acts that law and order are meant to eliminate, but all those occasions that make us cry out in anger and resentment: "That is not right!" I evoke their thought here chiefly to show the range of the moral and political puzzles that arise as soon as the normal model is put to a critical test. And if we are prepared to recognize these perplexities, we will be in a better position to take a new look at injustice. The great doubters should help us to raise some questions of our own, and that is why I shall begin this book with their enormous "no!"
Any effort to think about injustice in all its magnitude must begin with Plato, not because he has both the first and the last word on the matter but because he is so remote, so much the foreign mirror in which we learn to see ourselves. To read Plato is to be forced to start all over again because his is the most radical of all rejections of the normal model. There is no other intellectually comparable place to begin.
According to Plato, the normal model is an expression of deep ignorance. It is a bad joke, a circus. Far from altering unjust people, it only encourages and maintains their habits. Injustice, truly understood, is a condition of misdirected psychic energy, in which aggressive and acquisitive impulses expand, while rationality can barely assert itself. A society that reflects this character is not only incapable of educating its members, it, in fact, actively misleads them. Its art of ruling is reduced to keeping these disorderly tendencies alive by checking them, and with them a mindless society survives. For what do law courts do but invite the greedy to accuse the even more greedy of offenses arising from greed and aggression? The very existence of the normal model of justice is the most telling testimony to its own incompetence. It not only fails to fulfill its own promise to eliminate injustice, but in its inconsistency does not even try. In our ignorance we invite the unjust to pursue their claims by providing them with public facilities for expressing them.
Can anyone be said to receive or give others what is due, when no one is competent to do his or her assigned task and constantly meddles in affairs that are wholly outside the range of understanding? To Plato it was obvious that all historically known societies are simply unable to achieve their own norms or even to understand them. The reign of ignorance is thus not only inherently disorderly but also unjust in the conventional, normal sense of the word, since no one either gives or receives what is demanded by the normal social rules. If competence and occupation are never matched and there are no ruling principles according to which the inherently unlimited wants of men can be restrained and ordered, there is no justice whatever. The normal model, far from establishing justice, merely allows personal disorder to become socially systemic; it simply perpetuates injustice. Such is its effect and social function.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from THE FACES OF INJUSTICEby JUDITH N. SHKLAR Copyright © 1990 by Yale University. Excerpted by permission.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
"About the title" may belong to another edition of this title.
PBShop.store US
Wood Dale, IL, U.S.A.
AbeBooks seller since April 7, 2005
Shipping rates within U.S.A.
| Item | 7 to 14 business days | 7 to 14 business days |
|---|---|---|
| First item | £ 0.00 | £ 0.00 |
Payment methods
Store description
We first started out as “The Paperback Exchange,” a chain of physical bookstores where we would part exchange your beloved books for new stories to transport you to faraway places. However, as shopping started to evolve to online shops and marketplaces, we bid our stores goodbye to become “PBShop.” This transition has only allowed us to blossom as we now ship thousands of titles to book lovers across the globe. We pride ourselves in being a community of local book lovers which allows our passion and devotion to shine in everything we do. In 2020 we not only celebrated our 20th birthday but our 1st birthday as being completely employee owned after becoming an E.O.T in September 2019. We are proud to be different and embrace standing apart on a book mountain by working from a virtual inventory which allows us to provide thousands of books that may be difficult to get for your bookshelf or your studies. Working with a number of different suppliers allows us to explore other avenues such as puzzles, sheet music and even stationery so we really do have something for everyone. Life is about being versatile in all realms of existence. If this is your first visit or you are a returning customer, we would like to welcome you to the PBShop family, for there is no friend as loyal as a book. We are a company who put our customers at the centre of everything we do as we understand the importance of reading because once you learn to read, you will forever be free. There are a whole lot of things in this world of ours that we are yet to explore, which is why we will forever inspire curious minds.…
Specialty
Hardbacks, PaperbacksSeller's business information
Pbshop.co.uk Ltd
Unit 22 Horcott Industrial Estate, Horcott Road
Fairford, United Kingdom GL7 4BX
Terms of sale
Returns Policy
We ask all customers to contact us for authorisation should they wish to return their order. Orders returned without authorisation may not be credited.
If you wish to return, please contact us within 14 days of receiving your order to obtain authorisation.
Returns requested beyond this time will not be authorised.
Our team will provide full instructions on how to return your order and once received our returns department will process your refund.
Please note the cost to return any unwanted order to us is borne by the buyer.
Should your order arrive damaged, not as advertised or faulty, we must be advised of this within 14 days of delivery. Please contact us so we can find the best solution for you.
Our Customer Care Team can be contacted via emailing paperback-us@paperbackshop.co.uk, or by calling our UK Office on +441285 712 917. We are available 9:00am till 5:30pm GMT weekdays and 9:00am till 1:00pm GMT on Saturdays.
Right of withdrawal
If you are a consumer you can withdraw from the contract in accordance with the following. Consumer means any natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession.
Information regarding the right of withdrawal
Statutory right to withdraw
You have the right to withdraw from this contract within 14 days without giving any reason.
The withdrawal period will expire after 14 days from the day on which you acquire, or a third party other than the carrier and indicated by you acquires, physical possession of the last good or the last lot or piece.
To exercise the right of withdrawal, electronically fill in and submit a clear statement on our website, under "My Purchases" in "My Account". We will communicate to you an acknowledgement of receipt of such a withdrawal on a durable medium (e.g. by e-mail) without delay.
To meet the withdrawal deadline, it is sufficient for you to send your communication concerning your exercise of the right of withdrawal before the withdrawal period has expired.
Effects of withdrawal
If you withdraw from this contract, we will reimburse to you all payments received from you, including the costs of delivery (except for the supplementary costs arising if you chose a type of delivery other than the least expensive type of standard delivery offered by us).
We may make a deduction from the reimbursement for loss in value of any goods supplied, if the loss is the result of unnecessary handling by you.
We will make the reimbursement without undue delay, and not later than 14 days after the day on which we are informed about your decision to withdraw from this contract.
We will make the reimbursement using the same means of payment as you used for the initial transaction, unless you have expressly agreed otherwise; in any event, you will not incur any fees as a result of such reimbursement.
We may withhold reimbursement until we have received the goods back, or you have supplied evidence of having sent back the goods, whichever is the earliest.
You shall send back the goods or hand them over to PBShop.store US, Springfield Gardens, New York, U.S.A., +44 1285 712917, without undue delay and in any event not later than 14 days from the day on which you communicate your withdrawal from this contract to us. The deadline is met if you send back the goods before the period of 14 days has expired. You will have to bear the direct cost of returning the goods. You are only liable for any diminished value of the goods resulting from the handling other than what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the goods.
Exceptions to the right of withdrawal
The right of withdrawal does not apply to:
- The delivery of newspapers, journals or magazines with the exception of subscription contracts; and
- The supply of digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium (e.g. on a CD or DVD) if you accepted when you placed your order that we could start to deliver it, and that you could not withdraw once delivery had started.
Shipping terms
Books are shipped from our US or UK warehouses. Delivery estimates allow for delivery from either location.
Privacy and security
PRIVACY POLICY
We are committed to protecting the privacy and security of personal data. This policy tells you how we will collect and use your personal data, and what you should expect in respect of the personal information about you that we have collected.
We are PBShop.co.uk Limited (registered in England & Wales with Company No: 9366362). Our registered office is at Swatton Barn, Badbury, Swindon, SN4 0EU, United Kingdom.
The person with responsibility for our data protection compliance is the Managing Director and they can be contacted via email at help@pbshop.store.
We are the data controller of the personal data that we keep and use, and we are therefore responsible for making sure that our systems, processes and people comply with the relevant data protection laws in respect of that personal data.
We will act in respect of personal data to comply with the six principles of the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), which are:
Lawfulness, fairness and transparency;
Purpose limitation;
Data minimisation;
Accuracy;
Storage limitation;
Integrity and confidentiality.
You have rights in respect of how your personal data can be processed; these include the right to request:
a copy of your personal data;
that inaccurate data is rectified; and
that your personal data is, in certain circumstances, erased or restricted.
You have the right to complain to the Information Commissioner, which you can do by contacting the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) directly. Full contact details, including a helpline number, can be found on the ICO website (www.ico.org.uk). This website also has useful information on your rights and our obligations. However, please raise any concerns or issues with us first so that we may deal with this as quickly as possible for you.
COLLECTION, USE AND DISCLOSURE OF PERSONAL DATA
We collect and process data for the following reasons:
personal data collected and created in relation to our selling books and other items; and
personal data relating to our people (which means those people working for our company, or providing services to us, or potentially working or providing services to us, including employees, consultants, temporary or casual workers and contractors).
All of our people are required to abide by our Privacy Policy when handling personal data, and are provided with appropriate data protection training. Any breach of data protection will be taken seriously, and may result in disciplinary action.
Selling books and other items
COLLECTION:
We will collect personal information which may include names, addresses and other information for our customers. This will be done for the management of the commercial relationship with our customers.
We may collect this personal data from you directly, and also from third parties, including publicly available third party sources. Additional personal data will be collected as it is created by or supplied to us in the course of anything we do for you.
USE:
We will use the personal data in the course of making sales and to comply with requirements that we are required to undertake.
We will only use your personal data when the law allows us to. Most commonly, we will use your personal data in the following circumstances:
in performance of a contract (the agreement to sell books and other items); and/or
compliance with a legal obligation; and/or
vital interests of the data subject; and/or
where it is necessary for our legitimate interests (or those of a third party) and your interests and fundamental rights do not override those interests.
We may also use your personal data in the following situations, which are likely to be far less common:
where we need to protect your interests (or someone else’s interests);
where it is needed in the public interest or for official purposes.
DISCLOSURE:
We may share personal data with third parties as is necessary in the sale of books and other items, including to third party providers who deliver services to support the operation of our company.
In respect of all disclosures of personal data, we will only share the personal information which is necessary for the particular purpose for which it is provided, or where we have another legitimate interest in doing so, and we will ensure that the personal data is appropriately protected.
RETENTION PERIOD:
We will keep personal data only for as long as is necessary to fulfil the purposes for which we collected it, including for the purposes of satisfying any legal, accounting or reporting requirements. Normally, our retention period for personal data collected for this purpose is a minimum of 6 years after the end of the period that we are selling books and other items.
Our people
COLLECTION:
We will collect names, addresses, contact details, education and employment history, identity and other background checks (which may include appropriate criminal and financial checks and confirmation of the right to work in the UK), marital status and information on next of kin and dependents, financial information (such as bank details and NI numbers), date of birth, gender, a copy of your passport and driving licence, performance information and compensation history, recruitment information (including references), salary, benefits, pension and annual leave information, disciplinary and grievance information, photographs, information about your use of our information and communications systems and CCTV footage or other information obtained through electronic means.
We may collect and use special categories of personal data as required in the carrying out of obligations and exercising specific rights of us or the data subject in the field of employment. This may include information relating to matters such as health, racial origin, religious belief and offences or alleged offences.
Personal data may be collected from you during the selection process (for example via your application form and CV) and during your employment (including holiday forms, expense claims, performance reviews, any disciplinary or grievance processes), or from third parties, including referees, health service providers, background check providers.
USE:
Personal data of our people will be used for HR administration and management, both in respect of the selection of people to work for us (including suitability, eligibility and/or fitness to work), and those who do work for us, to include learning and development, disciplinary and security (of people, offices and data) requirements, providing and liaising with benefits providers, business management and planning (including accounting and auditing), paying you and dealing with tax and NI deductions, assessing and deciding on salary reviews and compensation, conducting performance reviews and managing performance, dealing with legal disputes involving you or others, preventing fraud, monitoring your use of our information and communications systems, ensuring compliance with our policies, and equal opportunities monitoring.
We will only use your personal data when the law allows us to. Most commonly, we will use your personal data in the following circumstances:
In performance of a contract with you; and/or
compliance with a legal obligation; and/or
vital interests of the data subject; and/or
where it is necessary for our legitimate interests (or those of a third party) and your interests and fundamental rights do not override those interests.
We may also use your personal data in the following situations, which are likely to be less common:
where we need to protect your interests (or someone else’s interests);
where it is needed in the public interest or for official purposes.
In respect of all disclosures of personal data, we will only share the personal information which is necessary for the particular purpose for which it is provided, or where we have another legitimate interest in doing so, and we will ensure that the personal data is appropriately protected.
In respect of special categories of personal data, we may process this in the following circumstances:
in limited circumstances with your explicit written consent; and/or
where we need to carry out our legal obligations and in line with our policies; and/or
where it is needed in the public interest (such as for equal opportunities monitoring or in relation to our occupational pension scheme), and in line with our policies; and/or
where it is needed to assess your working capacity on health grounds, subject to appropriate confidentiality safeguards.
Less commonly, we may process this type of information where it is needed in relation to legal claims or where it is needed to protect your (or someone else’s) interests and you are not capable of giving your consent, or where you have already made the information public. We may also process such information about our people (or former people) in the course of our legitimate business activities with the appropriate safeguards.
The special categories of personal data may be used in the following ways:
in relation to leaves of absence, to comply with employment and other laws;
in relation to your physical or mental health, or disability status, to ensure your health and safety in the workplace and to assess your fitness to work, to monitor, manage and administer benefits and absences;
in relation to your race, national or ethnic origin, religious, philosophical or moral beliefs, or your sexual life or sexual orientation, to ensure meaningful equal opportunity monitoring and reporting.
DISCLOSURE:
Personal data may be transferred to service providers who support the operation of our business (such as payroll service providers), to other third parties reasonably necessary in the conduct of our business (including insurers, professional advisors, regulators). These third parties may be acting as processor, or controller of personal data in their own right.
In respect of all disclosures of personal data, we will only share the personal information which is necessary for the particular purpose for which it is provided, or where we have another legitimate interest in doing so, and we will ensure that the personal data is appropriately protected.
RETENTION PERIOD:
We will keep personal data only for as long as is necessary to fulfil the purposes for which we collected it, including for the purposes of satisfying any legal, accounting or reporting requirements. We will normally keep personal data of applicants who we do not employ for six months after we receive it.
We will keep personal data of employees throughout your employment and normally for a minimum of six years after your employment ends.
Changes to your personal data
It is very important that the personal information that we hold about you is accurate and current. Please tell us if your personal information changes during your relationship with us.
Data Security
We have put in place measures to prevent your personal data from being accidentally lost, used or accessed in an unauthorised way, altered or disclosed. In addition, we limit access to your personal data to those of our people and other third parties who have a business need to know. They will only process your personal data on our instructions and where they have agreed to treat the information confidentially and to keep it secure. We have put in place procedures to deal with any suspected data security breach and will notify you and the ICO of a suspected breach where we are legally required to do so.
Where we store your personal data
We principally store data, both electronically and on file, at our office.
Personal data may be transferred outside of the EEA by processors acting on our behalf. For transfers to countries not considered adequate by the EC, we will ensure that personal data is adequately protected, as required by the GDPR. This would include by use of the Standard Contractual Clauses adopted by the EC to protect personal data.
Your rights
Under certain circumstances, you have the right by law to request:
access to your personal data. This enables you to ask to receive a copy of the personal data that we hold about you and to check that we are lawfully processing it.
correction of the personal data that we hold about you.
erasure of your personal data.
object to processing of your personal data where we are relying on our legitimate interest and there is something about your particular situation which makes you want to object to processing on this ground. You also have the right to object where we are processing your personal information for direct marketing purposes.
restriction of processing of your personal data.
transfer of your personal data to another party.
Links from our website
Our website may, from time to time, contain links to and from the websites of third parties that we permit to make such links. If you follow a link to any of these websites, please note that these websites have their own privacy policies and that we do not accept any responsibility or liability for these policies. We recommend that you check these policies before you submit any personal data to these websites.
CHANGES TO THIS PRIVACY POLICY
Any changes we may make to our privacy policy in the future will be posted on our website, so please ensure that you are viewing the correct version.
Please contact us if you have any questions, comments or requests regarding this Privacy Policy.
Last amended May 2021.