CHAPTER 1
Future Systems of Identity In the World Community
HAROLD D. LASSWELL
Introduction
The most conspicuous institutions of government and law in the world arena are the nation states and the transnational network of intergovernmental organizations. They affect and in turn are affected by the transnational political parties and pressure organizations that operate between official agencies and private groupings. The public order institutions of today's world are not strong enough to provide even minimum security from the threat or fact of war.
Our immediate problem is the examination of "identity." The public order of nation states depends on many factors, among which the patterns by which individuals identify with such states play an important part. An obvious question is whether a comparable asset can be mobilized for the strengthening of world public order, or whether world political institutions must precede world loyalty. In any case the future will continue to be affected by the predispositions of all whose nationalistic loyalties are expressed in ways that perpetuate the institutions of world division and war.
As usual, history confirms the fact that many different roads may lead to the same Rome. In feudal times "nationality" — the sense of belonging to a people of distinctive language or general culture — was compatible with political disunity. Political "nationalism" has sometimes arisen after a period of subjection to a rule perceived as oppressive (as in con temporary Africa). Nationalism has also emerged as a movement aimed at uniting a divided people into a single body politic (as in nineteenth century Germany and Italy). The principal characteristic of nationalism as a system of political identity is the sense of belonging to an actual or potential body politic that rightfully is or should be as free as any other. Exp1essed negatively, this implies freedom from external control. Affirmatively, nationalism embodies a demand for equal access to whatever decision arenas make authoritative and controlling commitments. The "negative" aspect is phrased in terms of "sovereignty"; the "positive" in demands for "recognition" and "admission" to processes for clarifying common interests. The "positive" ideologists celebrate a "Federation of Free Nations" and a "Parliament of Man."
Political Identity
The question is whether a sense of political identity comparable to nationalism is developing or can develop in support of a world -inclusive system of public order. Will a transnational identity arise the object of which is the whole nation of man? Will such an identity mobilize enough intensity of support on a sufficiently large scale to become a significant factor in future world politics?
A political identity is a shared perspective on the self as a participant in politics; it is held with sufficient intensity by enough people to achieve at least a minimum threshold of effect on political outcomes.
It is everyday knowledge that we are each linked by multiple loyalties to many territorial and pluralized groups, and that under various circumstances we give priority to different identities. At times we are aware of conflicting loyalties, especially when the claims of larger and smaller identities seem to be mutually incompatible. Ordinarily we cope with latent incompatibilities by diverting attention to other matters. The cement of society is the strategy of avoidance, supplemented by creative ambiguity in the solution of man y incipient contradictions.
As a means of investigating the significance of any factor in the political process, we utilize a conceptual map of the whole process. Briefly:
Participants ->
Perspectives ->
Arenas ->
Base Values ->
Strategies ->
Outcomes ->
Effects ->
1. Participants, or the individuals and groups who interact politically. The world arena includes organized groups: nation states, intergovernmental structures, transnational political parties, transnational pressure groups, other transnational private associations. Can transnational, world-inclusive identity systems affect the composition of the world arena?
2. Perspectives, or the subjective events (symbols) that refer to politics. Included are symbols of identity (such as designations of territorial and pluralistic groups), demands (preferences and volitions regarding outcomes [values]), expectations (matter of fact references to past, present, and future events). The perspectives are also patterned as political myths: doctrines, or philosophies; formula, or legal codes; miranda, or popular versions of group character and fate. Can a growing sense of inclusive identity generate expectations and demands of great intensity and scope? Can such an enlarged self-image achieve stability by elaborating a comprehensive political myth?
3. Arenas, or the organized or unorganized setting in which political interactions occur (global, subglobal). Can a system of transnational and world identity contribute to the organization of a globally inclusive arena?
4. Base Values, or the assets available to participants for strategic use. Can the vitalized self-image of world community marshal and direct the use of economic and other resources in ways that strengthen public order?
5. Strategies, or the manipulations that precede outcomes, such as diplomatic, ideological, economic and military campaigns. Can the emerging system of identity stimulate the plans and operations required to consolidate and to sustain a strong and inclusive set of political institutions?
6. Outcomes, or the flow of successes or failures in votes or fights. Will the governments, parties, and pressure associations that identify themselves with a world image succeed in making themselves effective at the moments of final commitment to at least minimum public order decisions?
7. Effects, or the significance of outcomes for value accumulation and distribution, and for the innovation, diffusion, and restriction of institutions. As time passes will the self-image of man acting politically influence the various sectors of the world community in ways that cumulatively strengthen a public order of peace and dignity?
Indicators
Political identities are components of act-systems. They are preceded by drives or impulses at the unconscious or preconscious level; and they are accompanied and followed by words, gestures and other modes of expression. In short, an identity is an attitude composed of perspectives and operations (behaviors). Identities have both direction and intensity.
Our estimates of future world politics will be more operational if we keep in mind the state of the art that is variously called the study of political attitudes, opinions, or sentiments. The difficulties of investigating perspectives of identity — or, in fact, any perspectives — are only partly overcome. By introspection we are able to experience and describe one stream of subjective events (perspectives) directly (our own). Our everyday working postulate is that other people experience perspectives that are parallel to, though not necessarily congruent with, our own. Hypotheses about perspectives enable us to discover the often complex indicators that permit us to predict, explain, or even empathize with the thoughts and feelings of others.
Direct introspection of the primary ego (the "I," "me") must be supplanted by indirect inferences when we investigate other people. The fundamental indicators are words (or word equivalents such as gestures), deeds (overt acts that involve more than expression), resource manipulations (which involve weapons, machines, and similar features of the environment). (For a brief summary of the procedures available for studying indicators consult Note A at the end of this chapter.)
Dynamics
We are concerned with the dynamics of identity. We have suggested that the most important fact about an identity is that it is part of an action system. In schematic terms an act is a completed sequence of events that passes from the phase of preconscious impulse to subjectivity and expression. Acts are part of "interacts" when they are precipitated by the human or physical environment, or are perceived as successful or not depending on the response. Exposure to an environment stimulates a predisposition to act in ways that are perceived as maximizing (optimalizing) results. The symbols of self ("I," "me," "thou," "we") mark the boundaries of an identity. They depend on expected and realized net consequences. The members of an aggregation of people possess a common identity to the extent that they share identifying symbols with sufficient intensity to influence behavior significantly.
In some circumstances the advantages of publicly affirming a group identity are obvious. Those who vote on the winning side of a plebiscite in a disputed territory may expect to be value-indulged in many ways. They can look forward to better political careers than the losers, and to benefits in terms of jobs and contracts, prestige, admission to educational facilities, and the like.
It will not do to rely solely on a specific behavioral commitment in predicting the future. Subjectivities count. In private plebiscite voters may reassert their "basic identity" (telling family and friends that they are still at heart as they were before, and that some day an opportunity will arise to demonstrate it in action). In some cases there may be no private behavioral expressions, even when the individual keeps alive his basic identity by internal fantasy (in the same way that devoted espionage agents may continue underground and out of contact with their principal for years). Some persons, at least, are able to preserve an identity system by internal rewards (value indulgences), enjoying a quiet sense of moral superiority from their steadfastness, savoring a sense of secret knowledge, or imagining eventual gratifications in the "real world."
It is not difficult to see how the dissemination of an established identity system depends on "expected and realized net value consequences." Early socialization usually takes care of the matter. Results are obtained by a flow of environment exposures that reward identity-affirming behavior and deprive identity-denying or indifferent behavior. During early years the developing personalities of the young incorporate appropriate symbols of identity, expectation, and demand as part of their stable perspectives. These self-images mobilize and guide an impulse to appropriate completion. They guide attention, opinion, belief, loyalty, action, and organization.
Of special relevance to our task are the circumstances in which self-images are redefined and intensities are redistributed among identities. When does an identity system become more inclusive? Less? A general hypothesis is that the boundaries of a system of political identity (a political self) tend to be enlarged to include those who are perceived as similar to the self in politically salient ways. Boundaries are restricted to exclude those who are perceived (in the same terms) as incompatible.
The paradigm for an enlarging identity system in a group is the perception of a common threat of value deprivation and of possible joint action to prevent loss or even to obtain value gains. A shared field of attention thus generates a map of expectation. If the situation continues the participants stabilize the boundaries of their enlarged self-image. They remain durably oriented toward defending and extending the value position of the self in the sectors perceived as a common interest.
A stably enlarged identity becomes part of a group culture that includes a decision process that (1) protects basic institutions, and (2) interacts supportively with the civic order. The civic order is composed of the institutions whose policy processes rely on less severe crisis sanctions than are at the disposal of the institutions of public order.
One classic sequence of enlargement moves from a loose league or confederation of bodies politic to the formation of a more perfect federal or unitary union in a larger body politic. For example: the confederation of the thirteen British colonies in North America; later, the formation of a "more perfect" federal union. Complex readjustments of identity precipitated, accompanied, and consolidated those developments. For instance, the self-system of the colonists was restricted to exclude Great Britain, and the self-system of the British was restricted to exclude the colonies. Among the colonials particular identities were enlarged to include the new body politic.
The paradigm covers the restriction as well as the enlargement of identity systems. The analysis includes situations in which those who share a common self-image perceive one another as sources of deprivation rather than indulgence. This is what happened when the colonies became estranged from Britain.
After these preliminary considerations we turn to future sequences of world politics and systems of identity. We postulate as a desirable goal the achievement of substantial progress toward a world order of peace, welfare, and social justice. Our developmental construct assumes that this goal is possible, and outlines a sequence of conditions and strategies by which the goal can be approximated. No estimates of probability are made beyond the "possible."
A Projection: Global Interactions Will Increase in Frequency
This means that more people around the globe will take one another into consideration in their decisions and choices. To take other people into consideration does not necessarily imply such overt interchanges as travel, trade, or communication. That the official or unofficial elite of a given country takes another country "into consideration" may be demonstrated by internal indicators: references to external affairs in speeches and other statements by top executives; references in legislative sessions, cabinet discussions, military and civilian administrative agencies, reports of intelligence, planning, and appraisal services. Indicators that external events are taken "into consideration" by the rank and file of the community include: political party platforms, resolutions of pressure associations, news and comment in mass media, references in school textbooks, sermons, and other forums specialized to various institutions.
While it is true that the content of communication media are not direct measures of perspective, no one would seriously challenge the assertion that more or less frequent references to the external environment probably indicates more or less consideration of foreign affairs.
World Attention
Chart 1 projects the probable shape of the world attention curve in coming years and summarizes the rising trend that has been affected by the growth of mass media, literacy, and various forms of interchange in the last hundred years. The projection is to be understood in several ways. For example, it indicates the changing percentage of foreign news and comment in elite and popular media of all countries.
The chart is generalized for all countries, but it is unlikely that the degree of "external consideration" will be uniformly distributed through the world community. For instance, we know that attention to the external environment is greater per capita in small countries with active direct transnational contact than in the big powers (Table 1).
Is the inference that the big states ought to be broken up into smaller entities as a means of increasing the perceived involvement of the world's population with one another? This may be the implication; but it is highly improbable that China, the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. will divide into independent states in the immediate future.
The picture we have drawn needs to be qualified in order to emphasize the degree of contrast between the elite and the rank and file. The elite media of the globe pay more regular attention to the external environment than the popular media. Granting that the "consideration" of the foreign environment will increase, it is probable that a gap will continue to separate elites from broader levels of the population (Table 2). We shall presently evaluate the significance of this gap.
