The Conception of Value (Paperback)

Paul Grice

ISBN 10: 0199243875 / ISBN 13: 9780199243877

Published by Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001

About this Item

Paperback. The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Value judgements are viewed as objective; value is part of the world we live in, but nonetheless is constructed by us. We inherit, or seem to inherit, the Aristotelian world in which objects and creatures are characterized in terms of what they are supposed to do. We are thereby enabled to evaluateby reference to function and finality. This much is not surprising. The most striking part of Grice's position, however, is his contention that the legitimacy of such evaluations rests ultimately onan argument for absolute value.The collection includes Grice's three previously unpublished Carus Lectures on the conception of value, a section of his 'Reply to Richards' (previously published in Grandy and Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Oxford, 1986), and 'Method in Philosophical Psychology'(Presidential Address delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, 1975). The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Seller Inventory # 9780199243877

Bibliographic Details

• Title: The Conception of Value (Paperback)
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, Oxford
• Publication Date: 2001
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0199243875
• ISBN 13: 9780199243877
• Binding: Paperback
• Condition: new

About this title

Synopsis

The works of Paul Grice collected in this volume present his metaphysical defence of value, and represent a modern attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for value. Value judgements are viewed as objective; value is part of the world we live in, but nonetheless is constructed by us. We inherit, or seem to inherit, the Aristotelian world in which objects and creatures are characterized in terms of what they are supposed to do. We are thereby enabled to evaluate by reference to function and finality. This much is not surprising. The most striking part of Grice's position, however, is his contention that the legitimacy of such evaluations rests ultimately on an argument for absolute value.
The collection includes Grice's three previously unpublished Carus Lectures on the conception of value, a section of his 'Reply to Richards' (previously published in Grandy and Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Oxford, 1986), and 'Method in Philosophical Psychology'(Presidential Address delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, 1975).

About the Author

Paul Grice (1913-1988) was Fellow of St John's College, Oxford, and, until his retirement in 1980, Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley.