Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are not Machines

J. H. Fetzer

ISBN 10: 1402002432 / ISBN 13: 9781402002434

Published by Springer Netherlands, Springer Netherlands Nov 2001, 2001

About this Item

Neuware -An important collection of studies providing a fresh and original perspective on the nature of mind, including thoughtful and detailed arguments that explain why the prevailing paradigm - the computational conception of language and mentality - can no longer be sustained. An alternative approach is advanced, inspired by the work of Charles S. Peirce, according to which minds are sign-using (or `semiotic') systems, which in turn generates distinctions between different kinds of minds and overcomes problems that burden more familiar alternatives. Unlike conceptions of minds as machines, this novel approach has obvious evolutionary implications, where differences in semiotic abilities tend to distinguish the species. From this point of view, the scope and limits of computer and AI systems can be more adequately appraised and alternative accounts of consciousness and cognition can be more thoroughly criticised.Readership: Intermediate and advanced students of computer science, AI, cognitive science, and all students of the philosophy of the mind.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 352 pp. Englisch.

Seller Inventory # 9781402002434

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are not Machines
• Publisher: Springer Netherlands, Springer Netherlands Nov 2001
• Publication Date: 2001
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1402002432
• ISBN 13: 9781402002434
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu

About this title

Synopsis

An important collection of studies providing a fresh and original perspective on the nature of mind, including thoughtful and detailed arguments that explain why the prevailing paradigm - the computational conception of language and mentality - can no longer be sustained. An alternative approach is advanced, inspired by the work of Charles S. Peirce, according to which minds are sign-using (or `semiotic') systems, which in turn generates distinctions between different kinds of minds and overcomes problems that burden more familiar alternatives. Unlike conceptions of minds as machines, this novel approach has obvious evolutionary implications, where differences in semiotic abilities tend to distinguish the species. From this point of view, the scope and limits of computer and AI systems can be more adequately appraised and alternative accounts of consciousness and cognition can be more thoroughly criticised.
Readership: Intermediate and advanced students of computer science, AI, cognitive science, and all students of the philosophy of the mind.

About the Author

Fetzer is Distinguished McKnight University Professor at the University of Minnesota, Duluth.