"CHASING THE ELEPHANT INTO THE BUSH" is an insider's account of how the governing New Patriotic Party lost power in the closest elections in Africa's history.The writer believes that providing an accurate account will begin the process of correcting the rumours, lies and myths that are out there about the 2008 elections in Ghana.Throughout, the book is liberally sprinkled with quotes and historical references that makes it very informative and interesting.He begins with the state of the nation and the governing party as Ghana approached 2008.He then takes the reader through the NPP primary and his own experiences as a losing candidate.There is candid discussion of the rivalries in the campaign that undermined its effectiveness. He takes the reader inside meetings and quotes some of the key players at key moments in the campaign. There is candid discussion of the roles of the media, the security forces and civil society.The identification of issues and their use in the campaign is discussed thoroughly.While his sympathies are never in doubt, he is very objective and acknowledges the mistakes made by the campaign, the government and the party. He credits the NDC Campaign for doing certain things well.Amongst these are the deployment of President Mills and former President Rawlings as well as Vice-President John Mahama.He reveals the roles of key people, including the President, the Presidential candidate and powerful groups, like the "Kyebi Mafia". He offers candid assessments of all the key players.He suggests reasons for the NPP defeat and the way to recapture power.This will be a very significant first cut and reference point for an account of the 2008 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Ghana.
CHASING THE ELEPHANT INTO THE BUSH
THE POLITICS OF COMPLACENCYBy Arthur KennedyAuthorHouse
Copyright © 2009 Arthur Kennedy
All right reserved.ISBN: 978-1-4490-3703-1Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................................................vFOREWORD............................................................................viiINTRODUCTION........................................................................xiiiCHAPTER ONE THE STATE OF THE NATION.................................................1CHAPTER TWO THE STATE OF THE PARTY..................................................5CHAPTER THREE THE NPP PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY PRIMARRIES.....................11CHAPTER FOUR ASSEMBLING THE CAMPAIGN TEAM...........................................25CHAPTER FIVE THE CAMPAIGN TEAM......................................................33CHAPTER SIX CHOOSING THE RUNNING MATE...............................................57CHAPTER SEVEN THE MANIFESTO.........................................................71CHAPTER EIGHT STRATEGY..............................................................79CHAPTER NINE THE IEA EVENTS.........................................................93CHAPTER TEN CAMPAIGNING.............................................................107CHAPTER ELEVEN LOSING ROUND ONE.....................................................127CHAPTER TWELVE LOSING ROUND TWO.....................................................137CHAPTER THIRTEEN LOSING TAIN IN ACCRA...............................................147CHAPTER FOURTEEN THE SMALL PARTIES..................................................151CHAPTER FIFTEEN THE AFTERMATH OF DEFEAT.............................................159CHAPTER SIXTEEN WHY AND HOW THE NPP LOST............................................161CHAPTER SEVENTEEN THE WAY FORWARD...................................................169
Chapter One
THE STATE OF THE NATION
"Ask not what your country can do for you-ask what you can do for your country"
Former US President John F. Kennedy in his 1961 Inaugural Address
As the nation prepared to vote in 2008, there were a number of factors that pointed to trouble on the horizon despite the undoubted success of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government in the administration of the country.
The NPP government had compiled a very enviable record that should have ensured the re-election of any incumbent government.
In the first place, the size of the economy had quadrupled from about 4 to 16 billion USD from 2001 to 2007 while inflation and interest rates declined.
Secondly, extreme poverty had dropped from 39.2% to 28.9%. This clearly showed that the changes in the economy had benefited significant numbers of poor people.
Thirdly, we had introduced the National Health Insurance Scheme that had, according to NHIS officials, given 11.7 million Ghanaians access to health for the first time since the Nkrumah's era. To add to this, the President had secured funding from the British government to support free maternal care for the next decade.
Fourth, new investments in education had increased enrollment at all levels of our educational system. Primary School enrollment, spurred by the Capitation Grant and School Feeding Program had increased by a third. Furthermore, enrollment in Public Universities had doubled while that in the Polytechnics had gone up by half.
Fifth, the NPP Government had undertaken a level of infrastructural constructions that had given us a superb network of roads. Many roads, like the Bole-Bamboi, Madina-Mamfe and the Mallam-Kasoa roads had been completed and many others were under construction.
Lastly, giant strides had been made in our freedom. The "CRIMINAL LIBEL LAW" had been repealed and many agreed that freedom had never had a more reliable friend than the NPP government.
Despite these formidable achievements, there were dark clouds on the horizon.
First, the government had come into office pledging "zero-tolerance" for corruption and in the judgment of many, had failed to deliver. Despite dealing promptly with the Mallam Issah case and passing some anti-corruption laws, many felt that the vim had gone out of the NPP government's anti-corruption crusade.
Second, many of our Ministers and functionaries had become too big for their breeches. Too many lived ostentatiously or dealt with people in a manner they did not appreciate. Perhaps, the group that in the public's mind exemplified this attitude the most were the District, Municipal and Metropolitan Chief Executives.
Third, despite the economic progress, we had not been able to create enough jobs and many were complaining that there was "no money in our pockets".
Fourth, despite the significant increase in the strength of the police, there was a perception that the crime rate had gone up.
Fifth, in 2007, the NPP had held a Presidential primary that had offended the sensibilities of many in its display of opulence. Then in 2008, we topped this off with a Parliamentary primary that was acrimonious and led to significant divisions in our party.
Sixth, there was a global economic downturn that was making all incumbents unpopular. This downturn had led to significant increases in the prices of fuel and food that had led to demonstrations in many developing nations, including Egypt, Haiti and Zambia.
Seventh, there was the natural itch for change that had worked for the NPP in 2000 but was working against us in 2008. After eight years, people wanted change.
Eighth, there were policies, initiated or not stopped in 2008 that tended to reinforce the perception that the NPP government was arrogant and uncaring. Amongst these were the failure to reduce the price of petrol significantly, the agreement to purchase presidential jets and the construction of the Jubilee House.
Ninth, the President and the party insisted on the resignation of about eight Senior Minister who were contesting for the party's nomination for the Presidency, depriving the government of some of the best talents in the party. To compound this, the President sacked the National Security Co-ordinator, Mr Francis Poku.
Within the ranks of the NDC, there appeared to be a determination to hold on to what they had.
As usual, there were a lot of voters who did not identify with either party and their votes were going to be crucial in determining the winners of both the Parliamentary and Presidential elections.
Even though the NDC had picked Professor John Evans Atta Mills in 2006, it appeared that he had been rather quiet since his nomination. Apparently, he had spent most of the time after his nomination building bridges to Central and Western Regions and ironing out the kinks in his campaign team.
One factor that played to the advantage of the NDC Candidate was the perception that he had been around the block enough times and deserved it this time. Ironically, the rumours about Prof. Mill's health got him more sympathy.
In retrospect, the signs of impending danger were clearly there if we cared to notice.
Petty traders in Accra and Kumasi were up in arms about being moved from their places of business without adequate plans for alternative places to hawk their wares.
Drivers were up in arms about harassment by the police and could not get relief till it was too late.
And within the NPP, foot-soldiers were complaining to all who cared to listen about their neglect by party and government functionaries.
During the heat of the campaign, we found a public that gave us some credit for what we had done but blamed us for what we had failed to do.
As former U.S. President Bill Clinton used to say "elections are always about the future". The public were going to judge us on what we would do in future, not what we had done in the past. Ironically, our mistakes, which were more recent, counted more with the public than the NDC/PNDC mistakes in the past. As a friend who described himself as an independent reminded me "Doc, we voted for your party in 2000 because of these same NDC mistakes and we are not going to vote for you again on the basis of the same mistakes."
Chapter Two
THE STATE OF THE PARTY
"Your party is in the air but not on the ground" Anonymous
Heading into 2008, the NPP was a pale shadow of the much-vaunted machine that had won the 2000 election. This had occurred gradually and was due to a number of factors.
WEAKENING THE PARTY
Many of the leaders who had led the party to victory chose to move into government. The most glaring examples of these were the National Chairman, Hon. Odoi Sykes, who resigned to be the Ambassador to Canada and the General Secretary, Dan Botwe, who resigned to be Minister of Information in 2005. With these resignations came a shifting of the centre of gravity from the party to the government.
During the first term of President Kufuor's administration, there were repeated complaints by party members that they were being neglected. This neglect involved party members who were by-passed for appointments or contracts and those who felt that power had created a chasm between them and their leaders. These feelings were exacerbated by the feeling that quite a number of people who had not toiled for the party were now in prominent positions. During the first term, many accepted the Presidency's explanation that the party would be the focus of the second term and that they would be taken care of. These feelings of alienation accounted for the rejection of the President's candidate for National Chairman, Stephen Ntim and the election of Peter Mac Manu et al as protest candidates.
When these protest candidates were elected, it portended a rocky relationship between the party and the Presidency. Unfortunately, the protest candidates who became executives were unable to redress the frustrations which had gotten them elected in the first place. In effect, the party voted against the President's candidates but was unable to wean itself off dependence on the Presidency.
In quite a number of regions, the teams that had helped us win in 2000 and 2004 were replaced with less competent teams. One very telling example of this was the Central Region where the new team never seemed to click the way the old one did. Most people in the party agree that in retrospect, the team led by Dr Kweku Ghartey was more effective that the one led by Danquah Smith, which replaced it in 2005. Another such place was in Ashanti where the new team led by Yaw Amankwaah never attained the prestige of the previous team led by Antoh.
One significant by-product of the election was that the NPP was saddled with a Chairman and General Secretary who, in addition to lacking the experience of their predecessors, could not work together. Indeed, for all the time that they have served together, the Chairman and the General Secretary have never had a consistent and professional working relationship. Repeated mediation efforts have been unsuccessful.
It was against this background that the Presidential Primary was waged. The primary brought issues of money and personality differences into the ranks of executives who were already divided. Some contend that these divisions were created in the first place by Presidential aspirants jockeying for early advantage by supporting candidates for constituency, regional and national office. As money flowed from candidates to party functionaries based on who supported who, the party became more divided and interested in money.
Party executives stopped building the party and took to trooping to Accra for contracts or hand-outs from big party men.
In many regions and constituencies, the 2005 elections and its aftermath led to deep-seated divisions between executives that left the party paralysed. For example, in the Volta Region, the factions were so entrenched that all the repeated efforts to reconcile them were unsuccessful.
As one Reverend Minister kept reminding me "Doc, your party is in the air but not on the ground."
This point was brought home dramatically when in June, 2008, at a meeting in Koforidua, the Campaign asked the National Chairman to request an audit of polling station executives. Though called an "audit", this was really supposed to be an inventory which would have indicated to the campaign the state of our grass-roots. It would have indicated which polling station executives were in place, which ones had died or moved away and which ones were active. Those in place and active were to be the back-bone of the party's grass-roots effort. Surprisingly, the National Chairman was unable to complete this audit before the elections. As he explained to me recently, the constituency officers just ignored his repeated requests for the information.
CAMPAIGN RESOURCES
On top of this, after what appeared to be a very expensive Parliamentary primary, many of the Parliamentary candidates did not have sufficient resources to begin campaigning on their own. Thus they stayed at home for critical months when they should have been pounding the pavement and knocking on doors to win support. In some instances, when the National campaign finally made resources available, candidates chose to pay off debts incurred during the primary or buy personal items. This bred suspicion and led to accusations and counteraccusations amongst party leaders and Parliamentary candidates. This situation was compounded by diminished volunteerism in the party. People wanted to be paid for everything they did for the party and there was simply not enough money to do that. I recall being visited by a lady party activist in Accra who complained that she and her friends wanted to help but were not getting the necessary resources to do so. I asked her to bring me a proposal for house-to-house campaigning by the four friends that would cover two polling stations. They had a budget of 10 thousand Ghana cedis for the two-day exercise! To be fair, many did not do these things to deliberately cause defeat. They believed in their hearts that the party would win and that since others were making money, they would do so too.
KUFUOR AND ALAN
The last piece of this saga was supplied by the President's decision to back Alan instead of stay neutral. Before her death, Hawa Yakubu had dramatically turned to the President at a party event and pleaded with him not to take sides in the Primary but the President had ignored that advice.
I remember meeting Dr Richard Anane, a close confidant of the President in the middle of 2007 at a funeral. I had worked with him during my NUGS Presidency and had a very good relationship with him. He said that politics in our party would always be reducible to a struggle between the Busia and Danquah factions. He felt that even though we were back together, the divisions that had cost Victor Owusu the elections of 1979 were still there. He felt that in the forthcoming primary, that struggle between the two factions was at play with Alan and Nana Addo representing the Busia and Danquah factions respectively.
When I asked him what he thought the President had learned from Ntim's defeat he said the President had learned that "he did not back Ntim enough and that if he wanted to go in and support a candidate, he should do so more decisively to ensure success". He said in the President's judgement, which he shared, Alan would make the best President amongst our crop of candidates and that the women would vote for him because of his looks. He said that in his view, a person who had never been in government could never be President. He also said that in his view, the President had never received sufficient credit for his stewardship. He revealed, for example that when the President decided to take the country to HIPC, virtually everybody in the cabinet, including the Finance Minister was against it. "Yet after he hadasked for alternatives and they could provide none, he did it because he knew it was the right thing to do". Another such Kufuor loyalist is Maxwell Jumah, AKA, Kofi Ghana, who once introduced President Kufuor in New York by declaring that "I worship the ground Kufuor walks on". Despite the talk of the Danquah and Busia factions, the divisions are not as firm as they appear. According to Nana Addo, it was Danquah who handed the leadership of the party to Busia upon realizing that he had been tarnished by Nkrumah's propaganda to a point that made him ineffective. Also, despite talk of divisions, Victor Owusu had passed on to Nana Addo, his law chambers.
Chapter Three
THE NPP PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY PRIMARRIES
"So dad, how did the election go?" My son, Kwamina Kennedy, the day after the primary
The NPP Presidential Primary has been described by many as too long, too extravagant and with too many candidates. They were right on all three counts.
INITIAL CAMPAIGN TEAM
I started considering a run for the slot in early 2005. My team and I felt that given the frustrations with Ministers, a new face could do very well. Furthermore, we surmised that even if I did not get very far, my ideas would get far and I would establish a foot-hold for the future.
It appeared to us that the most likely support bases would be the youth, Central and Western Regions and the party in the Diaspora.
I had groups of supporters in Toronto, Atlanta, Washington D.C. and London. We organized fund-raising events in all these places that were very well attended. I attended all the events except for the one in London. Also, we launched a website to publicise my ideas and our campaign manifesto. This web-site was very ably set up and ran by Dr and Mrs Akwasi and Akosua Boateng, of Little Rock, Arkansas. They put in incredible hours in support of the campaign and were just wonderful. The groups included quite a number of people in the Diaspora. Amongst the sewere Patrick Akenteng, Bellinia Asiedu-Young, Chris Yeboah and Isaac Asiedu of Toronto, Gus Mensah, Kojo Acquaah Harrison, Siaw, AKA Afro and Steve Biko of London, Sam Adofo and George Mensah of Atlanta, as well as Okyere Bona and Stephen Ofori-Appiah of Charlotte and Washington D.C. respectively.
In November of 2005, we organized an event at the University of Cape Coast to in effect, test the waters.
Right after this, we toured the Central region and were very encouraged by the response. Many were very happy to see "one of our own" in the race and pledged support. In fact, being from the Central Region was considered such an asset that quite a few other candidates started claiming links to the region, some of which were rather tenuous. Soon, we began touring the regions. I too played up my ties to other regions. I told audiences that though I hailed from the Central Region, I had been born in the Volta Region, educated in Ashanti and Greater Accra and had ties to Brong Ahafo Region by marriage. Wherever we visited, party members talked of their frustrations with "the establishment" and talked about how it was going to be "a new face".
(Continues...)
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