Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence

Published by MIT Press (1998), Cambridge [MA], 1998

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Seller: Expatriate Bookshop of Denmark/John Jackson Books, Svendborg, DenmarkExpatriate Bookshop of Denmark/John Jackson Books

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Hardcover

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orig.cloth Minor rubbing. VG., dustwrapper. 23x15cm, xix,496 pp Contents: Motives for Monetary Expansion under Perfect Information; The Employment Motive for Monetary Expansion; The Revenue Motive for Monetary Expansion; The Mercantilistic or Balance-of-Payments Motive for Monetary Expansion; Comparison of Policy Outcomes under a System of Adjustable Pegs with Outcomes under a Commonly Managed Currency System & Its Consequences for European Monetary Unification; The Financial Stability Motive, Interest Rate Smoothing, & the Theory of Optimal Seigniorage; Asymmetic Information & Changing Objectives under Discretion; Overview of Models of Monetary Policy with Private Information; The Employment Motive in the Presence of a Minimal Information Advantage about Objectives; An Extended Information Advantage about Central Bank Objectives; Alternative Notions of Credibility & Reputation; The Politically Optimal Level of Ambiguity; Velocity Shocks, Politics, Signalling, Inflation Persistence, & Accomodation: Private Information About Money Demand & Credibility; Partial Disclosure of Policy & Its Effect on Policy Outcomes; Why Does Inflation Persist? Theories of Monetary Accomodation & of Inflation Cyclixality under Discretion; Signaling & Private Information about the Ability to Commit & about Objectives with Time-Invariant Types; Political Parties & Monetary Policy; Central Bank Independence & Policy Outcomes: Theory & Evidence: Aspects of Central Bank Independence & their Impact on Policy Outcomes & the Distribution of Inflation; The Measurement of Central Bank Independence. Minor rubbing. VG., dustwrapper. …

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Bibliographic details

Title
Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence
Author
Cukierman, Alex
Publisher
MIT Press (1998), Cambridge [MA]
Publication year
1998
Dust jacket
Dust Jacket Included
Binding
Hardcover
Edition
4th printing.

Expatriate Bookshop of Denmark/John Jackson Books

Svendborg, Denmark

5-star seller

AbeBooks seller since December 6, 1998

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