This new annual review from Cato analyzes the 2001/2002 Supreme Court Term, specifically looking at the most important and far reaching cases of the year.
CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2001-2002
CATO INSTITUTE
Copyright © 2002 Cato Institute
All right reserved.ISBN: 978-1-930865-35-8Contents
ForewordRestoring Constitutional Government Roger Pilon.....................................................................................................viiIntroduction James L. Swanson.......................................................................................................................1Property RightsThe Ebbs and Flows in Takings Law: Reflections on the Lake Tahoe Case Richard A. Epstein............................................................5FederalismWhen State Dignity Trumps Individual Rights Robert A. Levy..........................................................................................31The First AmendmentRegistering Publius: The Supreme Court and the Right to Anonymity Jonathan Turley...................................................................57Judicial Elections and the First Amendment: Freeing Political Speech James L. Swanson...............................................................85Cyberspace Cases Force Court to Reexamine Basic Assumptions of Obscenity and Child Pornography Jurisprudence Robert Corn-Revere.....................115EducationSchool Choice: Sunshine Replaces the Cloud Clint Bolick..............................................................................................149Criminal LawAn Eerie Efficiency Timothy Lynch...................................................................................................................171Redefining a "Crime" as a Sentencing Factor to Circumvent the Right to Jury Trial: Harris v. United States Stephen P. Halbrook.......................187The Drug WarTenants, Students, and Drugs: A Comment on the War on the Rule of Law Roger Pilon...................................................................227Coming UpOctober Term 2002 Erik S. Jaffe.....................................................................................................................253Contributors.........................................................................................................................................263
Chapter One
The Ebbs and Flows in Takings Law: Reflections on the Lake Tahoe Case Richard A. Epstein
Introduction: A Change in the Winds of Fortune
For the Framers of our Constitution, the principles of good government started with the protection of private property-that guardian of all other rights. The instinct behind their judgment is easy to grasp just by imagining how the world would look if governments could consistently disregard property rights. State bureaucrats could confiscate land at will, not just for public works, but to line their own pockets. Government officials could harvest with impunity crops planted by ordinary citizens, and systematically disrupt all private efforts at long-term planning. It takes little ingenuity to see the moral bankruptcy and economic ruination inherent in any regime devoid of property rights. Nor, ironically, would any of today's preferred freedoms be worth the paper they were written on. How could people pray if they could not keep government officials from snatching away their houses of worship? How could they criticize the government if not allowed to own printing presses and broadcast studios?
Fortunately, none of that has come to pass. One reason for our political stability is found in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment: "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." By and large, that clause has been sensibly (not ideally, but sensibly) interpreted to block government from seizing and occupying property-the greatest peril to individual freedom-without compensating the owner. Regrettably, the public use requirement has been watered down, in the name of urban renewal or land reform, to allow takings for private benefit. But in all cases of occupation, the courts have adhered to a well-nigh per se rule that requires compensation whenever government occupies land, including some tiny fraction of a larger holding.
Cases of seizure and occupation are only half the story, however. Government officials (like private individuals) are often tempted to seek the indirect path when the direct route is blocked. If outright occupation of the land requires payment of compensation, why not leave the owner in possession of the land but strip him of his rights to use and dispose of it? Then some particular end, such as urban growth control or the elimination of potential competition, can be advanced without triggering the compensation requirement. To keep matters in perspective, such restrictions on land-use do not pose dangers equal to those arising from unlimited direct occupation. But they are not small potatoes either. In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the seminal zoning case, the Supreme Court sustained an ordinance that reduced the value of the land almost 75 percent. (The ordinance required that a 68-acre plot slated for an automotive plant be devoted exclusively to single-family housing.) The power of regulation becomes still more dangerous when, as is the case with landmark preservation and wetland programs, administrative officials are given broad discretion to designate which lands will or will not be subject to an ordinance.
Given their pervasive use and powerful consequences, such regulations have become the focal point of intense judicial controversy. Over the past 15 years, the Supreme Court has grappled with multiple forms of land-use regulation. But its treatment of the issues has at best been halting and incomplete, even if owners have come out on top for the most part. It is no surprise that these decisions often reflect the now familiar right-left split on the Court, with the five conservative justices (Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) arrayed against the four liberals (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). But as is equally apparent, that coalition of five contains a subcoalition, with Justices Kennedy and O'Connor precariously positioned midway between the three conservatives and the four liberals.
In the 2000 term, the five-justice coalition held as Justice Kennedy wrote Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, one of the Court's stronger and more coherent decisions dealing with property rights. Palazzolo's central holding was that the state could not immunize itself from takings challenges simply by passing a statute and then claiming that individuals who acquire property thereafter are barred from challenging it because they took title "with notice" that the statute was on the books. The Court's "per se" rule-the phrase quickly becomes a term of art-held that the subsequent owner is entitled to raise the same challenges the previous owner could raise. In Palazzolo, the subsequent owner was the sole shareholder of a corporation that had been involuntarily liquidated. If he were automatically bound by the new regulation, then it would have been just a matter of time before all owners were so bound: over time, after all, corporations are liquidated; partnerships dissolved; land transferred, by sale, lease or foreclosure, divorce or death. For the time being, Palazzolo put an end to the incipient uncertainty in land titles.
Yet the mood of the Court proved most unstable as the pendulum swung sharply in the opposite direction this past term in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. The case involved a series of temporary land-use ordinances that prohibited new construction on land near Lake Tahoe. Succeeding moratoria were imposed by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA)-a specialized agency created by California and Nevada-to buy time to develop a comprehensive plan to regulate new construction in the Tahoe basin to preserve the water quality of Lake Tahoe. All of the plaintiffs in Tahoe were landowners of undeveloped plots of land located on the edge of the Lake Tahoe basin. Starting in the early 1980s, they have fought a protracted but largely unsuccessful battle with TRPA to build homes on their lands. Of the 700 or so ordinary people who started on this journey, 55 have since died and many others have dropped out of the struggle-their land still unused-from sheer emotional and financial exhaustion. No litigation against government is ever easy. In this case, ordinary citizens, often of limited means, tried in vain to run the gauntlet of TPRA's multiple moratoria and procedural hurdles, which were introduced in the 1970s and have been refined and elaborated over the years.
The legal struggle that reached the Supreme Court centered on two key ordinances that in the early '80s imposed a combined 32-month delay on new construction on key sites, mainly those with the steepest slopes. When TRPA finally produced a plan in 1984, California sought and obtained an injunction against its implementation on the ground that it was insufficiently protective of Lake Tahoe. If the injunction period were taken into account, the moratoria in question lasted some six years. Yet even after that, construction still had to run a formidable gauntlet of permitting requirements.
These post-1980 moratoria were spurred on by consequences of the previous boom period of new construction in the Tahoe basin. As mentioned previously, TRPA's prime justification for refusing to permit development related to the preservation of the once pristine Lake Tahoe. Owing to its high altitude and location, the lake was "oligotropic" in its natural state-it lacked nutrients to support the growth of plant life. In consequence, it enjoyed a matchless, cobalt blue clarity, long celebrated by Mark Twain and by citizens who lived and worked in the region. With development, however, Lake Tahoe had undergone a process of "eutrophication"-plant life was flourishing in the lake, undermining its clarity.
That eutrophication stemmed from a substantial increase in the level of nutrients in the lake as a result of the construction in the surrounding basin. As natural soil gives way to asphalt and concrete, land in the basin becomes progressively less able to absorb water. The increased runoff sweeps along soil and the nutrients found in soil. These nutrients in turn allow plant life to flourish within the lake, reducing its overall clarity. In response, TRPA divided the land surrounding the lake into seven stream environment zones. The amount of impervious surface allowed in each zone related to the amount of anticipated runoff, such that the least new construction was allowed in those areas designated as most fragile. The restrictions on new construction were intended to prevent an acceleration of the earlier cycle of eutrophication, which everyone rightly regarded as a legitimate social purpose.
The new provisions applied both to owners who had already built up their sites and to those whose land was undeveloped. The impact in the two cases was quite different, however. Owners of existing structures were often barred from building additions, docks, driveways, and the like. Owners of undeveloped lands typically could not build anything at all. The record contains no evidence of measures introduced by TRPA to require modifying existing structures, which appeared to have been grandfathered, in line with common practice. As implemented, the building moratoria and the permit system that followed it have at most prevented an increase in the rate of runoff; they have done nothing to reduce any runoff attributable to prior construction. The onus of preventing further eutrophication of Lake Tahoe has thus been cast on those landowners who did not have the need, foresight, or luck to build on their properties before TRPA's adoption of its restrictive rules.
Clearly, Tahoe involves some form of regulatory taking, given that those owners were allowed to retain possession of land that they could not develop. As so often happens in such cases, however, the exact takings question raised is itself the source of some disagreement. In accepting the case for review, the Supreme Court phrased the question as follows: "Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a temporary moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution."
Justice Stevens evaluated that question with reference solely to the two ordinances, not the subsequent injunction of the 1984 plan. So limited, the Court did not consider the cumulative effect of the various delays. Nor, as it construed the question, was it permissible to ask whether some circumstances might excuse the payment of compensation. Instead, it opted to decide only whether a per se rule made all total but temporary restrictions on land-use development compensable. So framed, the six-member majority answered that question in the negative, backing off earlier Supreme Court decisions, such Palazzolo and Suitum v. Lake Tahoe, which involved earlier disputes over building near Lake Tahoe.
In so deciding, the Court unleashed the factional political forces that strong property rights are meant to curtail. With Justice Stevens's blessing, an endless set of legal and planning maneuvers allowed the lucky earlier builders on the edge of Lake Tahoe to exclude or delay the latecomers the like use of their properties. The incumbent residents, as political insiders, used the rolling moratoria to gain the benefit of lower land densities. They parlayed their political power to cast the bulk of the costs of environmental protection not on themselves, who were responsible for the lake's deterioration, but on the latecomers, who bore no responsibility for the deterioration. Tahoe represents a dubious morality tale in which the insiders win and the outsiders lose. This is not really a case about property rights. Rather, one group of owners with political power has taken advantage of a second group of owners with less power. Clout counts.
An outcome that misguided does not arise by chance. Here, the causes are both motivational and intellectual. The Court simply does not see why protecting private property against regulation serves an important social function. Because it sees little if any real downside to regulation, it consciously refuses to articulate any consistent approach to takings problems, ranging from the simple occupation of an isolated plot to the complex regulation of many plots. To show the dire consequences of that attitude, and the confusions in current takings law, this essay first explores the relationship between cases of occupation and cases of regulation, comparing two key Supreme Court precedents, Armstrong v. United States and Penn Central v. New York. Against that conceptual framework, the essay then critiques Justice Stevens's opinion in Tahoe. Finally, we address in preliminary form the larger question of the implications of Justice Stevens's ad hoc approach for the rule of law.
The Conceptual Framework
Armstrong and Clear Principles
Some sense of how the Takings Clause should work can be gained by working backward from Justice Black's oft-quoted statement of purpose in Armstrong v. United States: "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
The statement rings true in the context of that case. Armstrong was a Maine subcontractor who had a right to attach a lien for work and materials on boats manufactured by the Rice Shipbuilding Company for the United States Navy. Before all of the boats were completed, Rice defaulted on its government contract. In response, the Navy removed the boats from Maine, which made Armstrong's lien worthless. He had a huge loss, and the taxpayers of the United States gained a windfall of equal magnitude. Overall, however, the gains and losses do not cancel each other out. If the Navy's ploy had worked, then in the long run everyone would suffer from the resulting instability in contracting practices.
That tale of (large) public gain and (larger) private loss links up with the language of the Takings Clause in rigorous fashion. Here is how. The first two questions in any takings case are (1) Was private property taken?, and (2) Was any compensation provided in return? In Armstrong, the lien was taken, but nothing was provided in exchange. In the simplest condemnation case, an isolated parcel of land is taken outright from one party and used by the government. Again, something has been taken, but in the absence of cash payment, nothing has been provided in return. Matters can become somewhat more complex, of course. The government need not take all of one's property. It can take only part, which it does when it takes a life estate, uses business property for a term of years, takes an easement to walk over someone's land, or, most critically, takes a covenant that restricts an owner's right to use or develop his property.
In some cases, the government targets not a single parcel but tracts of land with several different ownerships. The increase in the scope of the government's efforts, however, does not turn a taking into something else. The government's actions are strictly additive. If restrictive covenants are imposed on 100 landowners, then the government has taken property from 100 landowners, each of whom is entitled to compensation. But with comprehensive regulation, the inquiry becomes more complex, for it is necessary to ask whether the restrictions imposed on one landowner count as the compensation to all others-just as when a private developer imposes voluntary and reciprocal restrictions on all plots within a subdivision. If so, then loss and gain may well come back into balance if all of the owners are left better off by the government's scheme than they were before. But there is no guarantee that that will happen. Equality in the form of regulation does not guarantee equality in its impact. Even if the restrictions in question have a formal equality across users, they could, in practice or by design, benefit people on one side of the railroad tracks at the expense of those on the other.
Just that happened in Tahoe: a uniform set of restrictions caused far greater hardship to people who had not built than to people who had. Takings on net do not have to be $100 taken and zero returned, of course. They can be $90 taken and $10 returned, leaving an uncompensated balance of $80. In some cases, moreover, the regulations may be diffuse in their impact so that it is hard to measure who has gained and who has lost. Such is true, for example, with a technical change in the recordation statutes, when it is better to let the matter slide than to try to figure out which millions of people should pay or receive some trivial amounts of money. But at Lake Tahoe the stakes were very high, and the disproportionate impact was the unmistakable sign of a large-scale taking with tiny compensation in exchange.
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