Alternative Initial Public Offering Models: The Law and Economics of Shell Company Listings in German Capital Markets. This item is unavailable.Alternative Initial Public Offering Models: The Law and Economics of Shell Company Listings in German Capital Markets

The continuous search for improved methods of public equity financing has resulted in the derivation of alternative models for listing companies on stock exchanges through so-called shell companies. Since such an entity has no operations of its own, its sole purpose is to find an operating company it can ultimately be merged with through the use of proceeds acquired from the initial shell listing. Axel Moeller seeks to answer the questions pertaining to the practical implementation of such alternative listing models in Germany from a law and economics perspective. In light of the fact that a legal framework with regard to shell listings does not exist, the underlying legal analysis is based on the accumulation of general principles derived from German business and capital markets law. From an economic and financial perspective, the ensuing analysis demonstrates the potential efficiency gains of a shell listing for small and medium-sized German enterprises.

Born Windhoek (Namibia); studies in law and economics at the University of Cape Town, Bucerius Law School and WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management; research and teaching associate at the Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg; 2013-15 research associate at Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative and International Private Law; currently Max Planck Fellow, Faculty of Law, University of Oxford.