Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy

Justin Kelly, Mike Brennan

ISBN 10: 1608880559 / ISBN 13: 9781608880553

Published by Nimble Books, 2010

About this Item

Seller Inventory # LU-9781608880553

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy
• Publisher: Nimble Books
• Publication Date: 2010
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1608880559
• ISBN 13: 9781608880553
• Binding: Paperback
• Condition: New
• Dimensions: 15.24W x 0.71H x 22.86D centimeters 15.24 centimeters width by 0.71 centimeters height by 22.86 centimeters depth

About this title

Synopsis

The publication of the 1982 version of Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, introduced to the English-speaking world the idea of an operational level of war which encompassed the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations. It was followed 3 years later by the introduction of the term "operational art" which was, in practice, the skillful management of the operational level of war. This conception of an identifiably separate level of war that defined the jurisdiction of the profession of arms was, for a number of historical and cultural reasons, attractive to U.S. practitioners and plausible to its English-speaking allies. As a result, it and its associated doctrine spread rapidly around the world.

This monograph argues that the idea of an operational level of war charged with the planning and conduct of campaigns misconceives the relationship between wars, campaigns, and operations, and is both historically mistaken and wrong in theory. Brigadier Justin Kelly (Australian Army Retired) and Dr. Michael Brennan conclude that its incorporation into U.S. doctrine has had the regrettable impact of separating the conduct of campaigns from the conduct of wars and consequently marginalized the role of politics in the direction of war. In essence, they argue that the idea of the campaign has come to overwhelm that of strategy.

This monograph argues that as warfare continues to diffuse across definitional and conceptual boundaries and as the close orchestration of all of the instruments of national power becomes even more important, the current conception of campaigns and operations becomes crippling. To cope with these demands by formulating and prosecuting "national campaigns," the authors propose that the responsibility for campaign design should "actually" return to the political-strategic leadership of nations supported by the entirety of the state bureaucracy. This would mark the return of the campaign to its historical sources. If the United States and its allies fail to make this change, they risk continuing to have a "way of battle" rather than a "way of war."